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This study is a critical review of the impact that United States democracy 
assistance programs, implemented between 1992 and 1997, had on Zambia's 
transition to democracy. The study assesses the Zambian government's ability to 
create a more open, accountable, and transparent political system with stable 
political institutions and a vibrant civil society. Analyzing the complex processes 
associated with consolidating democratic gains while undertaking fundamental 
economic reforms in the context of globalization is the main focus of the study. 
The study also seeks to understand the relationship between foreign democracy 
assistance programs and the support for neo-liberal economic reforms by donor 
countries. 
The findings suggest that United States democracy assistance programs 
were constructed on several faulty assumptions and most components of its five- 
year assistance programs either failed outright or were later proven to be 
unsustainable. The democracy assistance programs failed in part because of the 
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Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) government's betrayal of its original 
mission, the maintenance of a one-party state authoritarian presidential system, 
and because of the severe economic crises associated with the unpopular structural 
adjustment program. The dramatic reduction in state involvement in the 
economy, the rapid implementation of the IMF/World Bank inspired structural 
adjustment programs, coupled with the failure to create an enabling environment 
for a market economy, and the lack of a national development plan, collectively 
undermined citizens' confidence in the government and the political institutions. 
It also led to more authoritarian responses by the Zambian government to address 
legitimate criticisms made by opposition political parties and civil society 
organizations. The government's intransigent behavior on several key national 
issues gave rise to sharp political tension and led some to seek extralegal means 
of replacing it. The country, once seen by Western governments as a model of 
democratic change in Africa, Remains at a dangerous crossroads and will continue 
to be there until the pro-democratic movement is reconstituted and begins to build 
new units of power and mobilize Zambian citizens in their own interest. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: THE ISSUES AND THE DEBATE 
Introduction 
The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between United 
States foreign policy and the impact that it has had during the post-Cold War era 
on the democratization process in Africa. Specifically, the study seeks to discover 
the extent to which U. S. democracy-assistance programs in Zambia, either 
promoted recognition of and respect for human rights and democracy, or 
undermined the achievement of that objective. We are especially concerned with 
United States' democracy-assistance activities that may have impacted or affected 
conditions which either favored or inhibited the formal and substantive 
democratization process in Zambia. 
Democratization in Africa 
Since the mid-1980s, African countries have moved from authoritarianism 
of various kinds toward democratic politics. One-party rule and military 
dictatorships have been under assault from popular movements for multi-party 
democracy and human rights across the continent. In country after country, in 
North, East, West, Central and Southern Africa, the cry for popular political 
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participation and people-centered development has rung out, and as Claude Ake 
argued, the long struggle for democracy seems to finally be showing results.1 It 
was also in the late 1980s and early 1990s when Western calls for good governance 
began to ring out loudly, "as a result of capitalist revolutions in Eastern Europe 
and the winding down of the cold war."2 The question of democracy began to 
appear more and more, especially following the publication of the World Bank's 
report entitled Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Development, which 
linked sustainable development and good governance.3 
The call for democracy by Western government was, as Victoria Brittain 
pointed out, ironic, given that some of the worst governed dictatorships, such as 
Zaire, Kenya and Morocco, had been the West closest allies in Africa for two 
decades.4 Brittain further states, "The term good governance came fairly quickly 
to mean respect for human rights and multi-party democracy, and on the 
bandwagon of these causes, which few cared to dispute, some of the most 
discredited opposition politicians of the post-war era got a second lease on life in 
countries as varied as Angola, Ghana, Tanzania and Uganda."5 
Claude Ake goes further when assessing the North's attitude toward 
democracy in Africa: 
For Africa, the concern of northern countries in promoting even this crude 
version of democracy is some progress. Through decades of involvement in 
Africa, the North's attitude had been that democracy is not for Africa. That 
attitude was an important component of the ideology of colonialization, which 
held that Africans were unfit to govern themselves, that they needed the 
civilization of colonial tutelage as their one hope of eventually achieving self- 
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determination and development. Even in the era of political independence in 
Africa, the North remained indifferent to issues of democracy on the continent, 
alienated by the nationalist onslaught on its presumptions and concerned that 
self-government, which Africans had so "hastily" demanded, would fail. 
Northern governments were happy to cooperate with the newly independent 
African governments in a "partnership in development"; they gave indulgent 
support to authoritarian African regimes in order to maintain influence and 
to protect their interests. This support was all too easily given because the 
authoritarian tendencies of the post-colonial era only confirmed the North's 
prejudices against the political maturity of Africa. In their quest for allies in 
the cold war, the great powers ignored consideration of human rights in Africa 
and sought clients whenever they could. All this crystallized opinion against 
democracy in Africa.6 
Yet today, the crisis of human rights and democracy seems to be more apparent 
than ever before on the African continent as a deep economic and social crisis is 
producing political upheavals that threaten to produce the rise of new and 
repressive elites in the continent's leadership, and further marginalization of 
Africa in the concerns of the West. 
At first glance, it appears that the new African democratic opening and 
calls for a "second independence," are similar to what Abraham Lowenthal and 
his colleagues have observed regarding the Latin American situation, i. e., the 
"democracy opening has been uneven and fragile, and summarizing it in the 
aggregate may obscure as much as it reveals. Elected regimes are not necessarily 
democratic, for instance, much depends on the extent and the conditions of 
popular participation and on the protection of basic civil rights."7 In fact, 
according to a number of observers, a cursory review of many of the recent 
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developments on the African continent suggests that elections may not necessarily 
be the only, or even the best measure of democratization.8 
The Democratization Process in Zambia 
The resumption of multi-party politics in Zambia in 1991 was hailed as a 
watershed development for democratization on the African continent.9 The 
peaceful transition from four-time president and independence hero, Dr. Kenneth 
Kaunda, to trade unionist leader of the popular Movement for Multi-party 
Democracy (MMD), Frederick Chiluba, was certified by such notable international 
personalities as former United States President Jimmy Carter, and international 
monitors ranging from the Organization of African Unity, to the Commonwealth 
States.10 
In academic and popular literature, scholars also cited the developments 
in Zambia as the beginning of democratic development in Africa similar to the 
changes that had just taken place in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. 
In Zambia itself, "Saddam Hussain Way" was symbolically changed to "Los 
Angeles Boulevard." Some observers even referred to Zambia as a "model of 
democracy" and economic reform worthy of being emulated all across the 
continent.11 While a few critics warned against confusing multi-partyism with 
democratization, most praised the social movement that unseated Kaunda after 
twenty-seven years. It was assumed by those involved in the Zambian pro¬ 
democracy movement, and by some of those observing the developments, that a 
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change in government and leadership would bring about democracy, 
development and protection from human rights violations.12 
However, by May 1996, some four and one-half years after the dramatic 
change in leadership, and after many months of privately expressing 
diplomatically displeasure with the unfolding governance direction being taken 
by the MMD government, the United States State Department issued a very 
strongly-worded statement announcing its review of all U. S. bilateral assistance 
programs to Zambia.13 The United States was followed by other bilateral donor 
countries, including Zambia's largest donor, the British government.14 In June of 
that year, the United States-based National Democratic Institute (NDI) 
discontinued its democratic programs designed to assist with political 
development15 This was followed in July 1996 by another United States statement 
which announced the cutting of $2.5 million in aid, specifically in areas of 
governance and democracy assistance.16 
The Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD) government ignored the 
donors' concerns relative to good governance issues, implemented controversial 
constitutional reforms, and on November 18,1996, held the second multi-party 
elections (since the end of one-party rule in 1991). The MMD won 131 of 150 
parliamentary seats, and its leader, Frederick Chiluba, won over 68 percent of the 
popular vote for the presidency. The Kenneth Kaunda-led United National 
Independence Party (UNIP), the main opposition party, and seven other political 
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parties under the banner of the "Opposition Alliance," boycotted the elections, 
citing widespread fraud, an inadequate voter roll put together by "a foreign firm 
known for rigging elections," and open media bias, among other reasons for its 
decision.17 
As a result of the 1991 elections and the subsequent change in government 
economic policy from centralized government control to an accelerated neoliberal 
macroeconomic reform program designed to move the country towards a market 
economy, Zambia received close to $1 billion annually in foreign assistance from 
the Western donor countries. That aid amounted to close to 70 percent of the 
country's gross domestic product. However, the 1996 elections and campaign 
results and even the pre-election period to them were so controversial that most 
donors' interpretation of the Zambian democratic process was that it was 
"backsliding" and therefore should be seen as anything but a heralded model 
worthy of support, or emulation.18 In fact, a number of the major donors either 
froze balance of payment support or promised to reduce or eliminate their 
bilateral aid programs, principally because of the adoption by the MMD- 
dominated parliament of unpopular constitutional reforms, some of which had the 
effect of eliminating all the major opposition leadership from competing in the 
November elections. 
Although the results of the November 1996 elections did suggest that the 
MMD had a strong national following and probably could have won in an open 
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contest with UNIP, the 1996 electoral campaign season provided for a number of 
questionable activities, initiated by the government, that seriously impacted upon 
the possibility of a "free and fair" election being held. The list of actions includes 
the above-mentioned constitutional reforms that eliminated most major opposition 
candidates, the declaration of Zambia being a Christian nation; sponsoring 
electoral reforms which led to the establishment of a new electoral commission 
only three weeks before the elections; restrictions on the freedom of assembly and 
association through the existence of a "public order act" that negatively impacted 
on political parties' ability to get their message out to the public; biased press 
coverage including the refusal of paid advertisements; political repression of 
selected opposition political leaders and other electoral reforms that prevent the 
identity of presidential candidates from being challenged until 14 days after the 
election.19 The latter change was important because the opposition claimed that 
Fredrick Chiluba was not the real name of the president, and further that he was 
bom in what is now the Democratic Republic of the Congo and therefore not a 
Zambian. 
Other serious concerns existed, such as a "blurred" distinction between the 
ruling party and the state, with regard to use of state resources for campaigning 
and the open and blatant expansion of the paramilitary police with MMD party 
members and loyalists and the inability of numerous political parties to gain 
access to the final voters' list.20 In addition, a number of other allegations, if 
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proved, would have suggested that the elections were anything but free or fair. 
These allegations include the issuing of duplicate national registration cards to 
some voters and the systematic omission of thousands of other eligible voters from 
the voters' rolls in areas known to be sympathetic to opposition candidates.21 
The immediate post-election conduct of the ruling party was also 
characterized by repressive activities against civil society organizations. A 
number of the organizations had released statements maintaining that the 
elections were neither free nor fair, and did not meet with internationally accepted 
standards. The subsequent detention, arrest and harassment of selected 
nongovernmental organization leaders, the raiding of offices, and freezing of bank 
accounts, were characteristic of the repressive practices engaged in by the MMD 
government through the state security apparatus that had once been used against 
them.22 A number of opposition political party leaders were also harassed and 
threatened with arrest, deportation, or being charged with treason, which carries 
a death sentence in Zambia. This was closely followed by the Chiluba cabinet's 
being dissolved, and the president's issuing a statement that he would be running 
the country with the assistance of the military and civil servants. The president's 
statement raised fears among the opposition of a palace coup having occurred. To 
many observers, the attempt to either destroy the sector of civil society 
representing the views of the pro-democracy movement, or silence dissent by a 
few prominent and outspoken critics, did not seem to reflect the fact that only 
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days earlier the MMD government had won a landslide electoral victory. The 
antagonistic relationship between political adversaries would eventually lead to 
the attempted assassination of Kenneth Kaunda and Roger Chungway, the head 
of the Opposition Alliance, and several months later, in October 1997, to an 
attempted military coup and mass arrest of opposition leaders on charges of 
treason, and the assassination of Kaunda's son in October 1999. 
On the face of it, one wonders what went wrong with the Zambian 
democratic process, once so proudly supported by tire donor countries. Why 
would the United States' first cuts in aid be in the area of democracy assistance? 
If the United States' action was designed to show the government of Zambia that 
it was serious about its concerns with the direction in which it thought Zambia 
was headed, one wonders, did it make sense to make cuts in the area of 
democracy-assistance programs, especially in programs whose objectives were 
conceived to sustain the democratic processes? Thus, these developments beg the 
question of not only strategy, but also effectiveness, of United States' democracy- 
assistance programs in Zambia. Marina Ottaway has asked, "... do foreign 
funded democratization programs make a difference in the transformation of 
African political systems?"23 To date, that question has not been answered as there 
is no scholarly assessment of United States' democracy-assistance programs in 
African countries generally, and none of the USAID's five-year democratic 
governance programs in Zambia in particular, which was one of the first large- 
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scale United States democracy and governance projects in Africa.24 Moreover, few 
assessments exist that examine contemporary transitional societies' attempt to 
place such assistance in the context of any country's attempts to make a transition 
to Western style liberal democracy, and its perceived linkage with capitalist 
development-away from the one-party state and socialist-inspired statist 
economic policies. 
Because of the absence of any in-depth critical analysis of the impact of 
United States foreign policy toward Africa during the 1990s,25 one cannot even be 
certain that the adoption of any set of prescribed neoliberal democratic recipes will 
give way to respect for human rights and democracy, good governance, an end to 
corruption and bring about the election of committed and competent leadership. 
In addition, as democratization programs funded by the United States have 
increased since the middle 1980s, tremendous changes have also taken place 
throughout the international community. Thus, while the United States has 
invested more than $1 billion in democracy-assistance programs on the African 
continent between 1986 and 1996,26 perhaps the best assessment to date can only 
conclude that U. S. democratization programs appear to be only modestly 
correlated to the success of elections, and have little or no bearing on the crisis of 
expectations exhibited by citizens, whose screeching calls for multi-party 
democracy initially led to the new democratic opening. 
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Statement of the Research Objective 
This investigation reviews several of the problem areas that emerged in 
Zambia's Third Republic as challenges to, and constraints on, the democratization 
process, and the role the United States' democracy-assistance efforts played in 
each of those areas. Specifically, throughout the study, the researcher attempts to 
answer five key research questions: 
1. What has motivated the recent United States interest in promoting 
democracy in Zambia? 
2. What were the prevailing concepts, main instruments and strategies 
that the United States employed in providing its democracy 
assistance to Zambia? 
3. What have been the focal points of United States' democracy 
assistance to Zambia? 
4. What was the impact and effects of United States' democracy- 
assistance programs on the Zambian political process? 
5. To what extent has there been United States policy incompatibility 
in the area of economic liberalization and political liberalization, 
and how has this affected the Zambian democratization process? 
Further, the inquiry concentrates on a specific period when United States' efforts 
to promote democracy in Africa have been particularly notable, i. e., the 
immediate post-Cold War period, 1992-1997. 
The case study on Zambia has been selected because the popular struggles 
that compelled the Kaunda government to reintroduce the multi-party political 
process, envisioned a society where basic needs would be met and citizen 
involvement in the decision-making process would be more open. In fact, for the 
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thousands of ordinary Zambians who, in some cases, risked their livelihoods and 
were ready to sacrifice their lives to bring about multi-party democracy in the 
country, multi-partyism was frequently equated with popular demands for food, 
shelter, and work, as well as a more equitable national integration, based on 
unhindered political freedoms and social justice.27 By analyzing United States' 
democracy-assistance policy in the context of the still-unfolding Zambian 
democratization process, one is better situated to make informed comments 
regarding the actual policy options selected. That is so for a number of reasons. 
The "Zambian Democratic Governance Project," according to the United States 
Agency for International Development, was fashioned to be a five-year $15 million 
activity designed to promote accountable government. The project had five key 
components, including constitutional reform, civic education, media 
independence, legislative performance, and policy coordination. In addition, the 
project supported a political party development program. Collectively, this made 
the Zambian democracy-assistance program one of the United States' earliest, 
largest, and most comprehensive democracy-assistance programs in the African 
region.28 
The inquiry also considers conceptual issues, such as the relationship 
between the state and civil society, democracy and development, constitutional 
reform, and the rule of law. This is necessary because, as Ibbo Mandaza argues, 
essential to the comprehension of the African scene is a methodology that 
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highlights the nature of the posteolonial state and dass structure that it inherited.29 
Therefore, the study also looks dosely at current MMD government's political and 
economic reforms under way in the country and makes an assessment of their 
impact on the enjoyment, or lack thereof, of democratic rights by Zambians, and 
on the democratization process itself. 
Assumptions 
Two assumptions inform the researcher's thinking in approaching this 
study. First, foreign policy generally can be characterized as the expression of a 
state's objectives in the international arena. In that arena, the foreign policy aim 
of the United States has been, espedally since World War II, the achievement of 
political, security and economic goals. The methods of obtaining desired goals 
have been diverse, ranging from economic penetration and covert subversive 
activity, to open military aggression and the overthrow of legitimate governments. 
Second, United States' policy toward Africa, while reflecting, for the most 
part, during the Cold War an anticommunist stance, has nevertheless been 
primarily geared to the interest of the transnational corporations and their effort 
to gain and maintain effective control over raw materials, resources, and cheap 
labor supplies. An objective of the transnationals, especially in the age of 
globalization, is the establishment of areas of profitable capital investment, with 
guarantees against expropriation as a result of revolutionary change, or even 
democratic reforms. Therefore, the foreign policy of the United States in the post- 
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Cold War period reflects this understanding through its expressed concern for 
stability, support for the implementation of structural adjustment programs, and 
the development of market economies. These two assumptions are not intended 
to suggest that other factors or perspectives, such as multilateralism do not have 
importance in the decision-making process. This is discussed more thoroughly in 
Chapter IV which describes democracy assistance in United States' foreign policy 
in the post-Cold War era. 
Theoretical Framework 
Theoretical approaches in international relations vary depending on 
specific schools of thoughts, including realism, feminism, pluralism, and 
globalism.30 Many of these theoretical approaches to analysis of international 
reality have been developed during the Cold War period of confrontation between 
the United States and the Soviet Union. During that period, Western political 
science tended to disregard the use of several concepts, and developed alternative 
analytical tools. One example of this phenomenon is the substitution of the 
political system as the main unit of analysis in political science, as opposed to the 
state. Paul Viotti and Mark Kauppi have argued that images have provided the 
basis for the development of theoretical works that attempt to explain various 
aspects of international relations, and that the image that one has of international 
relations is of critical importance because each image contains certain assumptions 
about world politics, whether or not explicitly recognized by the researcher, 
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concerning critical actors, issues, and processes.31 It is important to point out 
several main tenets of the realists and pluralist schools of thought, given that they 
have so dominated the discourse, and because this study does not utilize those 
images of international relations. 
According to Viotti and Kauppi, there are several critical assumptions that 
underlie the realist and pluralist schools of thought. For example, they argue that 
realism is based on four key assumptions. First, states are the principal or most 
important actors. Therefore, for the realist, states represent the key unit of 
analysis. Second, the state is viewed as a unitary actor, and third the state is 
essentially a rational actor. The authors argue that for the realist, a rational foreign 
policy decision-making process would include a statement of objectives, 
considerations of all feasible alternatives in terms of existing capabilities available 
to the state, the relative likelihood of attaining these objectives by the various 
alternatives under consideration, and the benefits or costs associated with each 
alternative. Fourth, realists assume that within the hierarchy of international 
issues, national security tops the list. Military and related political issues 
dominate world politics. Power, therefore, is a key concept. To the realist, 
military security or strategic issues are sometimes referred to as high politics, 
whereas economic and social issues are viewed as less important or low politics.32 
First, with respect to the pluralist school, nonstate actors are important 
entities in international relations that cannot be ignored. International 
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organizations, for example, can be independent actors in their own right. The 
organization's decision makers, bureaucrats, and other associated groups have 
considerable influence in areas such as agenda-setting-determining what issues 
are most important politically. 
Second, the state is not a unitary actor. Pluralists believe that to see the 
state as a unitary actor is an abstraction that masks the essence of politics that is 
found principally within the state. Third, pluralists challenge the utility of the 
realist's assumption of the state as rational actor, i. e., the pursuit of individual 
value-maximizing strategies at the organization's level can lead to collective 
disaster at the national-state level. Moreover, the decision-making process is 
typically one of coalition and countercoalition building, bargaining, and 
compromising that may not yield a best or optimal decision. Fourth, for the 
pluralist, the agenda of international politics is extensive. The pluralist rejects the 
notion that the agenda of international politics is dominated primarily by military- 
security issues. Foreign affairs agendas have expanded and diversified over 
recent decades, such that economic and social issues are often at the forefront of 
foreign policy debates.33 
The current upheaval in theoretical approaches to the study of international 
relations has been brought on because of the fundamental changes occurring so 
rapidly across the international community. No doubt these changes are bound 
to give rise to newer approaches of analysis. In the meantime, however, theory 
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is essential for an understanding of phenomena, for thinking about their 
interrelatedness, for guiding research, and for recommending sound policy action. 
This study seeks to investigate one aspect of the complex processes of the 
international system. An interdisciplinary approach that could encompass many 
different activities (where some of the boundary lines may not be clearly 
discernible) is essential to help carry out the research in an orderly and fruitful 
manner. Therefore, the image of international relations used in this inquiry is 
globalism, and the theoretical framework for analysis from which the researcher 
approaches the study is African political economy. The globalist perspective here 
is understood to be the global context within which states and other entities, such 
as transnational actors and international organizations, interact. This perspective 
also helps one to understand how these and other factors act as mechanisms of 
domination, by which some states, classes, or elites manage to benefit from the 
international system, at the expense of others as seen in historical perspective.34 
A special concern of this perspective for the inquiry, grounded in an 
appreciation of African political economy, has to do with how it relates to the 
undertaking of studies which are able to place "significant development at the 
political level firmly in relation to an analysis of the development of production 
and the principal contradictions embedded in the social relations of production."35 
Hence, a key unit of analysis throughout the study is the state because of its 
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central role in the complexities of the African struggle for democracy and development. 
In conjunction with the globalist perspective, the researcher uses the 
relative class power model of democratization developed by Dietrich 
Rueschemeyer, Evelyn Huber Stephens and John D. Stephens, in their work, 
Capitalist Development and Democracy. In this work, the authors identify three 
clusters within society, of which the first is considered to be of paramount 
importance. The clusters are: (1) the balance of class power, (2) the power and 
autonomy of the state apparatus and its articulation with civil society, and (3) the 
transnational structures of power. All three interact with each other in complex 
ways. In all three clusters the authors insists on the historical, sequential character 
of the required analysis.36 This is of critical importance, first, because "many 
structures and constellations persist and are influential beyond the historical 
configuration of their origin. Previous state structures and regime forms shape 
later political developments; the original shape of class organization and related 
social and political constructions of class interests are powerful determinants of 
later forms of class-based collective action . . . ."37 
Also, their model places the state central to the debate on democratization. 
They assert, "If the struggle for democracy is a struggle about power, we cannot 
confine our attention to the structure of power in civil society and the economy. 
Any modern state is on its own a significant part of the overall landscape of 
power. The state apparatus is furthermore of special relevance because it is 
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always a major actor in that field in which democratic rule must prove itself as 
effective and real-the power to shape authoritative decisions, binding for all."38 
Finally, the authors suggest that the state is vitally important when analyses 
are being undertaken of the democratization process of countries in the global 
South. 
The colonial state represents a special case because it typically had greater 
autonomy from the indigenous society than virtually any other state. This is 
of great importance for the 'new nations' of the Third World, since state 
structures and their articulation with civil society often persist once firmly set. 
True, decolonization often constituted a radical break, and one certainly 
cannot count on simple continuities—the colonial inheritance: in state-society 
relationship in new nations. But the transformations of decolonization and 
their impact on state autonomy take a different form depending on the level 
of economic development, the density of civil society, and the relative strength 
of different social classes.39 
The nature of the state in Africa is a very critical factor, which explains why it is 
possible and so easy for governments and mainstream economic activities to be 
conducted despite the consent of the governed, i. e., why the state is not effectively 
accountable to citizens even after colonialism has formally ended. 
Throughout this assessment, the concept of social classes is used in part 
because, as Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens point out, the concept has been 
an extremely powerful explanatory tool in the classic analysis of social science 
during the last two hundred years. However, the three authors also warn against 
defining social class interests in a mechanical manner. They say, when referring 
to the relationship between class interests and collective, "The interests actually 
pursued by landowners and peasants, industrial entrepreneur and urban middle 
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classes are historically articulated and cannot be deduced from their objective class 
situation."40 
The concept of social class is also important to the present study primarily 
because, as Issa Shivji and others have pointed out, civil society is often projected 
as if it were homogenous, while the class, character, and the class project of social 
movements are ignored most of the time as being irrelevant, or part of an 
outmoded approach.41 Hence, the concept is not used to ignore other cleavages 
or forms of inequality related to race, ethnicity, or gender. In fact, the concept as 
used in this study seeks to reflect or incorporate these realities as suggested by 
Mahmood Mamdani in his work, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the 
Legacy of Colonialism. Moreover, although Zambia is culturally and ethnically 
diverse, under Kaunda the country was able to avoid the type of interethnic or 
religious strife found in other parts of Africa. Nevertheless, the four largest 
groups are generally geographically dispersed in a manner that has important 
political significance in the political process. The largest groups are the Bemba, 
who are located in the Northern, Luapula and Copperbelt provinces in the north 
and have provided much of the labor force for the copper mines; the Lozi, who are 
the majority m the Western province, which was once administered as a separate 
protectorate by the British colonial government; the Tongas in Southern Province, 
the agricultural center of the country; and the Nyanja speakers who are located in 
Eastern, Central, and Lusaka provinces. 
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Statement of the Major Hypothesis Being Tested 
A critical discussion of United States' policy toward Africa historically has 
been characterized by extremes. At once critics, such as Bernard Magubane, 
Nzongola-Ntalaja and others,42 have argued that the policy has been geared 
toward plunder and exploitation guided by geopolitical and strategic advantage 
over European and now Japanese competitors. They have suggested that the 
modem policy, that which does exist, is built on a foundation of past 
anticommunism, influenced by the trivialization of Africa in general United States' 
policy formulation.43 At the other end of the spectrum, observers supportive of the 
neoliberal policy approach to African development suggest the United States has 
been providing needed development assistance to struggling democracies in a 
severely underdeveloped area of the world where European historical links have 
to be appreciated. What is needed, they argue, is macroeconomic adjustments, a 
new focus on trade as opposed to foreign assistance, and the almost total removal 
of the overly centralized state from the economy in order for the process of 
sustainable development to "take off."44 
The researcher's hypothesis, influenced by Issa Shivji, Claude Ake, Adedeji 
Adebayo, and Tom Carothers, among others, is that United States' foreign policy 
objectives of political and economic liberalization, which are based on the idea 
that democracy and market economies are mutually reinforcing, are running at 
cross purposes, i. e., lack complementarity, in Zambia and sufficient attention is 
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not given to this point, because the programs are not designed or implemented on 
the basis of any significant analysis and accounting for the political effects of the 
economic liberalization assistance. Similarly, as Carothers asserts, neither are the 
democracy-assistance programs designed or implemented with much 
consideration of their possible economic effects.45 
United States' democracy-assistance programs are based on several 
assumptions which may be suspect in their applicability to the Zambian political 
context. For example, it is assumed that economic reforms that reduce the state's 
role in the economy will tend to reduce the state's means of exerting political 
control over citizens, and especially over the local business class and foreign 
capital. It is further assumed that by establishing private property, reducing the 
leverage of the state over the lives of individuals, and raising the overall 
socioeconomic level of the population, the transition to a market economy can 
strengthen democratization.46 Thus, because of the inevitable clash of policy 
approaches, what may for some be well intended United States democratic 
assistance programs aimed at supporting the transition to democracy, as presently 
constituted, cannot possibly accomplish their stated aims or overall objectives. 
Therefore, an alternative explanation must be sought to decipher the logic of 
United States' democracy-assistance programs. 
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Data and Methodology 
Between 1994 and 1996 the researcher conducted nearly one hundred 
interviews with senior representatives of literally every political party and major 
Zambian nongovernmental organization involved in the country's political 
process. In addition, the researcher was a country representative for the National 
Democratic Institute in Zambia, carrying out a political party program in 1994 and 
1995, and as such, the researcher had the opportunity to meet with, in a formal 
and informal capacity, United States' officials, representatives of the Zambian 
government the Zambian business community, Zambian intellectuals, civil society 
leaders and members of the donor community. Therefore, a participant observer 
methodology informs the research and much of the data presented in the study is 
informed by firsthand knowledge. The participant-observer method of inquiry 
is well established in the social sciences and is particularly well-suited for the type 
of field research undertaken here. In fact, Creswell has argued that one of the 
advantages of this approach is that "the researcher can record information as it 
occurs."47 
The interview technique was employed as a source of background 
information on United States' Zambia policy and the impact of the policy 
implementation on the democratization process. The inquiry also benefits from 
the review of original documents of the Zambian pro-democracy movement, 
political party manifestos, and reports by United States-based nongovernmental 
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organizations promoting democracy and human resource developmental Zambia, 
and from the researcher's practical experience working on several United States- 
funded democratic assistance programs in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, Latin 
America, and the Caribbean. 
Throughout the study, use is made of a number of serial publications, 
including numerous Zambian periodicals. In addition, extensive use is made of 
scholarly articles, relevant book-length works, and selected human rights 
documents. Besides the implicit policy analysis obtained through the posing and 
answering of the questions outlined above, several other often overlooked 
indicators will be given needed attention. For example, the question of who the 
decision makers and implementors were, and what processes informed the 
decision makers is considered. How goals and objectives were formulated and 
what the nature of the structures was that made it possible to operationalize the 
agreed upon objectives are evaluated. The analysis also includes an examination 
of existing empirical data, such as statistical data on unemployment, poverty, debt 
and other social and economic indices. However, because the study is descriptive 
in format it is an explicit qualitative inquiry that allows specific conclusions to be 
derived in a deductive manner. 
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Scope and Limitations of the Study 
To evaluate the impact of a state's foreign policy on the democratization 
process in a given country is a rather broad undertaking, especially here since the 
United States was not the only or the major provider of democratic assistance to 
the Republic of Zambia and the behavior of the MMD government has to be 
considered in each instance. In other words, the correlation between and 
identification of specific causal factors will be arrived at through a rigorous 
qualitative narrative that considered essential quantitative data. 
The need for inquiry into such a complex problem as a process, and from 
a comprehensive perspective, demands a rather rigorous approach. Hence, this 
study does not pretend to try to outline all of the causes and effects, contributions, 
failures, or successes of United States' democracy-assistance programs in Zambia. 
Moreover, the researcher's attempt here is to utilize the most relevant conception 
and development of the democratization idea as it relates to the African peoples' 
historical struggle for human rights and democracy. Towards that end, the 
researcher's effort to perform a critical analysis of United States' democracy- 
assistance programs and their relationship to the democratic transition in Zambia 
between 1991 and 1997, naturally means that in order to understand the whole, its 
component parts must be thoroughly understood as well, including the role of the 
MMD government. 
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A second related issue with respect to scope and limitations of this study 
has to be addressed as well. Is it possible for one to make value neutral 
judgements about social process, about society, or about the kind of public order 
that would provide common people with the possibility of developing to their 
fullest potential or those phenomena that would deny the same, by way of brutal 
repression or systematic exploitation and oppression? The researcher believes it 
is not possible. The insight one draws from observation and inquiry suggests a 
certain degree of obligation and responsibility. 
Moreover, the ideal of a detached investigator is false and misleading. All 
researchers bring certain values and beliefs with them to their work, whether 
consciously understood or not This researcher has stated possible biases openly 
and believes they are in line with views of the majority of Africa's 
population-whose unrelenting exploitation and underdevelopment inform their 
outlook. 
Importance of the Study 
The importance of this study has to do with the changed post-Cold War 
international situation and the lack of critical evaluation of United States' 
democracy-assistance programs in Africa. As the researcher sees it, because the 
promotion of democracy has become one of the formal core policy objectives of 
United States' foreign policy in the post-Cold War period, and because the United 
States has at least temporarily regained its post-World War II status as the single 
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superpower in the world, its activities on the world's poorest continent need to be 
seriously reviewed. 
As pointed out by Issa Shivji, Guy Martin, Tom Carothers and others, there 
is an almost complete lack of in-depth field-oriented studies of United States' 
democracy-assistance activities generally, and especially those activities on the 
African continent.48 Therefore, the inquiry is intended to be a meaningful 
contribution to the literature that may assist scholars, policy makers, and pro¬ 
democracy activists is gaining a better understanding of the complex and ever- 
changing democratization process in Africa. In short, the question of what the 
implication for the continent might be if United States' policy remains the same 
in the coming period will be an additional perspective to consider. Moreover, for 
the African peoples, this study is important in the sense that it may add to the 
growing body of opinion that suggests a second and more real independence is 
the order of the day if Africa is to survive. 
Outline of the Study 
The study is divided into two parts. Part One consists of Chapters I 
through III. Chapter I introduces the study and outlines the research objective and 
approach to the study. Chapter II is a critical review of the issues and the debate 
on democratization in Africa. It considers, in a general manner, the current 
democratic transition underway in Africa with particular reference by key 
concepts found in the scholarly literature on the subject. 
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Chapter III offers a historical perspective on the Zambian democratic 
transition that takes into account the struggle against colonialism, the 
independence period, and offers an overview of the challenges that the Movement 
for Multi-party Democracy faced upon coming to power. The Zambian state's 
historical development and incorporation into the world capitalist system is taken 
into consideration as essential background data. 
In addition, a critical appraisal of the pro-democracy movement in Zambia, 
especially since 1990, is provided. Also, a review of the approach to 
democratization adopted by the social forces leading the call for change is 
addressed. This is done in an attempt to determine if the type of "democratic 
change" articulated by tire pro-democracy forces was what the Movement for 
Multi-party Democracy, adopted as its practical program. In fact, a debate of the 
issue of whether or not the demands articulated by the pro-democracy movement 
will really bring about desired domestic changes is analyzed. 
Part Two of the inquiry consists of Chapters IV through VII. Chapter IV 
reviews United States' foreign policy towards Africa thus far in the post-Cold War 
era. The place of democracy assistance in United States' policy is outlined in 
detail. Additionally, special attention is given to United States' efforts, 
governmental and through nongovernmental organizations, of "promoting 
democracy" in Africa and presents a descriptive outline of the United States' 
interest in Zambia and its democracy-assistance program components and 
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objectives in Zambia, since the signing of the democracy and governance project 
agreement in September 1992, between USAID on behalf of the United States' 
government and the Ministry of Legal Affairs, on behalf of the government of 
Zambia. 
In Chapter V, following Carothers' methodological approach, a detailed 
investigation is undertaken of the main focal points of United States' democracy 
assistance provided as part of its program to aid Zambia in its democratic 
transition between 1992 and 1996. The areas reviewed are Constitutional Reform, 
Legislative Performance, CabinetPolicy Coordination, Media Independence, Civil 
Rights Promotion, Strengthening Political Parties and Economic Liberalization. 
In each instance, a statement of the United States' policy objective and practical 
activity during the period under investigation is made, followed by an assessment 
of the program results and impact of the activity on the Zambian democratization 
process. A critique of the principal assumptions underlying United States' policy 
and practice of democracy assistance in each area is provided, and the perceptions 
of Zambians on the impact of the democracy-assistance programs are examined. 
In Chapter VI an attempt is made to move beyond what the implementors 
of United States' democracy assistance said was accomplished, and critically 
review effects of United States' democracy assistance of Zambia's democratic 
transition through the prism of the November 1996 elections. 
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In Chapter VII the findings of the inquiry are presented in a summary 
fashion and several concluding remarks are offered as lessons learned from the 
Zambian experience that may be particularly relevant to the overall 
democratization process in Africa. The findings also indirectly address whether 
or not the United States knows how to "export" democracy and what kind of 
democracy, to countries of the global South or should it even be in the business of 
exporting democracy of any type, especially given the growing crisis of 
democracy and human rights in the United States.49 
With respect to United States' foreign policy, especially its democracy- 
assistance programs, the findings should suggest the most appropriate ways to 
encourage and offer assistance to the unfolding democratization process on the 
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CHAPTER II 
DEMOCRATIZATION IN AFRICA: 
THE PROBLEM OF DEFINITION AND 
THE DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM 
Introduction 
This chapter critically investigates the debate on democratization in Africa 
and the current change occurring on the continent. It advances the notion that the 
role of the state in the democratization process is clouded by a failure to appreciate 
the manner in which the state was constructed. The dominant perspective within 
the literature is critically reviewed as well as significant contributions by African 
scholars. Additionally, extensive use is made of the seminal work undertaken by 
Thomas Carothers who is perhaps the recognized authority on United States' 
democracy-assistance programs. 
The Debate on Democratization 
The debate on democratization in Africa draws on a number of rich 
political traditions but first it must be carefully situated within the overall 
international debate on democratic development. Throughout the international 
community today, popular movements for democracy are increasing. In Africa, 
Asia, the Middle East, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, the movement 
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for democratic reform has been likened to a "sea change," especially since the end 
of the Cold War with the collapse of communism and the fall of numerous 
autocratic one-party states.1 The waves of popular movements against political 
repression, one-party states, military regimes, autocratic rule, non-mutually 
beneficial economic regimes and human rights violations have continued to wash 
away undemocratic anc anti-democratic systems and usher in new directions in 
the flow of political development. 
Accompanying tnese developments has been the intensification of the 
debate on democratization. With respect to the African component of the 
discourse on democracy, Lloyd Sachikonye, says, 
The current political and economic reforms in most African countries 
stimulated debate on the definition and content of democracy and civil 
society in the African context. . . . The popular demands for political and 
economic change have been influenced by debates on the relationship 
between democracv and development, between state and civil society, and 
on the significance of the role of international forces in contributing to the 
reform process. In turn, the wave of popular struggles for democratization 
has provided a stimulant and context of contemporary debates on the 
prospects, indeed the sustainability, of current political and economic 
reforms.2 
Today, it seems as if the initial euphoria regarding a "global resurgence of 
democracy," has subsided, and given way to more difficult challenges concerned 
with the consolidation and sustainability of the numerous fragile political reforms. 
In fact, with respect to the African continent, this has revealed a more serious and 
complex task of notonlv establishing sustainable democratic political systems but 
overcoming the multilayered legacies of political repression and perverted 
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development associated with the continent's past, especially the last 200 hundred 
years. 
The Issues and the Debate 
There are a number of important questions within the debate and many of 
these questions have been raised and to a degree answered from different 
perspectives. Some of the more salient questions include the following: 
□ Do multiparty elections lead to greater tolerance, expanded 
participation, respect for the rule of law and more public accountability ? 
□ Do foreign-funded democratization programs make a difference, 
positive or negative, in the transformation of African political systems? 
□ What types of conditionalities are necessary to sustain and consolidate 
the democratization process in Africa? 
□ What should be the relationship between democratization and 
development? 
□ Are liberal democracy and structural adjustment programs the most 
suitable approach to achieving democracy and sustainable economic 
development in the African context? 
□ What role does civil society empowerment play in the democratization 
process, and how should the relationship between civil society and the 
African state be understood in theory and practice? 
□ To what extent are pro-democratic movement's conceptualization of 
substantive democratic change limited by factors such as globalization 
and structural constraints confronting African states within the 
international system? 
□ Should the donor community decide what is good for Africa with 
respect to implementing, monitoring, and evaluating democracy, and 
good governance, or even social values and economic development, 
simply because they provide the bulk of the funding? 
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□ Does constitutionalism, as practiced in African transitional regimes, 
actually serve to subvert the rule of law and counterpoise it to the 
democratic yearnings of the popular democratic movements? 
Another of the key issues central to the democratization debate is whether or 
not the high correlation between degrees of democracy and levels of economic 
development in Western democratic societies will be the same in non-Western 
societies, and to what extent does economic liberalization fuel the democratization 
process.3 For example, one may ask whether China, Chile, and Singapore are the 
models to be watched, i. e., countries where obvious authoritarian rule has 
produced exceptionally high rates of growth, or are Russia and South Africa more 
relevant examples, where political liberalization has run ahead of economic 
growth. Those countries would not be seen as emerging markets with 
tremendous growth potential if it were not for the political liberalization which 
has taken place.4 
As pointed out in Chapter I, numerous African leaders and critics of United 
States democracy assistance to Africa have suggested that economic development 
must precede democracy, implicitly rejecting the view that democratization and 
development are mutually supportive, or should be implemented concurrently.5 
In the immediate post-Cold War period, the call for democratic governance 
in Africa by pro-democracy movements has consistently been linked to calls for 
popular participation in the political process, sustainable economic development, 
respect for human rights and the rule of law, gender equity, equitable national 
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integration, peace and reconciliation, social sector rehabilitation, employment 
creation, poverty alleviation and an end to growing marginalization.6 
The "transition to democracy" in many regions, especially during the 
1990's, has intersected with the phenomena of globalization, i. e., "the 
intensification of worldwide social relations that link distant localities in such a 
way that local events are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice 
versa."7 Thus, it is clear that "the nation-state faces a crisis of relevance. What 
remains of its purpose and power if authority over domestic social standards is 
yielded to disinterested market forces. If governments are reduced to bidding for 
the favors of multinational enterprises, what basis will citizens have for 
determining their own destinies?"8 Therefore, it is particularly important that the 
debate on democratization in Africa be carefully situated. 
Globalization and the Contemporary Struggle for Democracy in Africa 
The African continent is one region of the world where the movement 
toward democracy and the call for a second independence has been most evident, 
albeit uneven and contradictory. Although several major violent conflicts, large 
migrations of refugees, the AIDS epidemic, serious ethnic tensions, massive 
impoverishment, environmental degradation and drought continue to plague the 
region, it is significant that between 1990 and 1996 more than thirty countries had 
popular "pro-democracy" movements thatresulted in democratic elections or some 
form of political liberalization.^ The "winds of change" had not blown in such 
41 
powerful gusts since the 1950s and 1960s independence movements. For example, 
in 1999 at least five of the southern African countries held multi-party elections.10 
At the same time, as Adebayo Adedeji has pointed out, 
More than any other region in the world, Africa has... become the hapless 
victim of a massive failure to understand the nature of its problems. Lenses 
crafted by Europeans and Americans to aid in the inspection of European 
and North American phenomena cause distortion when trained on Africa— 
with costs that are not restricted to Africans alone. With the increasing 
realization that not only capital but also disorder can move around the globe, 
even the World Bank is beginning to doubt the wisdom of gazing at Africa 
through European lenses. In a 1989 study, the Bank posed the questions: 
'Does Africa face special structural problems that have not been properly 
understood? Has the institutional dimension been neglected? Have the 
recent reform programs been too narrow or too shallow?'11 
The impact of globalization on the consolidation aspect of democratic 
transitions has not been researched in any great detail, although several scholars 
have reviewed the impact of economic reform on democratization efforts but 
many times the international economic context within which the reform is 
occurring has been neglected.12 Therefore, the question of whether and how the 
establishment of a democratic political system will be consolidated in countries 
where it has recently emerged is also an important aspect of the democratization 
debate. This is especially true for the African continent where over 90 percent of 
the countries have adopted and implemented some form of International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) or World Bank-inspired Structural Adjustment Program.13 
All available evidence clearly demonstrates that it is the urban and rural poor, and 
working class who disproportionately bear the brunt of the macroeconomic 
austerity programs being implemented in numerous African countries. In part 
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because of that reality, the democratization debate in Africa, has been one of the 
most vigorous in the 1990s.14 
Democratic advances in Benin, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, and South 
Africa have been matched and at times overshadowed by democratic setbacks in 
countries such as Angola, Central African Republic, the Gambia, Kenya, Sierra 
Leone and Zambia. Moreover, seemingly intractable political situations in 
Nigeria, Liberia, Egypt, Algeria, The Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo are predicaments that cause great pause when the discussion of democracy 
on the African continent takes place. Collectively, however, these developments 
have produced a struggle to define the type of program, new leadership and new 
body of relevant ideas that would guide the pro-democracy movement. At times, 
some of the same old false conceptions and perceptions of what the democratic 
process is all about continues to frustrate the emergence of clearly understood, 
indigenously generated, ideological views on how democracy might take 
permanent root in African soil. Further, the view that democracy can be imposed 
on African states, by simply insisting that they adopt a multi-party system or else 
forgo aid, still exists even among many pro-democracy advocates and donors. 
The global economy and transnationalization of capital have made the 
world more interdependent, i. e., no nation or people can function as an island 
unto itself and no nation or people can dominate another without consequences 
that reverberate back on itself. Moreover, what is often overlooked by some 
observers is the fact that globalization is challengeable over questions of 
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democracy, social and environmental justice, and racial and gender equality, as 
much as over concerns with commerce, production and technology. Yet, old 
notions of the relations between nations continue to exist, especially when it comes 
to power relations between the global North and countries of the global South. It 
is in this context that liberalization of political and economic structures throughout 
the global South, and especially in the African region has to be understood. 
Perhaps the late renowned Nigerian scnolar, Claude Ake, stated it best 
when he posits in his book, Democracy and Development in Africa, the complexity of 
the African crisis. He says, 
Sub-Saharan Africa is mired in one of tne deepest and most protracted crisis 
of modern history. This crisis has been phenomenally harsh, tragic and 
demoralizing. . . . Not many people view the development of Africa as a 
viable proposition. This is not surprising. The world has been mesmerized 
by the dismal statistics of declining productivity and growth rates, escalating 
indebtedness, and chronic malnutrition, famine and disease. The high 
incidence of political instability and violent conflict in some parts of Africa, 
such as Burundi, Rwanda, Liberia. Somalia, Sudan and Sierra Leone has not 
helped matters.10 
The Dominant Libérai Perspective and Its Critics 
Samuel Huntington, author or The Third Wave,1* is one of the contemporary 
composers of the dominant perspective that informs most democracy studies. 
Huntington has identified five factors which he feels have been most fundamental 
to the global democratizing trend m the last twenty years. These are: 1) legitimacy 
problems in authoritarian systems; 2) rapid economic growth in the 1960s; 3) 
changes in the doctrine and activities of the Catholic church; 4) changes in the 
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policies of the Soviet Union, the United States, and the European community; and 
5) snowballing, or diffusion of transitions from early democracies to later ones.17 
Huntington also contends that modem democracy is an exclusive product 
of Western Europe and its diaspora, with its roots lying in the social pluralism, the 
capitalist class system, the civil society, the acceptance in the rule of law. It is a 
product of European people's experience with representative bodies, the 
separation of spiritual and temporal authority, and the commitment to 
individualism that began to develop in Western Europe a millennium ago.18 
Therefore, according to him, the question of consolidation is best answered by the 
two factors of economic development and the receptivity to democracy of non- 
Western cultures.19 Huntington further argues that "democracy is incompatible 
with total economic equality, which can be achieved only by a coercive 
dictatorship, but it also is incompatible with gross inequalities in wealth and 
income. Economic growth eventually reduces these inequalities and hence 
facilitates the emergence of democracy."20 
Huntington has also expressed elsewhere his belief that a political system 
is democratic to the extent that its most powerful collective decision makers are 
selected through periodic elections, in which candidates freely compete for votes 
and in which virtually all adults are eligible to vote and resolve group conflict by 
diverting it into peaceful channels.21 
According to Huntington, "achievement of that goal is facilitated by the 
dominance of the rule of law and the protection of civil and political rights, 
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including private property rights. Hence, the permanent tension between the 
government's need to govern and its need to be responsive to its citizens is 
moderated through various procedures, institutions and acculturation (elections, 
parties, strong legislatures, etc.). This definition excludes any connection to 
socioeconomic conditions or to any particular outcome of the democratic 
"22 process. 
Whether Huntington is correct or just being narrow and extremely 
Eurocentric in his perspective on what is necessary for democracy to take root and 
grow, his views are typical of the dominant perspective in democracy studies. 
Several other Western scholars such as Rudolph Rummel, Michael Doyle and Jack 
Levy, have asserted that perhaps the most fundamental reason why liberal 
democracy is preferable to any other political system is because democracies do 
not go to war with each other. Therefore, according to their logic, one could 
assume that a world full of democracies would be a peaceful world. To 
substantiate that assertion, those scholars have argued that it is the absence of war 
between democracies that comes as close as anything we have to an empirical law 
in international relations.23 
Many other democracy and regime change scholars, besides Huntington, 
have argued that there are a number of basic prerequisite conditions that must be 
realized for democracy to exist. Their basic argument suggests that the chances 
for democracy are probably greatest in countries that have high levels of economic 
development and low levels of inequality, where ethnic and other cleavages are 
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not severe, where the middle class is large and relatively prosperous, where there 
are autonomous groups and associations, where the political culture values 
compromise and tolerance of others, and where external supporters are 
democratic and generous.24 At the same time, it is not clear whether any of these 
conditions are necessary or sufficient to say that democracy exists in any given 
social context. Moreover, contemporary realities in numerous countries clearly 
show that democracy sometimes prevails when few of these conditions are 
fulfilled, and it sometimes fails in countries where many of the preconditions are 
met. 
The Neo-Liberal Economic Paradigm and Political Democracy in Africa 
The crisis of democracy and human rights in Africa has been described in 
many ways by observers of differing persuasions. However, most critical 
observers almost always return to the central role of the state, especially as it 
relates to governance and development. It is important to clearly outline here the 
dominant perspective and the major prepositions of the view most widely 
accepted as the basis for addressing the African crisis and informing the actual 
practice of democratic development. Therefore, it is necessary to review the 
perspectives of the two leading international financial institutions, the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund, especially their views on good governance 
and economic liberalization which represent the dominant theoretical perspective 
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on the relationship between capitalism and democracy, and economic 
liberalization and political liberalization as currently practiced in Africa.25 
Today because of the transnationalization of capital, tire interconnections 
of politics and economics have become more central toward gaining a proper 
understanding of international relations, generally, and tire continued 
maintenance of the neo-colonial domination of Africa countries, in particular. 
Additionally, one is better positioned to understand and appreciate Africa's 
contemporary role in the unfolding international division of labor, by realistically 
examining the impact of economic and geo-political dependence on state 
structures and on the democratization process in the context of present-day global 
realities. 
Although the African grassroots consensus is that a decade or more of a 
concerted and expansive imposition of neo-liberal economic policy reforms 
supported by the international donor community has failed to bring any respite 
to the more than 90 percent of African countries who have implemented structural 
adjustment programs, the multilateral banks are still enthusiastically promoting 
this model as the best option and most of the time as the only solution to the 
African crisis. The rigid "faith" in such programs, in spite of the recent Asian 
economic crisis, may lead one to conclude that the programs are more about 
maintaining a system of domination and inhibiting democratic development 
rather than promoting it. 
48 
For the World Bank, the African crisis is conceptualized in the following 
manner: 
After independence, most successor regimes generally supported the concept 
of a strong central government which would ensure economic equity to all 
citizens. Without the necessary checks and balances, this resulted in the 
emergence of highly centralized and all powerful patrimonial states 
characterized by the following features: lack of accountability; lack of the rule 
of law; disabling regulatory burden on private sector development; distorted 
resource mobilization and an overly bureaucratic budget management.26 
Thus, from the Bank's perspective, contemporary development efforts are 
threatened by the ineffectiveness of the civil service, especially when the civil 
service is required to play a central role in planning and managing fundamental 
changes in the economy as part of structural adjustment programs and the 
patrimonial distortions affecting the institutional environment, incentives 
framework and the performance of core government functions. From the bank's 
perspective, sustained economic growth can come only through political and 
macroeconomic stability and continued reliance on the private sector and 
outward-oriented strategy.2' 
Some of the spokespersons for the IMF, on the other hand, have argued 
that the widespread problems facing many African countries are well known, 
including political fragility, regional instability, limited administrative and 
infrastructual resources, drought, deteriorating terms of trade, heavy debt 
burdens, and a difficult international economic and financial environment.28 
The IMF also argues that a number of these countries are undertaking 
comprehensive macroeconomic and structural reforms to reduce financial 
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imbalances, structural distortions, and institutional impediments to economic 
progress. Thus, IMF's programs are claimed to be instituted in cooperation with 
"donor governments, nongovernmental organizations, the World Bank, and other 
international organizations," and are designed to cooperate with African 
governments in their efforts to implement adjustment and achieve satisfactory 
economic growth.29 Toward that end, the IMF argues that it provides 
macroeconomic policy advice, technical assistance, and financial support. 
According to a number of the Fund's publications, specifically designed to 
explain its programs in Africa, there are essentially seven key propositions 
underlying its approach to political liberalization or "good governance" and 
economic liberalization in Africa. These are: 
1) Democratic political systems and free market economics are two parts of 
the same process sustaining each other; 
2) Market oriented reforms are one way to achieve the establishment of 
democratic institutions and the best way to assure sustainable 
development; 
3) Liberalization strategy that underpins IMF supported adjustment 
programs does not undermine African countries prospects tor 
industrialization, economic growth, or state sovereignty; 
4) Adjustment policies supported by the IMF in Africa are oriented toward 
free market and the private sector, as opposed to direct government 
controls, because the other approach deflects governmental energies away 
from governing and generates rules and red tape and over time creates 
distortions that lead to inefficiency and corruption; 
5) In principle, elimination of the unsustainable component of the excess of 
total national spending over total national output may be achieved solely 
by curtailing demand without devaluing the nationa currency. 
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Devaluation is desirable, however, when the currency becomes seriously 
overvalued; 
6) Privatization as a policy element in IMF supported adjustment programs 
for African countries that are currently experiencing serious economic 
slowdowns help restore financial discipline in the public sector, thus the 
state must unburden itself of enterprises that drain its resources and 
threaten responsible financial management; and 
7) IMF supported adjustment programs are not responsible for the fiscal 
retrenchments, cutbacks in the delivery of public services and associated 
deprivations in African countries far from causing economic deprivations, 
IMF supported adjustment programs are designed to foster the conditions 
to eliminate them30 
The merits, or lack thereof, of the argument contained within the 
propositions stated collectively, is obviously debatable on the basis of the Zambian 
situation, which as a classic case, is reviewed in Chapter VI. However, what is an 
issue here is not just the substance of the argument but the underlining 
rationalization for the statements, given available data and the realities generally 
known to exist as a result of the implementation of structural adjustment 
programs across the continent of Africa. 
The Problem of Definition 
As one can gather from the foregoing, there are profound disagreements 
among scholars and advocates on the meaning of democracy, especially, with 
regards to theorists who, Robert Rothstein has argued, emphasize procedural and 
institutional elements as opposed to those who emphasize its social aspects and 
egalitarian components.31 
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According to political scientist Guy Martin, who conducted an extensive 
study of English and French literature on democracy in Africa for the United 
Nations, definitions of democracy vary from the extremes of narrow and wide 
interpretations, from institutional change to socio-economic emancipation and the 
development of a democratic culture.32 Martin also suggests that given the fact 
that democratization is a process that presupposes the creation of minimal 
conditions, a narrow definition has generally been adopted by policy makers for 
practical reasons, i. e., "they have to start somewhere"; in international political 
negotiations (where financial aid decisions are linked to political conditionality); 
and by some African leaders in their quest for legitimacy. Therefore, he 
concludes, "democracy can be defined either in behaviorist terms (true 
competition and participation; effective political freedom) or in structural terms 
(political institutions, electoral systems and independent legislature and judiciary 
appropriate to a multiparty system)."33 Martin makes an extremely important 
contribution to the literature by categorizing the mushrooming literature into three 
distinctive groups. Group one is concerned with personal rule and the 
authoritarian syndrome; group two is concerned with major theoretical 
contributions to the study of democracy; and group three is concerned with recent 
studies on the democratic transition and political reform in Africa.34 
In group one, considered to be pioneering works on the changing structure 
of power and the emergence of democracy in Africa, he includes studies such as 
those conducted by Jackson and Roseberg, who suggested a topology of personal 
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rule and Samuel Decalo, who focused on extreme cases of personal dictatorship; 
and Dov Ronen who edited a volume on pluralism and democracy in Africa.33 
The neo-Marxist critique of the one-party state is also seen as part of the 
pioneering works. Chief among these works is that of Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja 
who focused on the struggle for a second independence movement which 
involved the transformation of the inherited structures of the state and the 
economy, in order to make them capable of serving the interest of African workers 
and peasants.36 
In the category of major theoretical contributions, Martin argues that 
Patrick Chabal was among the first scholars to attempt to reassess the aims, 
methods, concepts and theories which Africanists had applied to the study of 
African politics and suggest new approaches to contemporary African political 
theory and practice.37 He also cites the contributions of J. F. Bayart and Richard 
Sklar for their incisiveness and originality. Robert Fatton is also given great praise 
especially for his latter work, wherein he focused on the interrelatedness of 
culture, power, production, exchange and consumption relations in contemporary 
Africa. George Ayittey's work, which argues that black neo-colonialism is to 
blame for Africa's present predicament, and that a second liberation struggle will 
sweep away black kleptocracy and rediscover African traditions, is also cited by 
Martin in this category.38 
In the category of recent studies, Martin suggests that a lively debate on the 
challenges, opportunities, problems and prospects of democracy in Africa has 
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been raging in various academic fora and periodicals, most notably the Journal of 
Democracy, Politique Africanine, and in the CODESRIA Bulletin?9 Martin maintains 
that it is noteworthy that such a debate focuses on improved systems of 
democratic governance and are engaged by Africanists of all ideological stripes 
across the world, notably by many African intellectuals who only yesterday were 
subjected to ruthless repression for daring to criticize dictatorial regimes.40 
Finally, Martin addresses perhaps the most controversial subject of whether or not 
democracy is a purely Western thing or does it have universal application. He 
cites as trail blazing the works of Peter Anyang' Nyong'o, Mahmood Mamdani, 
and Bade Onimode, who all have stressed the universality of democracy and the 
centrality of human rights to the concept of democracy.41 
Political economist, Lloyd Sachikonye, in his edited volume entitled, 
Democracy, Civil Society and the State, says, 
The concept of democracy is a heavily contested one. In spite of its significant 
capacity for mobilization in the political transformations in Africa and 
Eastern Europe in the past seven years, there does not exist consensus on the 
definition of democracy. Arguably, democracy means different things or 
processes to different social interests. However, in the contemporary 
discourse on democracy, the concept has become associated with a political 
system in which multi-partyism exists, periodic free and fair elections based 
on universal suffrage are conducted, and press freedom, human rights and 
rule of the law guaranteed. Governments and politicians are required to 
uphold and abide by the constitution; checks and balances in the exercise of 
power exist, and the independence of the judiciary and the key role of 
parliament in the legislative process. In this discourse, the minimalist 
definition of democracy relates primarily to political pluralism based on 
constitutional arrangements.42 
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Sachikonye also strongly asserts, in apparent agreement with Huntington, 
that many of those attributes of political pluralism have historically been 
associated with Western liberal democracy. He says of the characteristics, "They 
represent an outcome of long, drawn-out social and political struggles over several 
centuries between different social interests but primarily against structures of 
feudalism, aristocratic absolutism and privilege. In the liberal democracy 
discourse, 'contestation open to participation1 is sufficient to identify a political 
system as democratic."43 Sachikonye further argues that the liberal discourse 
suggests that conflicts are regularly terminated under established rules as elections 
fill offices, legislatures establish rules, bureaucracies issues decisions, courts 
adjudicate conflicts and these outcomes are binding until and unless they are 
altered according to rules. According to him, those processes in liberal democracy 
are what guarantees its stability and legitimacy, because rules too can be changed 
according to rules. Finally, when commenting on the contemporary debate on 
democratization, he states, 
Following the collapse of authoritarian socialism in Eastern Europe and of 
one-party state and military regime models in Africa, Asia and Latin 
America, Western liberal democracy has become a major reference point for 
debates on democratic transition in these societies. These debates, are 
however conducted against the background of triumphalism in the West, a 
triumphalism based on the ideological ascendancy of liberal democracy and 
capitalism in the post-Cold War era. One major representative of that 
triumphalist school is Francis Fukuyama who has argued that there is no 
satisfactory alternative to liberal democracy, and asserted that capitalist 
democracy represents the end-point of mankind's ideological evolution and 
the final form of human government. . . . The claims for liberal democracy 
and capitalism have a certain resonance in the post-Cold War context. 
Former socialist societies are eagerly embracing liberal democratic and 
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capitalist structures. The authoritarian regimes in the Third World have few 
options except to genuflect to the same. But how useful is the minimalist and 
constitutionalist definition of democracy; and how valid are the claims for 
liberal democracy and the 'free market' system?44 
Radical theorist Issac Shivji argues that while many variations might exist 
and be articulated by scholars, including by some on the African continent, there 
are really only three identifiable perspectives that actually underlie the current 
debate on democratization in Africa. They are the liberal, the statist and the 
popular perspectives.45 According to Shivji, the liberal perspective, "draws its 
inspiration from western liberalism centered around notions of limited 
government, individual rights, parliamentary and party institutions, the centrality 
of the economic and political entrepreneur of the market place, etc."46 In addition, 
the liberal perspective disagreed with anything that suggests or lends validity to 
collective rights. 
The statist perspective focuses on development as a list of concerns best 
summed up in the rhetoric, "what use is free speech to a starving peasant." It does 
not reject democracy per se, and its present-day African versions even argue that 
development is not possible without democracy; (i. e., it has moved from the 
position state as an instrument of development). He also suggests that the statist 
position often dismisses the true right to self-determination by raising the specter 
of a further balkanized continent that would eventually drop off into tiny pieces.47 
The popular perspective, according to Shivji, remains the most undefined 
of the views. Nevertheless, it 
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opposes both the statist and liberal in their typically top down orientation by 
emphasizing popular struggles and mass movements from below. It 
challenges the universality of liberal values and authoritarianism of the statist 
positions. But in the present debate ... it remains fuzzy and confused 
precisely because of the triumph of the liberal. That which would clearly 
distinguish the popular perspective-position on imperialism, state, class, class 
struggle etc.-remains unsaid by its intellectual proponents for fear of being 
condemned as old fashioned or even demagogic.48 
Shivji argues that the popular perspective also attempts to address one of the most 
critical issues in the debate on democratization in Africa, i. e., the issue of self- 
determination and equitable national integration. Shivji says of the popular 
perspective, "While recognizing the right to self-determination as an important 
democratic principle, agonizes over its contradictory character: the relation or 
interface between national liberation, embodied in the right to self-determination 
.. . and social emancipation projected by popular class struggles."49 
Several other scholars have argued that the liberal model, albeit the 
dominant model, has serious flaws associated with it which can be (and often is) 
but should not be overlooked. For instance, Robert Rothstein, in his article, 
"Democracy in the Third World: Definitional Dilemmas," has argued there are 
flaws in the concept and practice of liberal democracy especially as it related to 
countries of the global South. Rothstein says, 
criticism of the pluralist model of democratic politics must be even more 
strongly stated in reference to the Third World. Vast inequalities in power, 
wealth, and information constitute one set of problems. The power and 
influence of the state and the central bureaucracies are massive, which gives 
them a virtual monopoly in allocating resources and determining policies. 
Moreover, these disparities seem to be growing. An even more fundamental 
obstacle to full-fledged democratization in many Third World countries is the 
attitude of political elites toward opening the political system to meaningful 
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participation and competition. High levels of participation may increase 
legitimacy and efficacy over the long term, but generate demands that cannot 
be met in the short term.50 
Rothstein further contends that, 
Demands for immediate economic betterment from an unsophisticated 
electorate, battered by decades of failed hopes and promises, are an obvious 
threat to any incumbent government that must balance a wide range of 
competing domestic and external interests. . . . Although displacement of 
many authoritarian regimes is sharply increasing the prospects for 
participation, elite support for giving meaningful political influence to 
ordinary citizens often remains forced and reluctant. The resulting contained 
and limited participation is unlikely to stabilize Third World democracies. 
A formal democracy controlled by the rich and powerful differs little from 
past oligarchies... the struggle to control the state is especially virulent when 
resources are scarce, allocations are made in a biased way, and divergent 
groups must compete for a shrinking pie. The political game is zero-sum, 
and the absence of a culture of accommodation and tolerance reinforces the 
dangers associated with unrestrained competition.51 
Claude Ake has argued that even at its best, liberal democracy is inimical to the 
idea of the people having effective decision making power. He suggests, 
The essence of liberal democracy is precisely the abolition of popular power 
and the replacement of popular sovereignty with the rule of law. As it 
evolved, liberal democracy got less democratic as its democratic elements, 
such as the consent of the governed, the accountability of power to the 
governed, and popular participation, came under pressure from political 
elites all over the world as well as from mainstream social science, which 
seemed even more suspicious of democracy than political elites. On the 
pretext of clarifying the meaning of democracy, Western social science has 
constantly redefined it, to the detriment of its democratic values.52 
Llyod Sachikonye has also pointed out that even most ardent advocates of 
liberal democracy have to admit that major social inequalities continue to exist in 
the established democratic societies of the north. He argues that three strands of 
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the critique of liberal democratic philosophy are important. Sachikonye, 
maintains, 
In addition to these inequalities, the question remains unanswered on 
whether there are no other deeper sources of discontent within liberal 
democracy The deep flaws in liberal democracy should not be explained 
away. These flaws relate to the constitiutionalist and material dimensions for 
liberal democracy. In liberal democratic regimes, democratic procedures can 
be manipulated by elites and by the communications media which they 
control and do serve "to pour out a torrent of obfuscation, half-truths and lies. 
In this critique in which liberal democracy is equated with capitalist 
democracy, the latter is viewed as 'oligarchic rule tempered by democratic 
forms/ While this critique does not dismiss the importance of 
constitutionalism or democratic procedures, such structures and measures 
under capitalist democracy are also means of containing pressures from 
below.53 
Sachikonye argues that a second strand of critique goes beyond Fukuyama's 
inadequate acknowledgment of the inequalities inherent in capitalist democracy. 
According to him, the critique argues that democracy requires more than the 
maintenance of formal liberties. In other words, Sachikonye suggests, that 
without substantial reforms and redistribution of economic assets, representative 
institutions -no matter how democratic in form- will simply mirror undemocratic 
power relations of society. True democracy, therefore, requires a change in the 
balance of forces in society.54 Additionally, he suggests that the case for extending 
the definition of democracy beyond its constitutionaist forms is necessary to 
include matters of social and economic content, as well as practical activities. 
Their impact is a persuasive one because the two dimensions, of form and content, 
and should not be separated because they both constitute the substance of 
democracy.55 
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Finally, Sachikonye submits that a third strand of critique of liberal 
democracy relates specifically to the structures and ideology of capitalism. 
According to him, the capitalist system is defined as a system of economic 
organization that demands the existence of a relatively small class of people who 
own and control the main means of industrial, commercial and financial activity 
as well as a major part of the means of communications. These people thereby 
exercise a totally disproportionate amount of influence on politics and society both 
in their own countries and beyond. Yet democracy is based on the denial of such 
preponderance of control and influence which requires a rough equality of 
condition.56 
Capitalist democracy is presented as the political system most supportive 
of economic growth, but this prescription is basically an orthodoxy of hegemonic 
power holders who present it as a matter of natural law, whether economic or 
developmental, rather than as a specific product of historical conditions. The 
economic prescriptions advocated for developing countries have been explicitly 
connected to political liberalization in the form of liberal democratic 
constitutionalism. This version of democracy is the political corollary of economic 
liberalization. Democratization is thus considered the necessary and natural 
product of submission to the rationality of the worldwide market.57 
The options relating to development strategies have dwindled particularly 
where access to finance from the international financial institutions is crucial. 
During the decade of the 1990s, policy reform conditionalities, which are attached 
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to borrowing by developing countries, have locked African countries into the 
international capitalist system much more firmly and dogmatically. 
Structural adjustment programs often entail the liberalization of investment 
and labor conditions, privatization of public enterprises, and significant cut-backs 
on social services such as education and health. Macroeconomic stabilization 
measures supported by the international financial institutions have often resulted 
in steep devaluations of the local currency and inflationary conditions, while 
wholesale trade liberalization has undermined domestic industry. Thus, 
accompanying the transitions to multi-party democracy has been a generalized 
offensive for the liberation of market forces, aimed at the ideological rehabilitation 
of the superiority of private property, legitimation of social inequalities and anti- 
statism of all varieties.58 
In a very ludd article entitled, "What Kind of Democracy in Africa?" Perlita 
Muiruri expounds on several of the aforementioned views. Muiruri begins by 
suggesting that in Africa, in particular, the motivations behind processes of 
democratization and economic liberalism are becoming inextricably linked. 
Muiruri further argues that the resurgent orthodoxy of the international neo¬ 
liberal economic framework has grave implications for the continued 
marginalization of uncompetitive regions such as Africa.59 Muiruri suggests that 
the IMF and World Bank's political policy intervention in Africa is an attempt to 
encourage the development of an appropriate political environment for the 
implementation of liberal macroeconomic policies in African nations and that the 
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implementation of economic liberalization may have unintended effects due to its 
simultaneous applications with democratization.60 Many of Muiruri's contentions 
are supported by other scholars. For instance author Gerd Nonneman in his work, 
Political and Economic Liberalization: Explaining Linkages, points out that the linkages 
between economic liberalization and political liberalization remain under¬ 
researched despite many sweeping assertions by politicians of the positive link 
between them.61 
Additionally, in what is perhaps the best detailed comparative 
investigation of free-market democracy, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber- 
Stephens and John Stephens, in their work, Capitalist Development and Democracy, 
address the process of market led economic development, tire role of the capitalist 
class and the achievement of political democracy. The authors argue, 
It is ironic that not only liberal historians, but also the orthodox Marxist 
accounts of the rise of democracy, see the bourgeoisie as the protagonist of 
democracy. In these views, the bourgeoisie drew strength from the growing 
dominance of the capitalist mode of production and thus was able to 
eliminate progressively feudal and absolutist political forms and finally 
establish democratic rule. This position can be maintained only if the issue 
of universal suffrage is neglected or if democracy is considered inevitably 
'bourgeois democracy-irrelevant or even hostile to working -class interests. 
That was not Marx's own view, who considered the achievement of universal 
suffrage the historical task of the working-class. . . . The chances of 
democracy, then, must be seen as fundamentally shaped by the balance of 
class power. It is the struggle between the dominant and subordinate classes 
over the right to rule that -more than any other factor- puts democracy on the 
historical agenda and decides its prospects. Capitalist development affects 
the chances of democracy, primarily because it transforms the class structure, 
and changes the balance of power between classes.62 
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Besides the growing body of literature, it is important to take note of the 
activities of pro-democracy movement advocates. One must first admit that the 
movement for democracy in Africa is often presented in abstract terms in most 
Western societies. African people are struggling against longstanding tendencies 
and practices of dictatorship or authoritarian "big man" leadership, overly 
bureaucratic one party states and tribalism, which produce the civil wars, 
economic devastation and abject poverty; so goes the typical descriptive 
presentation of tire current socio-political crisis on the African continent. 
Moreover, according to the standard presentation, the pro-democracy movements 
in these countries are engaged in a historical cause attempting to evolve political 
systems modeled after western experiences.63 
Little mention is ever made of the activities of northern imperialist 
countries or their previous relationships to, creation of and support for corrupt 
dictatorships. Such historical blinders may prove to be important aspects of the 
democracy-assistance debate. In addition, much of the literature assumes that 
economic conditionality is an inherently correct manner to assist in the promotion 
of democratic development in Africa. Thereby inferring that political 
development along western lines is what is best for the African continent, and that 
capitalist development is the best and only model for meeting and solving the 
needs of African peoples as no other alternative model is available.64 Thus, no 
critical appreciation of the role of "donor" countries is normally provided, or an 
understanding of their significant role in the development process sought, save for 
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the occasional critical article included in most collections of essays. In other 
words, the relationship between political liberalization and economic 
liberalization is rarely reviewed in any systematic manner. When it is mentioned, 
it is done so in an ideological way that suggests an a priori support making it a 
given that economic liberalism and the institution of a capitalist market are 
necessary for development and democracy to succeed in Africa, as it has done in 
other parts of the international community. 
The openly voiced objective of the often adopted structural adjustments 
programs is to prepare the country to get on the path to sustainable development. 
In fact, some African pro-democracy leaders, who fashion themselves as 
"technocrats," even mistakenly accept the policy prescriptions as a development 
program, which it is not. Further, the debate on democracy in Africa is 
constrained by the view that multipartism is inherently democratic and therefore, 
the one-party state is inherently undemocratic. The one-party state may be 
undemocratic but one should not ipso facto accept it as being such, just on the basis 
that it is supposed to be the opposite of multi-partism. Such an assessment has led 
to multi-party elections being questionably regarded as the most important, and 
often the only and absolute measure of democratic reform in numerous African 
countries.65 The problem here, however, not only in the economic but especially 
in the social and political sphere, is a lack of understanding that, in fact, it has 
been the economic policy of the northern capitalist states over the past decade 
which has most undermined and disempowered the underprivileged sectors of 
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civil society.66 People are asked to participate in popular elections for new 
leadership which may be sincere in its desire to achieve a new level of 
development However the leadership, even when committed, is often unable to 
guarantee sustainable development, or good economic management because the 
economic relationship has not changed in any fundamental manner, but in fact, 
may have been further tightened as macroeconomic adjustments are introduced. 
The crushing debt burden is a case in point. For instance, as Martin Kline has 
argued, 
Africa's debt is not simply an economic problem. It is a political one. If 
African nations were persons living in a capitalist society, they could declare 
bankruptcy. This was done by many American states in the 19th century. It 
is, however, an option that would be available today only at a very high 
price. Instead, African states have been forced to cede control of their 
economies. Most African states are now under Structural Adjustment 
Programs. The essence of these programs is that institutions outside of Africa 
have tight control over the economies and thus over social policy within the 
victim countries. External control of African economies has generally 
involved a program of deindustriialization and recolonization. It has 
involved closing down of industries, firing of civil servants, a general 
shrinking of the economy. . . . Ironically, some of the key people in the 
democracy movement have worked for international organizations like the 
World Bank and are committed to structural adjustment... the irony in much 
that has happened is that democratization is being supported, albeit 
sometimes reluctantly, by some of the very people outside Africa that put 
corrupt dictators in power, supported them, and bailed them out when they 
got into trouble.67 
Moreover, advocates of neo-liberal economic policies locate the causes for the 
underdevelopment of a given country in the state's protectionist policies, which 
may in fact, guard various interest groups involved in "improductive" activities 
such as eliciting rents from the state. According to Muiruri, in this approach to 
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policy analysis, the African state is seen as a rational actor and self-interest actor, 
a distributive agent whose interests are tied to clientelist groups. The logical 
conclusion of this, she suggests, is the view that the state requires to be freed from 
the demands of these interest groups.68 
Claude Ake has suggested that Africa's economic problems are essentially 
rooted in its politics and that the fundamental reorganization of society is 
necessary to bring about real democracy and sustainable development Ake 
argues that a democratic revolution is inevitable because it is the only route of 
escape from the crisis.69 
Many other African scholars believe that the development model being 
imposed on Africa, and accepted by the current leadership has not worked to the 
advantage of citizens as a whole anywhere on the continent In addition, they ask, 
why must African governments agree to follow any one particular development 
model, especially one desired by and for others. The developmental recipes 
"cooked up" in Washington or Paris for Africa have in it ingredients that are not 
even digestible in the north.70 Adebayo Adedeji, the former Undersecretary- 
General and Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa, says, 
For more than three decades, Africa has been required to act as if the answer 
to its socioeconomic problems and the key to its future lay in the pursuit of 
economic growth based on expanded exports of primary commodities. Over 
the last 15 years, however, the structural adjustment programs (SAPs) that 
international lending institutions such as tire World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) have offered to deeply indebted African 
countries on 'swallow-or-starve' terms have made Africa into a continent that 
can be molded at will to fit the needs of the global economy. Far from 
bringing about economic reform, these SAPs have severely eroded the 
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developmental drive that has always been the best hope for stabilizing the 
precarious political structures that succeeded colonialism. Today, there is 
hardly a comer of Africa that is not afflicted by violence and on the verge of 
falling apart.71 
Claude Ake has rightly pointed out that the popular misconception 
regarding the democracy movement in Africa when he said, 
It has been assumed, all too easily that the demand for democratization in 
Africa is a by product of revolutionary changes in Eastern Europe. However, 
the origins and aspirations of the democracy movement in Africa, as well as 
in its form and content, have no connection with events in Eastern Europe. 
Far from mimicking these events the democracy movement in Africa 
predates them.72 
The point could not have been stated any clearer, yet, the nature of the pro- 
democracy movement in Africa remains misunderstood when grasped at all, 
especially when viewed through "Western" eyes. At the same time, because of 
globalization one can not underestimate the influence of transnational cultural 
flows. Nevertheless, a mechanical reading of developments is worse. Moreover, 
it should be remembered that, 
democratic aspirations certainly were ideals that traveled across international 
borders. Such transnational cultural flows had, however, little effect if the 
structural conditions were not favorable . . . democracy is today an 
international accepted ideal, however variably 'democracy' may be 
interpreted. . . . Clearly this worldwide cultural hegemony of democratic 
ideals is tied to a specific historical constellation. Its effects become more 
significant when it is backed by powerful transnational pressures.73 
As it has been chronicled in the pages of the African Forum, the African pro¬ 
democracy movement wants to change a leadership whose failure and exploitative 
practices have banished all hope of material improvement and become life- 
threatening. Moreover, it wishes to effect this change as a preliminary condition 
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for initiating a new politics which would make development possible. The pro¬ 
democracy movement also sees the economic regression of Africa as the other side 
of the political regression. It recognizes that the cause of development is better 
served by a democratic approach which engages the energy and commitment of 
the people, who alone will attempt to make development sustainable.74 
For the African democratic movement, one of the primary motivating 
factors for the demand for popular participation has been the adoption and 
implementation of the reactionary and anti-people programs of the IMF and the 
World Bank and by a leadership alienated from the peoples real needs and 
aspirations. 
The democracy movement in Africa is not wholly about the establishment 
of a two-party or multi-party system modeled after the West generally, and the 
United States in particular. Elections of governments which exist within a neo¬ 
colonial imperial nexus may actually continue to deter the development of any 
genuine home grown and broad civil society owned democracy in Africa.75 This 
may be the case because, as W. E. B. DuBois and Martin Luther King, Jr. have 
argued in regards to the democratization process in the United States, true 
democracy can never be achieved as long as private property and the profit 




The dominant thinking of most committed radical intellectuals and activists 
is that democracy is central to Africa's development, and therefore 
democratization i.e., the process of change from authoritarian national and 
international systems of government to democratic forms of rule, is seen as the 
only acceptable path towards sustainable development and good governance. In 
fact, the process of democratization itself becomes a way in which Africans can 
attempt to put their "house in order" and remove Africa from the margins or 
bottom of the international system.77 
From the above, it is discernible that while popular support and public 
interest exists for the democratization process to succeed, there remains an 
apparent contradiction; in that the Western democratic model, (which many of the 
emerging African states are drawing inspiration from), has systematically 
promoted a version of democratic political development that is intricately tied to 
the private profit and foreign oriented capitalist accumulation process whidr’tô 
date has kept Africa in a "Pluto-like" marginalized orbit within the global system. 
Moreover, the offers of technical advice in the interest of capitalist development, 
supposedly to correct market distortions, in point of fact, is one way in which the 
popular classes condemnation of authoritarian rule and the role of the repressive 
neo-colonial state is turned on its head, as the policies implemented often actually 
serve to debase the working class, the very group that in most cases has played a 
key role in bringing about the initial democratic reforms. The "process 
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Finally, the literature has also suggested that a strong civil society capable 
of holding the state in check is a guarantee for successful democracy building. In 
the Zambian case, I believe this contention will not hold up. Therefore, my 
perspective is that civil society empowerment is necessary but not sufficient under 
the reigning neo-colonial and alienated political economy. Moreover, the density 
of nongovernmental organizations will not necessarily lead to state policies that 
better reflect the concerns of the popular classes or enable the needs of the poor to 
be addressed in some manner, especially if these organizations are themselves not 
initiated, operated and controlled by the people democratically. Civil society 
empowerment certainly needs to occur but, more fundamentally, the state needs 
to be transformed by shifting the power of conflicting class interest because "the 
installation of democracy requires complex class compromises that become 
embodied in new institutional arrangements."79 
Additionally, the literature makes clear that political equality is not 
necessarily the objective of the liberal democratic project underway in Africa. The 
dominant liberal paradigm does not speak to popular decision-making in 
economic matters, or what Samuel Bowels refers to as the extension of the 
democratic conception of personal rights to the economy,80 which are at the heart 
of the developmental crisis on the continent. Instead, it focuses on the more 
technical problems associated with the formal democratization process and tends 
to use elections as the major and sometimes only measure of democracy. 
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The literature reviewed thus suggests that most Western observers and 
pro-democracy advocates miss the mark on the role of external forces such as the 
IMF and World Bank as policy makers rather than the supposed and desired 
popular participation in economic decision-making. Another issue connected to 
the review of the literature is the uneven country coverage. Martin points out, 
"Our survey reveals that while a significant and rapidly growing body of 
literature on the general and theoretical aspects of political reform and 
democratization in Africa currently exists, detailed country case-studies of 
democratic transition based on extensive field work are still too few."81 
Finally, the current debate tends to take a short term view and narrow 
interest focus, on the prospects for African democracy by concentrating on regime 
change more than on institutional transformation or sustainability. 
From the way in which the debate has proceeded thus far several 
conclusions can be drawn. First, the concept of "democracy" is often equated with 
the concept of "capitalism." Second, as Samir Amin has pointed out, capitalism is 
almost always equated with the "market" and capitalist growth or expansion with 
"development."82 In other words, some in the pro-democracy movement, while 
sacrificing and taking risks for certain political liberties, tend to overlook the 
essential necessity of demanding and constructing a program to achieve economic 
liberation instead of simply economic liberalization. Third, the social projects of 
political liberalization and economic liberalization as presently conceived and 
implemented, are compatible. In short, most, but not all, of the main promoters 
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of human rights and democracy on the African continent have embraced the 
structural adjustment programs of the IMF and World Bank with open arms, 
almost blindly, or on account of being falsely convinced that there is no alternative 
to structural adjustment For them, the capitalist development model will not only 
bring about democratic reforms, it "in the long run" is seen as the only way 
forward in the march toward democratization. 
The results of such a narrowly defined debate is confusion that is bound 
to lead to false starts toward democratization. One can therefore derive that some 
of the main issues and the nature of the debates on human rights and democracy 
in Africa are possible to enumerate. I believe these issues include the following: 
constitutionalism, civil society, imperialism, the right of self-determination, the 
state, economic liberalism, political liberalism, class and class struggle, social 
movements and leadership. 
The approach adopted for this study is the popular perspective in 
combination with the African crisis being best understood as a crisis of 
development However, this researcher places it within the theoretical framework 
of African political economy. Given that the liberal approach is the dominant 
approach, the investigation will inherently offer itself as a critique of that view. 
This modified popular approach is best suited to assist this researcher in 
his investigation of the Zambian popular movements for human rights and 
democracy, and the United States response to these developments. More 
importantly, it will assist in capturing the neo-colonial states's behavior, and the 
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United States government's response to that state's actions, regarding popular 
demands for political participation, democratic reforms and human rights 
protection, as well as how democratization is impacted by its linkage to free 
market ideology. On the latter point, Martin Klein has this to say regarding the 
new orthodoxies and the African crisis, 
Historians cannot predict the future or create laws of history. The path that 
one or even a series of nations followed is not necessarily the path the next is 
going to follow. History is a way of apprehending the present. History does, 
however, give us certain regularities. What is disturbing about much of the 
analysis of the contemporary world is that it lacks any historical 
consciousness. We live in a moment of history when Marxism in its Leninist 
form has been shattered. The ideologues of a triumphant capitalism have 
been crowing, but they themselves are as rigid, as inflexible and as ahistorical 
as their one time enemies. They are imposing on Africa programs that go 
counter to those followed by every country that has successfully developed. 
... In imposing on Africa policies different from what they pursued themselves in 
earlier times, the donor countries, the IMF and the World Bank may well doom 
democracy.83 
This chapter has critically investigated the debate on democratization in 
Africa and the current change occurring on the continent. It advances the notion 
that the role of the state in the democratization process is clouded by a failure to 
appreciate the manner in which the African state was constructed, the challenges 
of the democracy movement in Africa, and confusion regarding the 
appropriateness of the liberal democratic model to the African continent are not 
well understood, and that the a prori link assumed between capitalism and 
democratic development as implemented in Africa, is central to the emerging 
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CHAPTER III 
THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY IN ZAMBIA: 
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
The Zambian peoples' struggle against colonial oppression is one of the first 
chapters in the country's modem democratic transition. The courageous efforts 
of ordinary citizens for freedom from the socially racist, economically exploitative 
and politically oppressive British empire cannot be easily overlooked or 
inadvertently dismissed, because independence was the fruit of African resistance 
to European subjugation and disempowerment. Independence was the result of 
consistent work of numerous individuals, communities, and organizations 
committed to the principles of freedom, justice and equality, and the right of self- 
determination. The contemporary socio-political and economic crisis in Zambia 
can only be understood against this background, and unerased impact of 
colonialism, the nationalist struggle for independence, and the inherited post¬ 
colonial state structure.1 
The colonial state and system of government in Northern Rhodesia and 
Barotseland Protectorate, as Zambia was called and ruled before independence, 
was highly centralized and alienating despite the official policy of indirect rule 
and supremacy of "native interest." This was because it was in place to maintain 
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economic exploitation, especially in the mining sector, and the racial subjugation 
of Africans, and persons of Indian national origin and persons of mixed race 
throughout the society.2 
The territory and indigenous peoples of present-day Zambia were 
incorporated into the world capitalist system as a company state in the late 1890s. 
The British South Africa Company had been given mineral rights over the 
territory. In the course of time a small settler community developed which took 
to farming. This settler community, blossoming into an agrarian capitalist class, 
was later joined by representatives of mining capital who came to operate the 
copper mines when they became operational in the 1920s. The latter constituted 
themselves as an imperial bourgeoisie. With the handing over of the company 
state to the British colonial government in 1924, a colonial state apparatus proper 
was erected. Although manned by settlers, it was controlled by the colonial office 
in London.3 
As one of the British colonies in Southern Africa, Zambia ... was developed 
according to British interests, specializing in the production of copper while 
its agriculture and indigenous industrial base were allowed to disintegrate. 
British regional colonial policy was facilitated by building an elaborate 
network of transport, commercial and industrial centers linking the countries 
in the region to Rhodesia and South Africa. This legacy of economic 
dependence on South Africa continues to stifle autonomous and sustainable 
development in Zambia and southern Africa as a whole.4 
The subjugation of the African population was achieved in the typical 
colonial fashion of forced labor, and the introduction of poll and hut taxes. In each 
case brutality was used to establish "obedience" to the new alien system being 
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imposed. For instance, before the hut tax was imposed there is evidence that 
hundreds of huts were burned. A migrant labor system was established that 
basically included varied periods of work and then back to the village. 
Hamalengwa argues, "the migrant labor system was a deliberate policy of the 
colonial state and capital to maintain low wages, thus extracting super profits and 
also to control the inevitable class struggles that would result from permanent 
proletarianization or a stabilized work force. With the development of the copper 
mining industry, the development of a permanent proletariat was inevitable."5 
Hamalengwa also argues that prior to the stabilization of the African 
working class, there was hardly any collective resistance to capital. He therefore 
suggests that one of the consequences of the stabilization of the workforce- 
permanent proletarianization-was the development of collective organization and 
action by tire African working class.6 
The founders of both the trade union and political movements were 
actually from among the minority elite of educated and white collar workers. 
These were persons such as Mbikasita Lewanika, who was both one of the 
founders of the trade union movement and the founder President-General of the 
Northern Rhodesia Africa Congress, the first overtly political organization in 
Northern Rhodesia and Barotseland. However, as the struggle a gainst colonialism 
progressed the working class would play an increasingly key role. The struggle 
against colonial domination was intricately tied to the social and economic nature 
of the class struggle, and particular form of race conscious nationalism that 
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emerged in Zambia. In fact, between the 1930s and 1940s numerous strike actions 
were taken by African workers to express their grievances against poor, 
discriminatory working conditions and pay in the mining areas. By 1954, sixteen 
African unions had been formed.7 
The political aspect of the struggle escalated from 1944, in response to 
heightened demands by the minority white settlers, for the amalgamation of the 
protectorate north of the Zambezi with the settler colony of Southern Rhodesia in 
a federation. In the end the Federation was imposed in 1953. 
The decade-long struggle against "Federation," and the radical changes in 
the international community and on the African continent, between 1953 and 1963, 
were among the primary reasons for the launching of a successful independence 
movement in Zambia. 
"Federation" was an attempted readjustment by capital, through the mining 
companies and the settler populations, to maintain colonial domination over the 
Africans. It sought to establish one economic and political unit between Southern 
Rhodesia (present-day Zimbabwe), Nyasaland (present-day Malawi) and 
Northern Rhodesia (present-day Zambia). The Federation was dominated by 
Southern Rhodesia where the largest number of settlers lived.8 
Throughout the anti-colonial struggle, the history of political parties and 
their relationship to the trade union movement during this initial step toward a 
democratic society was very significant. The Northern Rhodesia African Congress 
was the first and main African political party founded in 1948, under the 
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presidency of Mbikasita Lewanika. At the end of 1951, Harry Mwaanga 
Nkumbula took over as President-General. The party was later renamed the 
Northern Rhodesian African National Congress. It is important to point out that 
it was not a new organization because many other historical accounts fail to grasp 
the continuity in the organizational aspect of the African democratic struggle.9 
A split within the party between the more radical and accommodationist 
elements led to the formation, in 1958, of the Zambian African National Congress 
(ZANC).10 The Zambian African National Congress was banned shortly after its 
formation, with many of its leaders jailed. Kenneth Kaunda, who had been chosen 
as a compromise leader of the Zambian African National Congress, was one of 
those jailed by the British colonial authorities. After the banning of ZANC, several 
other parties were formed, some of which later merged to form the United 
National Independence Party (UNIP), whose leadership was handed over to 
Kenneth Kaunda by Mauna Chona.11 The split was mirrored by another "split" in 
1959 in the Trade Union Congress, which was an amalgamation of African trade 
unions. According to Hamalengwa, a Reformed Trade Union Congress (RTUC), 
affiliated to and active in UNIP was bom.12 
The negative side of this coin was that it sowed the seeds against genuinely 
free and independent trade unionism. It also began the dictatorial, and 
undemocratic practice whereby the political national leadership sought to make 
puppets out of the trade union leaders. Thus, the relationship between trade 
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union economics and nationalist politics has been a significant, controversial and 
complex topic within Zambia's political culture. This is so because 
the colonial authorities preferred reformist unions to the militant ones and 
therefore concentrated their efforts on the orientation of the trade union 
leaders towards this end through massive propaganda literatures and the 
holding of a series of seminars. The European reformist trade unions were 
allowed to collaborate with the African trade unions. The aim was to make 
African trade unions apolitical and confine them to the bread and butter 
issues of their members.13 
These developments, however, were not occurring in a vacuum. As Mudenda 
points out the general rise and dialectical interplay between the nationalist 
consciousness after World War II and the emergence of a new international reality 
was a significant historical factor in Zambia, as it was in many other parts of the 
colonized world. He says: 
The nationalist period was heralded by many factors which were in turn 
enhanced by the "wind of change," which followed the end of the Second 
World War. Among other things, the wind of change put on the agenda the 
demise of the colonial empires. The colonial government's theoretical 
commitment to decolonization made monopoly capital operating in Zambia 
begin to look for other allies near home. As a result, monopoly capital, 
represented by the mining companies, began forming an alliance with the 
settler communities within the region. In order to consolidate and strengthen 
this alliance, the mining companies sponsored and supported the formation 
of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.... Owing to the fact that the 
national liberation struggle was a united front and largely directed against 
a foreign power, the movement used the ideology of nationalism to rally 
support Nationalism as an ideology focuses on the nation and subsumes all 
other interests, including those of classes, under the banner of national 
liberation. On this basis, the struggle between labor and capital was not 
brought to the forefront. Furthermore, the connection between the capitalist 
mode of production and colonialism was not established and, as a result, the 
struggle for national liberation was not seen as being a struggle against the 
capitalist system in general .... Throughout the struggle for national 
liberation, the different strands which formed the united front retained their 
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different perceptions of what they stood to gain once independence was 
14 won. 
Historically, as has been pointed out above, a key aspect of the Zambian 
working class struggle has been reflected in the struggle between labor control 
and labor resistance during both the colonial and post-colonial periods. One of 
the main approaches used by radical social scientists to explain the nature of the 
class struggle in the Zambian setting has been through the use of the "labor 
aristocracy" contention. To a great degree, the theory does illuminate particular 
aspects of the Zambian class struggle as well as the character of the post-colonial 
state. 
The labor aristocracy thesis is premised on the supposed "numerous and 
generous benefits enjoyed by workers-high wages, good conditions of work, 
housing, the use of complex and modem technology and therefore the 
concentration of trained manpower in the industry. The literature also 
emphasizes the integration of the workers into the capitalist system through the 
domestication and incorporation of their unions."15 
Richard Sandbrook has cautioned however that, 
To constitute a labor aristocracy, a group of organized workers must not only 
be relatively privileged, but also perceive itself as having interests separate 
from, and indeed opposed to, those of the lower strata or classes. One cannot 
infer that such a perception exists merely on the grounds of an income 
differential and the presence of a large "industrial reserve army" in the towns. 
Although the situation will vary from place to place, there are certain widely 
operating social and economic factors tending to associate urban workers 
with popular interests and grievances to make them men of the people.16 
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As mentioned earlier before independence the ruling class tried to 
incorporate the labor movement as a subordinate appendage to its own design. 
This was also the case after independence. Munyonzwe Hamalengwa has 
maintained that, 
The ruling class in Zambia has, since independence in 1964, tried to 
incorporate the labor movement as a subordinate and subservient social 
entity by various methods, either peacefully or forcefully. Some of these 
included: (1) an attempt to take over the Mineworkers Union of Zambia 
(MUZ) leadership in 1966; (2) an attempt to remove trade union organization 
in a one-party state; (3) vetting of trade union leaders aspiring for office in a 
trade union by the party; (4) an attempt to transform the Zambia Congress of 
Trade Unions (ZCTU) into a wing of the party; (5) repression by arresting and 
detaining labor leaders; and (6) by introduction of a labor code, etc. By 
declaring most workers as essential workers and forbidden to strike, the right 
to strike has been forbidden by decree. These efforts have been resisted by 
the labor movement. In a country which had a one-party state, where all 
autonomous organizations such as political parties, student organizations and 
so on had been suppressed and banished, the relative success of the labor 
movement to maintain an independent existence has been quite impressive.17 
The labor aristocracy thesis has been shown challenged in a number of 
ways. Perhaps the strongest criticism has to do with empirical research that 
suggests that the focus on life styles, higher wages, residence and aspirations of 
the "aristocracy" do not bear out the positions of the advocates. Some of these 
critics have shown that the higher cost of living in the urban centers and the 
remittances by urban workers to rural relatives operated as a check on the rise of 
the absolute wage level.18 Mudenda suggests, for instance, that while the state 
may pass legislation, declare states of emergency, impose a one-party state system, 
ban strikes etc., labor may alternatively use many forms of resistance, some of 
which may go undetected by the state or employers.19 
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Mudenda divides the class struggle in Zambia into three distinct yet 
interconnected periods. The periods are the prenationalist, nationalist and post¬ 
nationalists.20 The characterization of each period is as follows: 
During the earlier part of the colonial rule, the education of the Africans 
was largely left to various missionary organizations. The products of these 
mission schools formed the nascent African petty bourgeoisie. Owning to the 
discriminatory policies of the colonial state, these educated Africans were 
made to work in positions that were below their capabilities. Because of this 
frustration, they began to organize associations to discuss their plight . . . 
The peasants went into the united front because they believed that they 
would have access to good land and agricultural finance after independence. 
The workers joined the struggle with the hope that an African government 
would be more sympathetic to their plight, and that thereby they would get 
better conditions of service after independence. The petty bourgeoisie, on the 
other hand, joined and led the struggle for national liberation in the hope that 
an African government would bring about an end to discrimination in the 
services and enhance their prospects for career advancement based on merit 
What is significant about these different class aspirations is that none of the 
classes which formed the united front had associated their deprivations with 
the logic of the functioning of the capitalist system.. .. The period between 
1964 and 1971 was more or less a continuation of the nationalist phase, but its 
importance rests in the fact that it was a period of readjustment. It was a time 
during which the illusions held by the workers and peasants in the nationalist 
period were exploded. It was also the time during which the petty 
bourgeoisie consolidated its control of the state. Also during this period, 
monopoly capital was not very certain of the new government and began to 
send large amounts of money out of the country in the form of profits and 
dividends. This led to gross undercapitalization of the firms operating in 
Zambia. Such a state of affairs could not last long.21 
The First Republic and the Post-Colonial State 
The United National Independence Party won the 1964 local elections and 
subsequently formed a government On October 24,1964, the Republic of Zambia 
was born. Zambia was one of the most urbanized African countries at 
independence. Between 1964 to 1972 there was a Westminister style multi-party 
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political system of government in Zambia. Several major political parties existed 
in the opposition, the most prominent among them being the African National 
Congress. This period in Zambia's political history is commonly referred to as the 
First Republic. 
At independence, Zambia was one of the more prosperous African 
countries, enjoying a relatively high standard of living compared to most others 
in the Southern Africa region. According to political economist Fantu Cheru, 
During the first decade of Zambia's independence, both production and 
employment were growing rapidly without any disturbing imbalances. 
Increased output of copper and favorable international prices provided the 
revenues for massive investment in education, health and infrastructure 
serving the cooper industry. While the contributions of the manufacturing 
sector to GDP rose from five per cent in 1964 to 14 per cent in 1974, overall 
gross domestic product rose by eight percent per annum, among the highest 
in Africa.22 
Despite the phenomenal growth in Zambia's export earnings from copper 
throughout the 1960s, very little investment went into modernization of the copper 
industry. Since government ownership in the mining sector was small, 
multinationals such as Anglo-Americans were able to repatriate enormous profits 
throughout that period. Beginning in 1970, however, the Zambian government 
took several steps to wrest control of the mining sector from the multinationals. 
By 1986, the mining sector was 80 percent publicly owned.23 
As mentioned earlier, Zambia's economic crisis can only be understood 
from the pattern of economic development which it inherited from the colonial 
period. It must, however, also be stated that the model of development pursued 
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under the one party participatory democracy system model, that was offered as 
socialism, was in actual fact a dependent capitalist import substitution model.24 
The period between 1964 and 1972 is commonly referred to as the Second 
Republic in Zambia. It was during this period that the roots to the crisis of the 
one-party state were laid. In fact, Mudenda points out that the political economy 
of state capitalism in Zambia, as practiced by the governing party led to numerous 
undemocratic practices that were dismissed in the name of socialism and national 
unity. Obviously, such practices would also engender opposition to the 
accompanying political repression. The initial opposition to the excesses of the 
one-party participatory state system of governance was led by the Zambia 
working class. This was the case in part because of the history of workers' 
involvement in politics but also because of the numerous attempts of the state to 
either co-opt, incorporate or subordinate the workers movement, principally 
because of its professed ideology. The party dominated all aspects of civil society 
and many organizations were in fact part of the state.25 The activities of the state 
and the workers movement were all the more important because 
Zambia is one of the few countries in... Africa that has a large working class. 
The Zambian working class originates from the fact that Zambia's 
colonization was part of a scheme to create a huge reservoir of cheap labor for 
monopoly capital to exploit within Southern Africa. Secondly, Zambia has a 
large mining industry which has contributed to the formation of a working 
class in the country. From the early days of forced labor, through migrant 
labor, and later the labor stabilization policies, the process of 
proletarianization in Zambia has evolved to a point where it is now possible 
to discern three distinct sections of the working class employed in the 
modem, agricultural and informal sectors.26 
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According to Mudenda, the solution to some of these problems, however 
partial, presented itself in the form of the Rhodesian Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence and the generally hostile environment Zambia found herself in 
immediately after independence. 
As a result of this hostility, the ideology of nationalism was given a new 
lease on life. In the name of patriotism and the rule of law, the workers and 
peasants were forced into acquiescence by the various state apparatuses. In 
addition, a modus operandi between the petty bourgeoisie, especially the 
faction that had by now turned into a bureaucratic bourgeoisie, and 
monopoly capital was being worked out. In order to legitimize this working 
relationship, a populist ideology of Zambian humanism was propagated and 
adopted by the party in power as the national ideology. Zambian humanism 
is an eclectic ideology which tries to mix various elements from nationalism, 
socialism, Christianity, and 'traditional' African beliefs. Furthermore, 
economic nationalism in the form of partial nationalization was pursued in 
order to allay the worker1 nationalist revulsion toward monopoly capital 
while making the valorization of finance capital still possible. However, these 
partial solutions did not provide a panacea for the problems that faced the 
Zambian social formation. As time went on, opposition to the government 
increased and the ruling class began to look for other ways and means to 
consolidate this new alliance of classes and to suppress further opposition.27 
Mudenda further argues that, 
The promulgation of the Second Republic in 1972 was part of a scheme to 
consolidate the dominance of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie in coordination 
with monopoly capital over the Zambian state. This juridical stratagem 
introduced three very important developments into the Zambian polity: a 
one-party system, the enshrining of Zambian humanism in both the party and 
republican constitutions, and the declaration of the supremacy of the party 
over government It was claimed that the party was the party of the 
"common man" which did not belong to or champion the cause of any 
particular class in the country.28 
During the 1970s, in the area of foreign policy, Zambia and Tanzania were 
seen as the de facto leaders of the "frontline states" that opposed the apartheid 
regimes in the Southern African states of racist minority-dominated Rhodesia, 
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South West Africa and most notably in South Africa. For providing a home to the 
African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa, combatants from Zimbabwe 
African Peoples Union (ZAPU), Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and 
the Southwest African Peoples Organization (SWAPO), Zambia suffered 
invasions, bombings, and boycotts for its government's outspoken and 
unwavering criticism of the apartheid regime. In fact, much of the international 
prestige enjoyed by Kaunda and the Zambian people was due to their active 
opposition to the racist minority government in Rhodesia and South Africa. The 
rhetoric of humanism was claimed to be socialist inspired. 
The involvement of the state in the economy was predicated upon that 
orientation. In fact, the state was more involved in the economy in Zambia than 
in any other African country. But this did not necessarily equal the existence of 
a socialist society in the classical sense. 
With respect to domestic politics, Zambia's political system during the 
Second Republic was characterized by the existence of a strong, paternalistic, 
central government, which openly articulated a desire to ensure economic equality 
for all citizens. In this arrangement, the one-party government generally exercised 
power and control rather than provide service to civil society. Most institutions 
that could provide checks and balances and enhance accountability (such as 
legislatures, the mass media, and interest groups), were weak, or their relationship 
with the state was such that taking independent actions in their own interest 
against the state was compromised as some may have pursued a strategy of 
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securing access to and extracting protection or status from the state. In addition, 
the rule of law, generally formulated during the colonial period, grew no roots in 
popular understanding. Moreover, the makers and enforcers of laws sometimes 
considered themselves above the law and everyone else below the law. 
Finally, an overly bureaucratic management of public life developed a 
system that catered more to the relative powers of the elite rather than serving the 
public. Political and personal loyalty were rewarded more than merit under an 
overly centralized regime.29 In the end, the legitimacy of the one-party state would 
be questioned more and more by the popular classes, especially as the economic 
crisis deepened.30 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the crisis of the one party state began to 
manifest itself more and more. A growing critique of UNEP's monopolization of 
power and politics emerged. The paternalistic domination and ethnic balancing 
act was also held in disdain by numerous groups who were beginning to respond 
to the constitutional barriers that constrained traditional oppositional politics that 
Zambian had known since before independence. During this period two serious 
political parties came into being but were banned by the UNIP government and 
some of the leaders jailed because the party was labeled as being violence prone 
by the state.31 Additionally, there had been at least three attempted coups during 
that same period. First, 
the years that followed the declaration of the Second Republic coincided with 
an international recession and, being a dependent social formation, Zambia 
was severely affected. With the decline of the economy, Zambia developed 
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a crisis in her balance of trade and negative growth rates. These problems 
reduced the capacity of the state to subsidize consumption and introduced 
increased involvement of the international financial agencies in the country, 
especially the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The policies of the IMF 
tended to erode further welfare services and the government subsidies. This 
resulted in a drop in the standard of living for a large section of the Zambian 
population.32 
Second, 
although regional insecurity used to be an explanation for most of Zambia's 
economic ills and for intolerance toward political opposition in the country, 
since the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980, the external threats have been 
reduced, thereby negating the usual government excuses of the external 
'enemy/ Gradually the 'people' began to look for other explanations from 
within. It readily became evident that the Second Republic closed most of the 
democratic ways by which leaders associated with various "scandals" could 
be easily thrown out of office. . . the general election of 1978 brought into 
Parliament a large group of people from the national section of the Zambian 
bourgeoisie. The spokesmen for this group were very vocal in their 
denunciation of the government policies that seemed to compromise the 
national interests, favoring instead those of monopoly capital. They were also 
very critical of the state's monopolistic control of the economy and the gross 
inefficiencies in the para-state enterprises, and called for denationalization. 
Monopoly capital and the comprador section of the Zambian bourgeoisie 
were not very happy with either the stringent foreign exchange control 
regulations, or the remaining welfare services and the socialistic pretentions, 
which the bureaucratic bourgeoisie defended. In short these sections of the 
Zambian bourgeoisie were advocating a more open system of capitalism.33 
The decline in copper prices coincided with the 1973 oil embargo by the oil 
producing countries which dramatically increased Zambia's oil import bills. The 
surplus of 1974 turned into an external debt of about five billion dollars by 1984, 
of which one billion was made up of overdue payments.34 When added to the 
general decline in terms of trade for copper and other Zambian exports, this led 
to the greatest economic crisis in the country's history.35 Mudenda argues, 
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Throughout the postcolonial period, the government has relied on the 
support of the peasantry. This was done by the introduction of various 
welfare services, e.g., free education and health facilities; by the abolition of 
the poll tax; and by the pursuit of a development strategy which claimed to 
improve the conditions of those living in the rural areas. Because of the large 
disparities between the wealth concentrated in urban areas and the poverty 
of the rural areas, the peasants were made to believe that the government was 
doing something about their poverty and that the urban population, i.e. the 
workers, were part of the cause. ... In the face of this opposition, the 
bureaucratic bourgeoisie, which controls state power in Zambia, responded 
by strengthening the oppressive apparatuses of the state in order to contain 
the forces of change... since the promulgation of the Second Republic, there 
has been a gradual expansion and strengthening of the security apparatus of 
the state.... Second, the state has stepped up its activities regarding social 
control and has not lifted the state of emergency imposed on the country after 
the Rhodesian UDI in 1965. Thus, the state is able to arrest people without 
paying much attention to due process of law.36 
Throughout the 1960s, Zambia made very little use of IMF resources. High 
export earnings from copper and low energy costs made it possible for the 
government to expand its investment program in the public and private sectors. 
There were occasions when the government made use of resources from the 
Compensatory Credit Facility (CCF) to make up for export shortfalls. 
Beginning with the Arab oil embargo of 1973, which coincided with low 
copper prices, Zambia increasingly became dependent on IMF resources. It 
made use of resources from the Fund's Oil Facility and was granted several 
Standby agreements. It also began to draw funds from the Extended Facility 
(EFF)after 1981. Between 1973 and 1978, Zambia was granted three Standby 
arrangements. Whereas the 1973 Standby agreement was granted with no 
conditionality, the other two involved conditionality requiring the 
government to put ceilings on the money supply, government credit and 
devaluation of the Kwacha. Subsequently, the Kwacha was devalued by 20% 
in 1976 and by ten per cent in 1978 The entire IMF/World Bank program 
for Zambia was based on a positive scenario that copper prices and the 
demand for it would improve substantially. Needless to say, the economic 
reform program failed when copper prices continued the downhill slide, 
worsening the domestic and external financial imbalance.37 
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By 1981, the Zambian economy had gone deeper into recession, and the 
Kaunda government once again approached the IMF which made available to it 
$800 million, the second largest credit to an African country.38 
The 1981 Standby agreement prescribed tighter fiscal and monetary policy 
and quicker payment of foreign debts. The program was tied to a three year 
World Bank program to reorient expenditure from infrastructure to 
agriculture and industry. Government expenditure was to be trimmed down 
from 12% to 7% of GDP. Unfortunately, the program collapsed in July 1982 
after 300 million had been drawn due to accumulation of payment arrears, 
increased government borrowing and a rise in the balance of payments 
deficit In April 1983, Zambia once again signed a new Standby agreement 
with the IMF and was granted a credit of 270 million.39 
The objectives of the agreement were to restore financial discipline and to 
improve the government's debt servicing capacity through demand management. 
Consequently, the currency was devalued by 20 percent and interest rates 
increased sharply. Prices of most goods were decontrolled and wage increases 
were restricted to five percent Food and farm subsidies were cut and taxes raised 
on services and mineral exports. 
In May 1984, Zambia presented a plan for restructuring the economy at a 
donor meeting in Paris. The document entitled 'Restructuring in the Midst 
of Crisis' identified four areas to be tackled by the government a) shortage 
of foreign exchange, b) underutilization of capacities, c) excessive level of 
capital intensity in industry, and d) excessive dependence on copper exports. 
To correct the distortions, both demand and supply side measures were 
recommended. On the demand side, die following actions were taken: a cut 
in government expenditure, the freezing of wages, and the removal of 
subsidies. Supply oriented measures included action on the exchange rate, 
pricing policies, interest rates, investment policies and the efficiency of public 
sector enterprises In early June 1984, the Zambian government reached 
a new twenty-month Standby agreement with the IMF for 225 million. This 
agreement, like others before it, was suspended in February 1985, with only 
85 million drawn. The sudden fall in copper prices prevented the 
government from servicing its arrears estimated at $800 million. 
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Furthermore, the plan to trim the budget deficit could not be met. This was 
aggravated by an estimated $18 million government expenditure during the 
20th Independence Day celebrations which it justified as necessary for 
boosting national morale by a nation beset by financial problems.40 
Cheru also points out that "In March 1986, the IMF granted a new Standby facility 
of $230 million to be repaid in two years. The Fund also granted additional $69 
million from the Compensatory Financing Facility (CFF). Following the new 
agreement several bilateral donors rescheduled debts owed to them by Zambia."41 
Zambia was able to make use of the first tranche of the Standby facility. 
Access to the second tranche was blocked when the government broke off 
relations with the IMF and began implementing its own program of economic 
reform It also suspended its debt payment to the IMF and the World Bank, and 
imposed a ceiling on all debt service as a proportion of export earnings.42 Between 
1985 and 1987, the Zambian kwacha was devalued by 700 percent.43 
Dorothy Mutemba, has written on the impact of such a dramatic devaluation. 
She says, 
. . . the government was shocked at the 700 percent devaluation of the 
Kwacha in the year of the auctioning system. In the first auction the Kwacha 
was devalued effectively from K2.42 to K5.01 to US $1. In October 1986, a 
year after the introduction of the system, the Kwacha was pegged at K 8.30 
to the dollar. The devaluation of the kwacha went into double digits in the 
second year. In April 1987, before the system was abolished, it had been 
pegged at K21.00 to the dollar. Scholars and other observers of the auctioning 
system have attributed the excessive devaluation of the Kwacha to the 
scarcity of foreign exchange and its unpredictability. . . . The majority of 
workers, whose wages had remained static since October 1985, could only 
buy 65 percent of what was brought before the auctioning.44 
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Protesting the increases in the price of maize meal, basic stable food stuffs, 
Zambians took to the streets, in 1986, first in the Copperbelt. Riots occurred again 
in June 1990 and in its wake at least 50 people were left dead and hundreds more 
were injured.45 
The impact of the collective western financial embargo on Zambia has been 
disastrous. While the IMF mandated liberalization allowed western countries 
to dump their surplus goods on the Zambian market, the devaluation of the 
kwacha relative to the major currencies helped them to stockpile Zambian 
minerals and agricultural goods at rock-bottom prices. The emphasis on 
privatization set a dramatic trend of de-industrialization as indigenous firms 
got swallowed by larger foreign firms.46 
Cheru argues that the effects of a virtual halt in new investment, inadequate 
maintenance and shortages in operating materials aggravated the deterioration of 
the social services, especially the health and education budgets.47 Moreover, he 
asserts that the removal of maize subsidies, combined with a sharp drop in the 
value of the kwacha and a decline in real incomes, contributed to a deterioration 
in nutritional standards among vulnerable groups.48 
In commenting on the bankruptcy of IMF economic "theology," Cheru further 
remarks, "a careful evaluation of Zambia's economic performance since 1984 
shows clearly that the IMF's prescriptions were based on faith rather than rational 
calculation. Despite strict adherence to the medicine prescribed, the Zambian 
economy slipped into a 'coma.' "49 Cheru adds, "For all the rhetoric of donors 
from the 'poorest of the poor' to 'basic human needs,' from 'private sector initiative' 
to 'adjustment with a human face1 -development assistance can often do far more 
harm to undermine equitable development than to foster it."50 
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In this case, Zambia's indebtedness is a manifestation of its peripheral role 
in the world economy, as well as its dependence on a development model not 
compatible with local realities. He also argues that under the pretext of 
development assistance, these institutions and their governments have long 
supported misguided development projects which, in the final analysis, benefitted 
local elites, western contractors, consulting firms and research universities more 
than the upgrading of Zambia's capacity to plan and implement alternative 
policies based on local knowledge and resources. 
In a final indictment, Cheru says that the disastrous impact of IMF 
stabilization programs on the economic and technical advancement of Zambia can 
easily be compared to the deliberate British colonial policy of "benign neglect."51 
Zambia initiated another ambitious structural adjustment program during 
1991. Under this program, the government began removing a variety of price 
controls, eliminating the dual exchange rate system, dismantling the 
administrative system for the distribution of foreign exchange, trimming the 
civil service and reducing government ownership of economic assets. 
Zambia was rewarded for these measures when Western donors at a Paris 
Club meeting rolled over $2 billion worth of debt.52 
In September 1991, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank 
announced that they were suspending additional aid because Zambia was in 
arrears on its debt payments. Zambia being in arrears was nothing new. 
Nevertheless, following the lead of the international financial institutions, several 
western donor countries also threatened to suspend or reduce foreign assistance. 
The Zambian government suggested in response that these actions were attempts 
to influence the outcome of the national elections.53 
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The contradictions and limits of the post-colonial state in conjunction with 
the dictates of the international financial institutions created a period in Zambia 
that necessitated an alliance, albeit temporary, between those classes fighting for 
popular democracy and sections of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie that had served 
the UNIP government and Kaunda faithfully. Therefore, the MMD was a coalition 
and social movement composed of numerous political tendencies and an equal 
number of leadership styles. Some of the UNIP officials who did join the MMD 
represented some of the factions of the bourgeoisie that had proposed reform from 
within, but were completely dismissed or referred to as "capitalist roaders." It 
appears that things began to really fall apart as the economic crisis in the country 
"severely reduced the ability of the state to recruit and co-opt large numbers of 
potential members of the various sections of the Zambian bourgeoisie."54 
The crisis of the one-party state crystalized during the 1980s. Once again 
it was the workers and students who initiated opposition to the government's 
policies. 
The strikes of the workers in 1981 . .. proved beyond doubt to the workers 
that their struggles are more than economic struggles. Second, the way in 
which those strikes were smashed by die state has taught the workers a very 
fundamental lesson: they cannot score any telling victory over the state 
without the support of the other oppressed and patriotic classes in the 
country. Third, there are signs that the peasants have come to realize that 
they are a marginalized class which is not 'needed' in the reproduction of the 
capitalist mode of production in neocolonial Zambia. Thus, their future, if 
there is to be any, lies outside the programs designed by the agents of 
monopoly capital and implemented by the bourgeoisie in Zambia.55 
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The crisis continued to deepen and political opposition calling for the 
scrapping of the one-party state emerged. Much of the initial articulation was 
based on the failed economic policies of the UNIP government. The Economic 
Association of Zambia, headed by Aka Lewanika and Derrick Chitala, played a 
leading role in organizing the desperate forces to oppose the one-party state 
personified by Kaunda and his rule for over twenty-five years. 
Lewanika and Chitala began to promote the idea of a national conference 
on the multiparty option. 
We suggested to Mr. Zimba that we organize for a National Conference in 
Livingstone at which a broad coalition of multi-party democracy activities 
would be created. We suggested that the conference be held at the end of 
April, 1990. It was further agreed that Aka and I would draw up the 
program and budget. Mr. Zimba, Aka and myself subsequently discussed 
our ideas with the ACTU Chairman-General, Mr Frederick Chiluba who was 
actively supportive and extremely facilitative. Although invitations were 
given to many people, we were forced to postpone the conference to July, 
1990 after we failed to raise money to pay for conference costs.56 
Because of the existing political repression and the need to make the meeting as 
broad as possible, the matter of exactly who should be invited required much 
debate. According to Lewanika and Chitala, 
The final organizational talk involved inviting guests. Aka and I together 
with Mr Mwaanga, Mr. Zimba and Mr. Chiluba, drew up a list of 130 people 
who included representatives from churches, the business community, young 
people and women, intellectuals, fanners, and the worker' representatives. 
We invited Hon. Dr. Robinson Nabulyato to open the conference. We failed 
to get an invitation to him in time for the rescheduled date. We were very 
happy when Mr. Arthur Wina at very short notice agreed to chair the 
symposium, and give the opening address, which he did with characteristic 
commitment, courage and clarity.57 
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In organizing the conference the list of criticism of the one-party state read 
like a list of abuses designed to argue for a complete break with the existing 
system. Among the most familiar and popular indictments of the one-party state 
system were various acts of political repression. In their work, The Hour Has 
Come!, Aka Lewanika and Derek Chitala, two of the original Movement for 
Multiparty Democracy organizers, outlined the following grievances: 
1. UNIP is a political party composed of its members and it cannot pretend 
to represent everyone. Those who do not belong to it are 
disenfranchised in the sense that they cannot stand for any elective 
office. They cannot decide a choice of Political Leaders in the State 
because they are outside the political mainstream, they cannot stand as 
Councillors or as Parliamentary candidates for example let alone as 
Cabinet or Presidential candidates. 
2. Under a multi-party system the public has the choice to remove his 
leadership and his party from office by peaceful means, and offer the 
opportunity to a leader of another political party and his colleagues to 
redress the ill of the former, thus a party in power has always to 
function with the interest of the people and the Republic as the 
cornerstone of policy. 
3. University closures are a regular occurrence regardless of the cost of the 
country's future manpower requirements, let alone inconveniences to 
parents and students alike. 
4. Honoring international financial obligations which could in turn attract 
more international aide to Zambia, to insure orderly development and 
proper use of its resources, has been unilaterally abrogated. 
5. The One-Party system of government is laborious and expensive to 
maintain because it duplicates state functions: Secretary General- Prime 
Minister; Secretary of State for Security - Minister of Defense and Home 
Affairs; Chairman of Economic Sub-Committee - Minister of Finance; 
Minster of Commerce and Industry - Minister of Mines. 
6. In a multi-party system all party posts should be abolished and cease to 
be a burden on the meager resources of the State. Each political party 
104 
will have to make adequate and alternative arrangements for the 
sustenance of its officials and cadres. All housing, transport and 
overseas travel privileges will have to be forfeited from employees of 
any party.58 
The National Conference was a bold act of political resistance itself. Similar 
national meetings had taken place and played catalytic roles in numerous 
Francophone West African states.59 That it was occurring in Southern Africa and 
against one of the most internationally famous independence heroes on the 
African continent was not lost on observers, whether they were foreign or 
domestic, friends, opportunists or enemies of the Zambian pro-democracy 
movement. 
The conference was so successful that its organizers launched a plan to hold 
a series of national rallies to explain the platform of the MMD. According to the 
organizers, 
the government-controlled media tried, somewhat unsuccessfully, to pretend 
as if the national symposium had not occurred by limiting coverage or only 
mentioning it in passing. The initial media inferences that appeared were 
either marginalized in internal pages or deliberately 'mickey-moused' on 
television screens to appear as if the participants were a bunch of madmen. 
In fact, the deliberate misrepresentation of the conference on television, attests 
to the need for change in the media, which would liberate our journalists 
from the cloak of tyranny and suppression in the spirit of the conference 
resolution: that press censorship and intimidation be stopped, and the 
independence of the mass media and freedom of journalists to exercise their 
professional fairness and excellence be unhindered. .. .60 
In May 1990, at UNEP's fifth extraordinary national council meeting, 
Kaunda agreed to hold a referendum in October 1990 on whether to continue with 
a one-party state system. However, by September 1990, after a vigorous debate 
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on the need for the re-introduction of multiparty politics in Zambia, the 
government scrapped plans for a referendum and announced its intention to 
prepare a new constitution providing for a multiparty system, with elections to be 
held before the end of 1991, two years ahead of schedule. The speculation of the 
pro-democracy activists was that the thinking in the UNIP camp on moving from 
a referendum to an election was that a snap election would return UNIP to power 
as the emerging opposition would split just as it had done in Kenya and other 
places on the continent Upon the legalization of political parties in December 
1990, the Movement for Multiparty Democracy registered as a political party and 
began to transform itself from a coalition leading the call for the re-introduction 
of multiparty politics into a democratically structured political party. 
The Zambian pro-democracy movement was a mixture of class forces who 
all were united around one thing, and that was to rid the country of the one-party 
personalized rule of Kenneth Kaunda. Therefore, it might have been predictable 
that some political factions would break away eventually to form their own 
political parties. "The problem of funding the national conference .. . forced us 
to move the venue from Livingstone to Lusaka .... Provisional booking at 
Garden House Hotel was made. However, we were forced to postpone the 
meeting a second time when we failed to raise the needed financial resources in 
time."61 
It was one of the principle resolutions of the national conference on the 
multiparty option to constitute the Movement for Multiparty Democracy to 
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campaign for the ending of the one-party state. Although it was anticipated by 
organizers that political parties would be legalized, the form and name of the 
party was not considered or determined before Kaunda announced his acceptance 
of the re-introduction of multi-party democracy. Once the signal was given that 
the one-party state was ending, however, it was decided to accept the freedom of 
multi-party campaigners to form or not to form parties of their choice. However, 
the majority of the "multi-partists" chose to form a party together. Because of the 
need to have maximum name recognition and national organizational support, it 
was agreed, after some debate, to maintain the name, "Movement for Multi-Party 
Democracy." The attempt to accept Arthur Wina as a consensus presidential 
candidate was undercut by Fredrick Chiluba and those who wanted him to be 
president on the pretext of championing democracy. Aka Lewanika and Derick 
Chi tala maintain thatChiluba had promised to support Arthur Wina and went out 
to campaign for him when in fact he was really campaigning for himself. 
Whatever the case, it was clear that most of the delegates to the February to March 
1991 MMD National Convention voted for Chiluba to lead the new party in the 
struggle to defeat a well organized, state funded, UNIP under the leadership of 
the politically clever Kenneth Kaunda. 
In early 1991, the Kaunda government appointed a commission, chaired by 
attorney Patrick Mvunga, to draft a new constitution for the Third Republic, under 
the undemocratic colonial era Public Enquirer Act. Kaunda had appointed Arthur 
Wina and Aka Lewanika to the commission. However, the two declined to serve 
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on account of the Public Enquirer Act being so undemocratic in nature. Their 
refusal to serve on the commission was supported by the entire MMD leadership, 
including that of Chiluba. 
The draft Constitution made specific provisions for the transition to a 
multiparty system through free and fair elections. After a national debate and 
several meeting sponsored by the University of Zambia Students Union 
Association and the Churches, a final meeting between the MMD and UNIP 
leadership was held at the Anglican Cathedral of the Holy Cross to discuss 
constitutional issues. Subsequent to that meeting and following a special 
Parliamentary committee chaired by General Huambo which recommended a 
compromise and some reforms, the UNIP-dominated Parliament adopted the new 
Constitution and election law on August 24,1991, and dissolved soon thereafter. 
President Kaunda promptly announced that the elections would be held on 
October 31,1991.62 
As suggested in Chapter I, the results of the election stunned most of Africa 
and the rest of the international community. Not only had Kaunda been 
resoundly defeated but he peacefully handed over power, even when some of his 
UNIP supporters, including a few in the military thought otherwise.63 The 
majority who voted believed that long lines for basic subsistence foods, declining 
standard of living, clarity about the employment picture and simply a sense of 
predictability about their lives and those of their children would be secured with 
an MMD victory.64 
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In short, the October 1991 elections became the proposed, but dropped 
referendum on the one-party state. The Zambian people had spoken loudly 
against the one-party state, though maybe not so clearly about the type of 
democratic development they expected under an MMD government. The 
differences between the popular democracy desired by Zambian citizens and their 
civil society institutions which were much suppressed or largely non-existence 
under the one party state, and the "process democracy" they received would 
become the central issue of the Third Republic under tire Movement for 
Multiparty Democracy. 
The MMD and The Third Republic, 1992 - 1999 
The MMD in Zambia is a class alliance of the urbanized working class, a 
segment of the comprador bourgeoisie and former bureaucratic/state 
bourgeoisie, urban petty bourgeoisie and the lumpen proletariat. This 
alliance has managed to win over the rural proletariat and its populist politics 
ensured that it captured the interests of the entire population, given the 
aggrandizement of tire Kaunda regime. Chiluba himself is rooted in the labor 
movement whose platform has always been social democracy whereby the 
labor movement would play its role as the protector of working class interests 
and divorced from state and party politics and the role of the state was to be 
answerable to the needs of the entire society including the working class.65 
The Movement for Multiparty Democracy faced a tremendous internal 
challenge of transforming itself from a social movement into a political party, and 
also within a few months into a governing party. Moreover, it inherited a 
shattered economy where inflation was as high as 200 percent; one of the highest 
per capita debt burden in the world; and heavy dependence on one primary 
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export commodity, in copper and civil servants who had operated in a system 
where patronage and loyalty often mattered more than merit.66 
The MMD's platform was democracy, accountability and private enterprise. 
During the campaign, the party promised to dismantle the extensive links between 
party and government that had been institutionalized under UNIP's long rule. For 
the newly elected MMD government the process of constructing a new political 
system, especially a change to a new culture of political pluralism, included a 
number of key political reforms and economic measures such as holding free and 
fair local government elections; the conduct of parliamentary business including 
respecting the role of the opposition in parliament and separate of powers; 
addressing systematic human rights abuses and reforming institutions notorious 
for committing those violations; the halting the growing debt crisis and budget 
deficit; and the process of enacting a new constitution that would "stand the test 
of time." In addition, the MMD promised liberalization of the economy, which as 
pointed out above was largely under state control and its legendary economic 
mismanagement was one of the key reasons for the fall of the Kaunda regime.67 
After the election, the MMD government did move swiftly to introduce 
economic reforms, reinstituting structural adjustment policies agreed to with the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. As part of the structural 
adjustment program, the MMD undertook perhaps the most radical privatization 
and liquidation program ever instituted in any African country. Government 
subsidies for basic needs such as health care, education, and foodstuffs were 
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removed, and virtually all key state enterprises were either privatized, liquidated 
or targeted to be. The bloated civil service was reduced by more than half. 
Between November 1991 and November 1996, the price of Zambia maize meal 
rose 1,000 percent; wages went down an average 30 percent, and the Chiluba 
government cut over 55,000 civil servants jobs, much to the chagrin of the labor 
movement that he used to lead, according to one observer.68 Additionally, three 
of the first pieces of legislation passed by the new MMD government were the 
Privatization Act of 1992, the Private Investment Act of 1993, and the new Banking 
and Financial Services Act of 1994. All three pieces of legislation were central to 
the neo-liberal economic policies being implemented in Zambia. 
Y et there were signs that all was not well with the Movement early on. The 
idea that a honeymoon would be available to the new transitional government is 
not true in the Zambian situation. In fact, during the Chiluba government's first 
nine months in office the country was rocked by a record fifty-six strikes of 
workers demanding that his government resign because of increasing 
privatization.69 The workers' strikes were joined by student demonstrations also 
protesting the government's economic policies. Hundreds of students were 
arrested during the first year of the MMD administration and charged with public 
order offenses. In April, and again in May 1992, the MMD government's security 
forces used tear gas to disperse peaceful demonstrations by miners' wives and 
children.70 
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Accusations of drug smuggling by top MMD officials surfaced in the 
international community as did local concerns with corruption by a number of 
other high ranking officials.71 In January 1994, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs 
and Community Development, Vernon Mwanga, and the Deputy Speaker of the 
National Assembly, Sikota Wina, were forced to resign. The popular opinion was 
that Chiluba had been forced by the ever aggressive international donors to 
remove these specific cabinet ministers for alleged involvement in drug 
smuggling.72 The harsh criticism of the "democratic" MMD government led to the 
formation of an Anti-corruption Commission, and the adoption of a Ministerial 
Code of Conduct Act.73 Despite those steps, the response of the Chiluba 
government to the Méridien Bank collapse caused most Zambians to begin to 
seriously question the integrity of the MMD government The Chiluba 
administration's response to the crisis was to provide official support for Méridien 
in the amount of K 30 billion.74 Moreover, the printing of new money was 
necessary for the exercise. At the same time, the government tried to persuade the 
owners to recapitalize the institution but failed. The end result was thousands of 
ordinary Zambian citizens losing their life savings, and they were never even 
given any explanation of what happened.75 
With respect to human rights, as early as 1992, the Minister of Home 
Affairs, stated publicly that the police and paramilitary Anti-Robbery Squads were 
authorized to "shoot to kill" armed robbers.76 Perhaps the most disturbing sign of 
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trouble was the March 4,1993 declaration of a state of emergency by the Chiluba 
government. 
The 1993 State of Emergency was announced on the grounds that a plot had 
been uncovered and documents obtained that outlined plans to overthrow the 
government. Those documents had been found at Freedom House, the UNIP 
headquarters. UNIP officials maintained that the documents, entitled The Zero 
Option, were not party policy and contained policy options which had been 
rejected. Nevertheless, twenty-seven senior members of UNEP were detained 
without charge or trial and held in custody for several months before all charges 
were dismissed and the state of emergency lifted.77 For many, the March 1993 
State of Emergency was one of the first indications that the Chiluba government 
would respond in a brutal manner to any challenge of his Administration, real or 
perceived. The Zero Option episode also marked the beginning of a worsening 
relationship between the governing party and the main opposition. Additionally, 
international human rights organizations began to question whether Zambia was 
a model democracy to be emulated.78 More generally, human rights concerns, 
especially police brutality, continued to be a regular feature in official reports on 
the subject. 
In January 1996, the Zambian Supreme Court struck down as 
unconstitutional the Public Order Act, a colonial era law restricting freedom of 
assembly that required police permits for public meetings. The action of the court 
was welcomed by civil society organizations who immediately began to take 
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advantage of the new freedom. In response to the Court's decision, the MMD 
dominated National Assembly promulgated and passed new regulations that 
imposed similar restrictions.79 UNIP and several other political parties perceived 
the new legislation as targeting the and injuring their ability to organize their 
followers. 
The deterioration of relations between the governing party and the main 
opposition party was also exacerbated by the deportation of two important UNIP 
officials to Malawi on the grounds that they were not Zambians.80 The drugging 
kidnaping and deportation of the officials was denounced not only by UNIP but 
also by various Zambian human rights groups because the questioning of one's 
ethnic origin represented a new form of political repression in Zambia and Africa. 
It was that act that opened the proverbial Pandora's box on the question of who 
was a "real" Zambian. That issue would later figure prominently in the political 
debate and eventual impasse in the country, especially as it related to the 
citizenship status of Kaunda and Chiluba.81 
Internal divisions were also present in the MMD. In fact, several founding 
members of the MMD and other key officials within the Chiluba Administration 
began to privately and publicly denounce some of the excesses they were 
witnessing. The contradictions led to resignations from the Chiluba 
Administration and the formation of a new political party in 1994, the National 
Party, under the leadership of Arthur Wina, Aka Lewartika, and Baldwin 
Nkubula.82 The contradictions persisted with the growing display of 
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authoritarianism and consequently led to more resignations and the formation of 
two other political parties, the Zambian Democratic Congress (ZDC), under the 
leadership of Derek Chitala and Dean Mugunombo, the then deputy secretary 
general of the MMD and former finance minister of the Chiluba Administration; 
and the Liberal Progressive Front (LPF), led by Roger Chongwe, the former 
Minister of Legal Affairs who had originally negotiated the governance assistance 
package with the United States.83 
Issues of accountability and transparency also were very prevalent during 
the first Chiluba Administration besides the issue of corruption. Perhaps the 
central topic of political discussion in the country was the promised constitutional 
reform. The Constitutional Reform Commission received extraordinary support 
by the donor community, including trips to other countries, and financial support 
for hearings around the country in all of its provinces. The submission of the 
Commission's report to the MMD government raised great expectations, as rumors 
regarding proposed changes surfaced almost as soon as the report was presented. 
Many of the recommendations of the Commission were ignored, especially one 
suggesting that the new Constitution be approved by a constituent assembly.84 
The MMD-dominated Parliament approved a new Constitution in May of 1996 
that resulted in the disqualification of former President Kenneth Kaunda from 
contesting the presidential elections. Another clause in the Constitution excluded 
traditional chiefs from holding office.85 UNIP's vice presidential candidate was 
a tribal chief. The MMD government justified its actions by stating that it was 
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simply implementing the wishes of the Zambian people who wanted to be 
governed by a Zambian and that their changes had nothing to do with Kaunda 
because at the time of the constitutional reform process, Kaunda was retired from 
politics. Several observers believed that the failure to settle the constitutional 
crisis by consensus put Zambia on a collision course. The repressive and coercive 
apparatuses of the state were not fundamentally changed in any way by the MMD 
government. Perhaps personnel changes at the top were made but the institutions 
once so loudly complained about by the MMD were essentially operating in the 
same manner as they had for UNIP during the Second Republic. In fact, even the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) raised questions about the budget and cost 
overruns of the armed forces. The IMF said in a special report on its April 1995 
quarterly visit, 
The final area of concern is defense expenditures which appear currently to bear 
no relation to the budget. Currently K 25 billion in overruns are projected and it 
appears likely that this figure could be much higher. Before settling on a revised 
defense expenditure projection, a complete description of the problem is 
needed. This would include the nature of the current overruns, the size and 
nature of the multi-year commitments entered into by the Ministry of 
Defense, and the plans for providing funding for these commitments. The 
Government's plan for effectively limiting future defense commitments must 
also be spelled out. If indeed there is a decision to increase defense 
expenditures in 1995 from budgeted levels, transparency requires that the 
decision be approved by Parliament in a supplementary budget and that the 
revised budgetary allocation be fully funded and strictly enforced. It will 
also be important that any decision to increase defense expenditures be 
clearly explained to the international community so as not to undermine its 
support for Zambia.86 
As a result of the unofficial intimidation, issues such as freedom of 
association gradually became a partially enjoyed right in practice. Self-censorship 
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was practiced by those who understood that their job or other quality of life 
advantages might be jeapodized because of MMD perceptions that they were 
associating with the enemy, i.e., political parties or civic associations now opposed 
to the Chiluba government.87 
In other important areas, the government did not follow statutory 
procedures for keeping the voters rolls up to date, and eventually canceled the 
1995 local elections. Freedom of the press was also seriously constrained. A 
controversial issue of The Post newspaper, Number 401, was banned by a 
presidential decree, and the paper's editors were repeatedly detained; first, for 
allegedly publishing cabinet members' discussion about holding a referendum on 
the proposed Constitution, and secondly after being charged with "contempt of 
Parliament."88 
With the strict adherence to the structural adjustment 
program-privitatization, liquidation and reduction of civil service- unemployment 
increased dramatically. The standard of living decreased significantly, and the 
level of poverty spread across the country to the point that more than 86 percent 
of Zambians were classified as living in abject poverty, i. e., they could not even 
meet their daily food requirements. The education and health sectors were hit 
hard by the "cash budget" constraints and subsidy removals. The combination of 
the growing impovishment and new costs for education and health services, 
meant that many families could not feed their families, or enjoy any access to basis 
education or health care. Finally, economic development suffered as debt 
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servicing, which accounted for close to 75 percent of foreign exchange earnings, 
had been the first priority. The agricultural and manufacturing sectors were 
causalities of the strict adherence to as well. Between 1991 and 1993 employment 
in the formal sector decreased from 552,000 to 494,000. Yet, during the first 
Chiluba administration Zambia's international debt remained virtually 
unchanged, still estimated to be between $7.1 and $7.5 billion, one of the highest 
per capita ratios in the world.89 As a result of these issues, crime, prostitution, and 
malnutrition increased in a very visible and spectacular manner while life 
expectancy on the other hand sharply decreased. The abnormally high incidents 
of HIV/AIDS, estimated to be as high as 25 percent of the adult Zambian 
population, was very much connected to decreased labor productivity and 
decreased life expectancy.90 
Most honest Zambians question the state of democracy in the country. 
Some have lost faith in what has been presented as democracy by the MMD. Still 
others have withdrawn, to the extent that they can, from political life in similar 
fashion to what thousands have attempted to do economically. However, a 
frustrated political informal sector with few avenues to register grievances, is 
bound to generate talk of coup d'etat if not action toward that end. This is true in 
part because many in the pro-democracy movement were confused about the 
democratic transition in Zambia. The confusion stemmed from what Gilbert 
Mudenda identified in the early 1980s. He argued, 
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Zambia, like most other African countries, is in the throes of a process of 
social change and transformation. However, neither social scientists nor the 
actors themselves seem to have a clear perception or understanding of this 
process. Such a 'blind spot' is largely due to the fact that there has been a 
campaign in most African countries against a scientific approach to the study 
of African social formations.91 
To amplify the point, Hamalengwa suggests that in the Zambian case it 
must be critically understood that, 
Political transformation, i. e., multiparty politics will not necessarily lead to 
the solidification of democracy in Zambia. Zambia faces severe economic 
crisis. . . . The debt crisis is as much a threat to political democracy as 
political autocracy itself. The debt means that the demands of the people 
cannot easily and immediately be met The unmet demands will lead to 
frustration and eventual protests. The state may be forced to repress these 
demands leading to political crisis and the beginnings of the cycle of 
repression and violence. Political democracy can only go so far. The 
challenge for Zambia and all African countries contemplating multiparty 
politics remain the same: Can these regimes, having ben formally 
redemocratized remain without altering any of the social, economic and 
political factors that unleashed undemocratic tendencies in the first place?92 
The struggle for democracy in Zambia has historically been complicated 
and even contradictory. However, it continues like most democratization 
processes to march on. The final outcome, more likely than not, will be 
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CHAPTER IV 
DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE IN 
UNITED STATES' FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS AFRICA: 
THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 
In this chapter, United States foreign policy towards Africa in the post- 
Cold War era is analyzed. Specifically investigated is the emergence of democracy 
assistance as a core component of United States foreign policy and its application 
in policy toward the Africa region. The chapter contains a brief outline of policy 
towards Africa by post cold war administrations. Special attention is given to the 
key assumptions underlying the approaches utilized by the United States Agency 
for International Development, the principal U. S. institution charged with 
providing democracy assistance worldwide. The model of democracy being 
promoted by the United States government, and organizations contracted with it, 
is critiqued. Also in this section, extensive use is made of the work already 
undertaken by Tom Carothers, the leading authority on United Stated democracy 
assistance. Finally, an overview of United States democracy assistance activities 
during the post-Cold War era in Africa generally and in Southern Africa in 
particular is presented along with a detailed overview of the United States 
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Democracy Assistance programs specific to Zambia between the years 1992-1997 
is provided. 
A Different World 
With the dawning of the 21st century upon us, humanity is already facing 
a world that is radically different than it was a few years ago. Three fundamental 
changes have occurred in the international community over the past decade which 
will have significant influence on international relations for a long time to come, 
they are: 1) the disintegration of the Soviet Union and collapse of communism as 
an alternative social system, 2) the Persian Gulf War under the banner of the 
United Nations, and 3) the emergence of economic superpowers to rival the 
United States military hegemony. These global shifts have transpired at the same 
time that the United States is in decline and experiencing a crisis of democracy as 
well as having lost its once unchallenged ability to influence international 
developments in the direction that it chooses.1 
In the new international political reality the old is sharply juxtaposed 
against the new. At a moment in history when humanity possesses the technology 
and productive capacity to substantially eliminate disease, hunger, homelessness, 
ignorance, poverty, and racial, gender, and economic inequality, these age-old 
afflictions are increasing in most countries. 
Today, globalization is a fact of life that cannot be dismissed. The 
continuing consolidation of the global economy could come to mean the end of 
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work as we have known it in the past. The search for higher profits has caused 
transnational corporations to relocate factories in areas where labor and 
environmental standards are low or unenforced and the rate of profit therefore 
higher. The "free market" is seen as the universal regulator of all social, political 
and economic relations. The result has been an internationalization of politics. 
This has led some policy makers and observers to assert that, 
The last several years have been an extraordinary time to be an 
American. We have seen rival governments and economic systems topple 
and un-ravel in virtually all of Eastern Europe and parts of Asia. Without its 
foes firing a shot, the Soviet Union, with the strongest army in the world 
collapsed. No amount of military might could substitute for a government 
that did not work, an economy that could not produce, and a social policy 
that represented the identities and aspirations of different nationalities and 
individual citizens. From these events, America has emerged as the sole 
superpower. Our unchallenged preeminence in the world, however, has not 
left us altogether settled on our future course, nor free of internal problems. 
There is clear and increasing evidence that our own political and economic 
systems, though still resilient, must be strengthened. Our ability to continue 
to lead globally will be determined by our ability to put our own house in 
order.2 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States did become the 
world's single superpower, militarily, diplomatically and politically. However, 
with the continuing rise of Japan and Asia, the newly unified Germany and 
Europe, the United States economic position has been challenged. Consequently, 
both economic and national security concerns continue to play an enormously 
important role in the shaping of United States foreign policy in the post-Cold War 
period. The perennial debate regarding human rights and trade with China is a 
classic example. Thus far, the market has won every battle. The major motivation 
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for taking contradictory and paradoxical policy positions could be a concern of 
possibly "falling behind." According to the United States State Department, 
several potential threats or themes have emerged that characterize United States 
foreign policy in the post-Cold War. These include: concern over immigration, 
nuclear proliferation, expansion of trade, growth of "rogue states" and Islamic 
fundamentalist movements, collapse of major nation-states, international drug 
trafficking and crime, environmental degradation, disease and health care, and 
finally population control.3 
All of the aforementioned topics can be addressed by the six strategic 
assumptions made by the United States government about long term global 
trends. The six strategic assumptions are: multiple conflicts; new technology; 
global problems; multilateral cooperation; democracy; and economic 
interdependence.4 
Multilateralism has been a central theme of the Clinton Administration 
in particular, the expanded use of the United Nations, and a sharing of global 
responsibilities with U. S. allies. The failed policy intervention in Somalia 
spurred what some referred to as the Somalia Syndrome, and a general rethinking 
of an overdependency on multilateralism, especially as it relates to military 
intervention. The isolationist tendency among right-wing Republicans and 
conservative Democrats is, in part, sustained by a fear that the sovereignty of the 
United States is being undermined by the uncontrollable movement of capital. 
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The end of the Cold War led many to believe that reductions in military 
spending would be possible, since the "Soviet threat" had diminished. Politicians, 
the media, and the public began to openly discuss where these savings might be 
invested-deficit reduction, economic conversion, or domestic needs such as 
housing, social security and education. Despite this, the peace dividend never 
actually materialized. Instead, military spending has remained at Cold War levels 
as the Pentagon and its supporters left no stone unturned in the desperate search 
for a reason to exist and expand. For example, in 1993 the Department of Defense 
performed what it claimed was a detailed assessment of international threats to 
determine U.S. security needs in the post Cold War era. 
The conclusions of the "bottom-up review" (BUR) were strikingly distant 
from reality, arguing that the post-Cold War world has become a more dangerous 
place despite the Soviet fall. The Pentagon reasoned that the United States needed 
to be prepared to fight two major regional conflicts on opposite sides of the globe 
at the same time, without any assistance from the United Nations or other allies. 
The Pentagon further argued that so-called "rogue nations" such as Iran, Iraq, 
Syria, Libya, and North Korea, constitute a serious military threat to U.S. national 
security despite die fact that combined these countries spend less than $10 billion 
per year on their militaries, compared to the over $260 billion a year the United 
States spends.5 
U.S. military intervention in the post-Cold War period has been 
conducted on an ever-changing basis. In 1990, under the banner, "Operation Just 
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Cause/1 the United States invaded Panama because of alleged involvement in drug 
trafficking by the state president who had been indicted by a U.S. grand jury 
based in Florida. According to informed observers there are more drugs flowing 
through Panama today than ever before. In Iraq in 1991, "Operation Desert Storm" 
was launched because of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and alleged Iraqi human 
rights violations in Kuwaiti hospitals. Later, the testimony delivered by the 
Kuwaiti ambassador's daughter of stories of babies being taken from incubators 
was revealed to be false. In fact, the United States Congress did not even know 
that she was the daughter of the ambassador. In Somalia, in 1992, "Operation 
Restore Hope," was presented to the American people as a "humanitarian 
intervention." Hope was not restored and when a U. S. army solider was dragged 
through the streets of Mogadishu after his helicopter (which had been firing 
indiscriminately in a raid trying to arrest General Aideed) had been shot down, 
the Clinton White House began to re-think peacekeeping in Africa, and more 
about re-election than saving Somalia from itself. With respect to the threatened 
invasion of Haiti in 1994, the U.S. was prepared to go in and get rid of a military 
dictator in order to restore "democracy."6 
Finally, the next most celebrated engagement or overt military 
intervention, has been to "restore peace" and end "ethnic cleansing" in the former 
Yugoslavia as part of NATO forces. Inherent in all these episodes, the idea of 
promoting democracy has been an underlying theme that has sometimes made its 
way to the headlines. 
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United States' Policy Toward Africa 
United States' policy toward Africa in the post-Cold War period has 
reflected all the aforementioned themes. Providing continued humanitarian aid, 
peacekeeping support, democracy assistance, and assistance toward making a 
transition to capitalism or the free market has been the main policy options 
pursued by the United States to produce a stable Africa. Former United States 
Ambassador to Zaire, Daniel Simpson, asserts that the promotion of 
democratization is a wise foreign policy for the United States to have toward 
Africa. He has also argued that, 
In the 1990s, the United States concluded that democracy might be a benign 
vehicle to prevent or cure what so manifestly ailed African countries -the 
names of Somalia, Liberia, Angola, Burundi, Rwanda, Zaire, Nigeria, and the 
Sudan signal clearly that the problem of governance has not yet been resolved 
in Africa. To some degree at least, the United States pulled in its train a 
skeptical or cynical France, UK, and other still interested powers who were 
unable or unwilling to profess themselves opposed to the concept of 
democracy.7 
However, this was not always the case. Defending United States strategic 
interest on many occasions was explicitly placed ahead of promoting democracy. 
In fact, Michael Clough has argued that for most of the last fifty years, United 
States' policy toward Africa was developed and implemented within the Cold 
War context.8 Therefore, the containment of communism and the elimination of 
any radical and nationalist movements were the overriding principles of United 
States' policy toward Africa. United States Cold War policy caused Africa not to 
be seen as a region unto itself by policy makers but as a continent rife for Soviet 
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and/or Chinese Communist intervention.9 It was believed that this was the case 
because of material support provided and the growing link between national 
liberation movements in Africa and their expressed socialist ideology. Againstthe 
background of a disgraceful European colonial history, and discredited neo¬ 
colonial policies, it is easy to understand why leaders of national liberation 
movements sought an alternative development model. However, the Cold War 
policy perspective led the United States, with the assistance of apartheid South 
Africa, to support anti-communist rebel movements that fueled civil wars in 
Angola and Mozambique. Those wars ruined the infrastructures of the two 
countries, maimed and killed hundreds of thousands of civilians, and displaced 
millions more. Not only were decades lost but perhaps also lost was those new 
governments' chance of developing and offering human dignity to their people. 
The long civil wars in Southern Africa alone were estimated to have cost over 1.5 
million lives and tens of billions of dollars. 
Africa, save for Liberia, has long been seen as a European sphere of 
influence by United States policy makers.10 Therefore, United States/Africa 
relations after World War II existed on two tracks. On the one hand, it was 
presented rhetorically in the context of the anti-colonial struggle. The United 
States was not seen as a colonial power and therefore attempted to ostensibly side 
with the anti-colonial thrust moving toward independence. That was highlighted 
during the Suez Canal crisis when the United States requested the British and 
French to explore alternative policy options, other than war, toward the Egyptian 
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government.11 At the same time however, it was not until the late 1950s, as the 
movement for independence was heating up, that a Bureau of African Affairs was 
established at the State Department. United States policy makers "rediscovered" 
Africa and its meaning for domestic politics as well.12 United States policy 
formulation on Africa from that time to today has been subject to the bureaucratic 
process more often than other regions.13 Even the assignment of ambassadorial 
posts has been, more often than not, determined by contributions to the political 
party that won the White House rather than an individual's knowledge, training 
or concern for a particular country or people. The Bush administration was 
notorious for engaging in this practice.14 
The marginalization of Africa in United States foreign policy was due to 
structural and ideological reasons such as racism, which influenced policy 
formulation as well as the general dismissal of the importance of Africa and 
African political issues to United States national security concerns.15 However, 
once Africa became a staging ground for the East/West ideological struggle 
during the Cold War period, its importance increased as did the need to know 
more about what developments were occurring on the continent. The Cold War 
also placed tremendous challenges before each side to explain the shortcomings 
of their own societies as well.16 The United States, seen as the leading Western 
capitalist country (the leaders of the "free world"), had to confront its problem of 
racial oppression and the extensive network of Jim Crow laws connected with the 
system of segregation maintained against African American citizens and other 
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national minority populations, at the international level.17 For some U.S. 
policymakers the system of "American Apartheid" hindered the promotion of the 
view that the U.S.A. was "the land of the free and the home of the brave" in the 
ideological contest with the "evil empire" operating behind the "Iron Curtain."18 
In contemporary United States foreign policy formulation, the continent 
of Africa is still seen as being part of two regions. North Africa (Algeria, Tunisia, 
Libya, Sudan, Morocco, and Egypt) is viewed as part of the Margrab region 
(inclusive of what is referred to as the Near East) and is therefore calculated into 
United States policy perspectives on the Middle East and Persian Gulf. Sub- 
Saharan Africa, from a United States' perspective, includes the other forty-five 
African states of the Organization of African Unity. 
Understanding the process of United States foreign policy formation, 
implementation and execution are also critical to gaining a proper perspective as 
to why United States' human rights and democracy assistance policy toward 
Africa has been expressed in the manner that it has thus far. 
With respect to United States Africa policy formation, several observers 
have suggested one often assumes that during a United States administration, 
Africa policy flows directly from the President through the Secretary of State to 
the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs and the State Department's 
Bureau for African Affairs down to desk officers and back out again to U.S. 
embassies around the world.19 The reality, however, is 
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a jumble of often conflicting advice and competing claims by domestic and 
foreign interests of rival actors including the National Security Council, the 
Pentagon, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Departments of Commerce, 
Agriculture and Treasury, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs (in particular each of the respective sub¬ 
committees on African Affairs) and influential non-governmental agencies 
such as multinational corporations and a few specialized think tanks.20 
Thus, a critical review of United States Africa policy suggests that the policy 
formation process is the result of a conglomeration of individual state policies as 
opposed to a specific regional outlook. Additionally, it has been observed that the 
historical position and actions of the United States is not lost on African leaders 
and thereby creates several problems for implementation of United States Africa 
policy.21 
As the 1980s began to unfold, the newly elected Reagan Administration 
sought to move away from the Carter Administration's focus on human rights and 
find a way to support friendly government, a good number of whom were 
dictators with horrible human rights records, and at the same time to sell 
interventionist policies at home as the defense of United States national security.22 
The solution was to return to the older Cold War policy norms built on American 
exceptionalism (the "shining city on the hill" and Manifest Destiny), and the 
promotion of liberal free market democracy within an anti-communist 
framework.23 Philosophically, it was Jane Kirkpatrick, the then United States 
permanent Representative to the United Nations, that articulated a rationale for 
distinguishing between authoritarian and totalitarian leaders that provided the 
necessary ideological justification for the about face policy change in the direction 
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of once again providing support to ruthless dictators, military juntas and sadistic 
counter-revolutionary forces.24 
It was the creation of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) 
during the Reagan Administration that provided a completely new operational 
vehicle to transmit the imaginative direction and at the same time be a less 
intrusive way to promote United States foreign policy aims, in particular, a United 
States version of free market democracy. 
Thomas Carothers, perhaps the foremost authority on United States 
democracy assistance, has suggested that, 
The emergence of the current wave of US democracy assistance occurred in 
the early to mid-1980s and was part of or at least related to the heightened 
cold-war policy of the early Reagan years. The National Endowment for 
Democracy (NED), a government-funded but privately-run organization 
devoted to promoting democracy abroad, was set up in 1984 with an $18 
million annual budget (currently $30 million). The idea for such an 
organization had germinated in the 1970s but found greater receptivity with 
the Reagan administration, which saw democracy promotion as an essential 
tool for fighting what was known in the United States as the war of ideas 
with the Soviet Union. Although the Endowment was soon eclipsed in size 
and significance as a democracy promotion actor by the US Agency for 
International Development (USAID), its founding concretely marked the start 
of the new trend toward democracy assistance.25 
The National Endowment for Democracy has an explicit mandate to 
promote and assist democracy abroad. The Endowment makes grants directly 
through its discretionary program and through it four core agencies. Larry 
Diamond has referred to the National Endowment for Democracy as a "quasi- 
gov emmental" organization, because it, like the German party foundations or 
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Stiftungen (which have been providing democracy assistance since the 1950's), is 
publicly funded but independently operated and directed.26 
The four core agencies affiliated with the National Endowment for 
Democracy are: the International Republican Institute (IRI), the National 
Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), the Free Trade Union Institute 
that now operates as the Solidarity Center of the AFL-CIO, and the Center for 
International Private Enterprise (CIPE), which is associated with the United States 
Chamber of Commerce.27 With the exception of the Solidarity Center, the other 
three core agencies were founded in 1984 following the creation of the 
Endowment. The Republican Institute is associated with the Republican Party, 
while the National Democratic Institute is associated with the Democratic Party. 
The Solidarity Center represents organized labor and the Center for Private 
Enterprise represents the United States business community. All the core 
organizations function independently of each other. 
The extensive use of non-govemmental organizations has, since the late 
1980s, been seen as a key ingredient in the new approach toward democracy 
promotion. According to the State Department's 1998 Strategic Plan for United 
States Foreign Policy, non-govemmental organization's "independence from the 
U.S. Government provides for flexibility in programming and in establishing 
partnerships."28 
Other key non-govemmental institutions very involved with providing 
democracy assistance programs funded by the United States government include 
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the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), the Asia Foundation, the 
Carter Center, the American Bar Association, the African American Institute, 
World Learning, Academy for Educational Development, Save the Children, and 
PACT, as well as numerous colleges and universities, and an increasing number 
of non-constituency based for-profit organizations.29 
Democracy Promotion and United States' Foreign Policy 
in the Post-Cold War Era 
As mentioned above, democracy promotion has become one of the core 
foreign policy principles of both post-Cold War United States administrations to 
date. In fact, the Republican Bush Administration's policy (1988-1992), to a great 
degree, has been extended by the Democratic Clinton Administrations (1992-2000), 
with some minor variations.30 Diamond argues that historically, the United States 
has been involved for some time in democracy promotion through a variety of 
governmental institutions. He says for instance, 
During the Cold War, USIA (and the associated anti-Communist Radio 
Liberty and Radio Free Europe) did much to puncture the totalitarian lid of 
secrecy and advance pluralist, democratic ideas. Today, USIA administers 
a wide range of activities to explain and advocate the concept of democracy; 
to provide information and counsel on institutional and policy options to 
those trying to consolidate democracy; and to facilitate links with American 
institutions toward those goals. In addition to its Fulbright scholarly 
exchanges, USIA brings hundreds of foreign professionals to the United 
States each year for month-long visits; places "professionals in residence" for 
limited periods (up to six months) to help establish democratic legislatures, 
media, and judicial systems; sponsors lecture tours and consultations by 
American experts By 1992 USIA missions in 85 countries had undertaken 
132 major projects under the agency's initiative for "Building Democratic 
Institutions," as well as another 215 projects addressed to related themes such 
as market-oriented economic reform and the free flow of information. 
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Almost all of USIA's Africa posts listed democracy programming as the 
number one theme in their FY95 country plans.31 
Diamond also points out that the United States Defense Department has 
increasingly involved itself in democracy promotion activities as well. He states, 
The U.S. Defense Department has also devoted increasing attention to 
fostering democratic civil-military relations abroad. In 1993, with support 
from the U.S. Congress and the German Government, the U.S. Secretary of 
Defense established the George C. Marshall European Center for Security 
Studies in Bavaria as an element of the U.S. European Command. In addition 
to promoting defense cooperation and partnership with the emerging 
democracies of Eastern and Central Europe, the defense training programs 
of die center (for both military and civilian defense officials) include extensive 
curricula in 'democratic defense management/ such as the role of executive 
and legislative oversight, the professional role of the military in democracies, 
and reconciling intelligence systems with the need for openness in a 
democratic society.32 
However, the principal United States governmental agency conducting 
democracy promotion under both Clinton Administrations has been the United 
States Agency for International Development In fact, democracy promotion is 
one of the fastest growth industries for foreign policy experts who have been 
called upon to advise numerous aid agencies active in providing assistance to 
governmental institutions and civil society organizations. Reflecting the new 
found interest in democracy a plethora of academic works have also been written 
debating the merits of promoting democracy abroad.33 Under the Clinton 
Administrations, the head of the U.S. Agency for International Development was 
Brian Atwood. Atwood had been the immediate past president of the National 
Democratic Institute for International Affairs, one of the four core institutions of 
the National Endowment for Democracy. 
140 
The Bush Administration 
As the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union neared 
an end, it was the fall of the Berlin Wall and rapid changes in Eastern Europe in 
1989 that symbolically represent the new "democratic" thrust.34 Citizens and 
newly-formed citizens' groups organized for political liberalization on a massive 
scale. These changes happened during the same period that the Gulf War took 
place. Although the Gulf War's rationale was centered around protecting the 
sovereignty of another country, and the violation of human rights in a country 
under occupation, perhaps the most defining statement of the period was the Bush 
Administration announcement of the existence of a New World Order.35 The Bush 
Administration's "New World Order" vision of the international community had 
as a component, the right to democratic governance. In some respects, as it was 
announced that the Cold War was over and the United States and the West were 
the victor, another confrontation was seen looming over the horizon. Some 
suggested that it might even be a more fundamental conflict, a "clash of 
civilizations."36 Whatever the situation, the United States had to rethink its 
engagement with the world. Several observers argued for a more isolated 
existence by the United States in such an uncertain world. Others suggested that 
it was now the United States' duty to spread democracy around the world.37 
The post-Cold War Bush and Clinton Administrations chose the latter 
option. In fact, the United States has been the leading industrialized country 
promoting democracy since the announcement of its "Democracy Initiative" in 
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December 1990, the same month that Iraq was given a deadline of January 15,1991 
to get out of Kuwait. 
In order to carry out the new initiative and to shed some of the anti¬ 
communist orientation, the Agency for International Development had to reorient 
itself. According to Larry Diamond, 
AID launched a historic reorientation of its mission. The initiative established 
the promotion of democracy as one of the agency's central aims and involved 
it extensively in assistance programs for free and fair elections, constitutional 
drafting, legislatures, judicial systems, local government, anti-corruption 
efforts, regulatory reform, civic education, and independent organizations 
and media in civil society. AID'S involvement in democracy promotion was 
deepened further with the inauguration of President Clinton, who had 
featured the promotion of democracy worldwide as one of the few foreign 
policy themes of his 1992 campaign. For Africa alone, AID funding for 
democratic governance programs increased from $5.3 million in 1990 to $119 
million in fiscal year 1994.38 
The Clinton Administration 
Upon entering the White House in 1993, Anthony Lake, the Clinton 
Administration's first National Security Advisor, selected Africa as his first topic 
of discussion. Also during the Clinton Administration, the first ever White House 
Conference on Africa was held.39 Although the place of Africa in United States 
foreign policy symbolically received more attention from the Executive branch, 
Clinton's first Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, only visited Africa once and 
that was just before he left his position, as compared to at least twenty-eight trips 
he made to the Middle East.40 It was also during the second Clinton 
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Administration that a historic visit to Africa in March of 1998 was made and an 
a controversial African Trade bill introduced and passed by the Congress.41 
Under the Clinton Administration, United States democracy assistance 
has steadily increased in all developing regions of the international community. 
According to Carothers, 
USAID's democracy-related programming expanded rapidly in the early 
1990s, reaching more countries in Latin America and Asia and spreading 
widely into Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union and Africa, and even to 
a limited extent the Middle East. Spending on such assistance by the U. S. 
government grew to approximately $400 million per year. It was in these 
years that democracy promotion was elevated to the status of a core priority 
of U. S. foreign aid. Internal bureaucratic structures were developed to 
institutionalize democracy promotion with USAID, an agency that had long 
focused almost exclusively on social and economic development.42 
A brief but closer look at the process used by the United States government 
in providing democracy assistance will further inform the study. 
Democracy Assistance and United States' Foreign Policy 
Larry Diamond has argued in his work, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s, 
that a growing number of "established democratic states are engaged in 
democracy promotion through diplomatic pressure and initiatives, through the 
mobilization and conditioning of multilateral policies and resources, and through 
their official overseas development or aid agencies."43 
Diamond also argues that besides the Western governments that a good 
number of Western based non-governmental organizations have become part of 
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the new drive to promote democracy in developing and transitional societies. He 
says, 
Governments of the leading industrialized democracies remain the most 
important and resourceful promoters of democracy, but they increasingly 
share the arena with a wide variety of nongovernmental organizations 
(NGO). Official democracy assistance comes from countries with long 
histories and lingering ties of colonialism (especially Britain and France) and 
of foreign intervention and occupation in the name of democracy (especially 
the United States), as well as from countries wishing to develop or deepen 
trading partnerships by promoting democracy among their neighbors... .** 
In the post-Cold War era, the United States has certainly been the country 
most identified with providing democracy assistance to other members of the 
international community and has taken the lead in encouraging others to attach 
"good governance conditionalities" to aid reception. The British and the French 
followed suit. Britain even established the Westminster Foundation for 
Democracy, an institute similar to the National Endowment for Democracy. 
In the United States State Department's 1998 International Affairs 
Strategic Ran, democracy promotion continues to be identified as a core element 
of the United States foreign policy. The strategic plan states, 
Changes in the world at the end of the 20th century make this a time of 
profound choice for the United States. The foreign policy goals of creating a 
more secure, prosperous, and democratic world for the benefit of the 
American people remain fundamental. However, deep and lasting change 
to the global landscape, such as new technologies, increasing population, and 
economic and geo-political transformations, have strategic implications for 
the U.S. international leadership. Defined by reference to the past, the post¬ 
cold war era has as its most significant attribute tire absence of any 
immediate, vital threat to national security. The demise of the Soviet Union 
has left the United States as the preeminent world power and invested it with 
unparalleled leadership responsibilities. But the end of superpower 
competition also eliminated the unifying strategy for U.S. foreign policy. 
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Now, in addition to regional security issues, an array of threats-weapons 
proliferation, terrorism, ethnic and religious conflict, organized crime, drug 
trafficking, and environmental degradation-challenges U.S. interests and 
blurs the traditional dividing lines between domestic and foreign affairs.45 
Democracy promotion is identified as one of the six strategic assumptions 
regarding long-term global trends that have influenced the policy makers' 
perspective of where, when and how the United States should engage the world. 
Specifically, under that topic the plan argues, "advancing United States interests 
in the post-cold war world will often require efforts to support democratic 
transitions as well as to address human rights disasters and democratic 
reversals."46 
The United States' stated goal associated with democracy promotion is 
to increase foreign government adherence to democratic practices and respect for 
human rights.47 Such a goal is arrived at on the basis of the view held by most 
policy makers that democratic countries do not go to war with each other, and 
therefore, a world full of democratic states would be a more peaceful and stable 
world.48 The strategies outlined for achieving the stated goal include the 
following: 
□ Support democratic transitions, especially in regions and countries of 
importance to the United States. 
□ Build, strengthen, and employ international forums to secure democratic 
transitions, prevent conflict, promote human rights, including labor 
rights, and support multilateral sanctions. Promote development of 
national and multilateral institutions for the promotion of human rights 
and the rule of law. 
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□ Support respect for human rights globally and intervene in selected 
human rights cases. 
□ Support democratic transitions through bilateral and multilateral 
assistance and exchanges, broadcast, and informational programs to 
establish and consolidate: competitive political processes, including free 
and fair elections; politically active civil societies, enhance women's 
political participation, free media, representative labor movements, and 
other pluralistic organizations; transparent and accountable government 
institutions; the rule of law, including neutral and professional law 
enforcement; and commitment to human rights.49 
Three key assumptions undergird the outlined strategies. They are as 
follows: 
1. The international environment will increasingly favor democracy, 
leading governments to profess democratic principles, but democratic 
practices will vary, depending in particular on the will and intentions of 
leaders. 
2. The transition and consolidation of democracy varies from state to state, 
but international influence can be crucial to the outcome. 
3. U.S. pursuit of democratic transitions in certain countries and 
circumstances will be subject to countervailing influences and interests.50 
Because it is the United States Agency for International Development that 
has been designated as the primary channel for United States foreign assistance, 
democracy assistance is seen as a mutually supporting part of its other strategic 
objectives. 
With the fall of the Berlin Wall, the demise of the Soviet Union, and the 
passing of communism as a threat to nations around the world, U.S. foreign 
policy moved into a new era. No longer does the United States have one 
clearly defined adversary, and thus no one measure by which to calibrate 
foreign policy worldwide. While they may be more diffuse, dangers and 
threats to peace, stability and economic prosperity persists in this new era. 
The challenges now is to recognize and understand multiple and constantly- 
shifting sources of peril and to address complex and inter-linked causes of 
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unrest such as ethnic strife, environmental degradation, rapid population 
growth, and poor economic performance. In the words of President Clinton, 
'Never has American leadership been more essential—to navigate the shoals 
of the world's new dangers and to capitalize on its opportunities/ One of 
these opportunities is to promote principles of democratic governance and 
provide technical assistance to newly formed democracies. USAID works to 
encourage democracy in developing nations throughout the world partly on 
the intrinsic value which rests in the ideals of liberty, personal and civic 
freedom, and government of, for and by the people: ideals on which the 
United States was founded and which continue to gird the social and political 
life of our nation.51 
The basic philosophy undergirding the United States approach to 
democracy promotion can be gleaned from the following statement by the Clinton 
Administration in its 1998 National Security Strategy of Engagement and 
Enlargement 
... the core of our strategy is to help democracy and free-markets expand and 
survive in other places where we have the strongest security concerns arid 
where we can make the greatest difference. This is not a democratic crusade; 
it is a pragmatic commitment to see freedom take hold where that will help 
us most Thus, we must target our efforts to assist states that assist our 
strategic interest. ... We must focus our efforts where we have most 
leverage. And our efforts must be demand driven-they must focus on 
nations whose people are pushing for reform or have already secured it.52 
While the approach is suggested as pragmatism in order to deal with 
critics, it nevertheless, continues to promote an ideological perspective linking the 
idea of United States national identity to that of democracy promotion. More 
fundamentally, however, is the fact that promotion of democracy and the 
expansion of free markets are seen as being important to United States national 
security interests. 
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The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has 
articulated the challenge of promoting democracy in the following terms, 
People throughout the world have demonstrated by their own actions 
that freedom is a universal concept. Men and women have risked their lives 
for the proposition that freedom, human rights, and accountable government 
are not just the province of a few industrialized states. The influence of 
democratic ideas has never been greater.... Political openings during the 
past decade came as a result of concerted, often courageous, indigenous 
efforts to build democracy. Some autocrats conceded their failure at the ballot 
box; some simply resigned; some embraced reform. A number of nations 
pursued democracy as an alternative to civil war. . . . The democratic 
transitions of the last few years create the possibility of a more peaceful, more 
rational, and more productive world. At the same time, nascent democratic 
institutions and processes are strained by unrealistic expectations of 
immediate socioeconomic progress, and by the rekindling of old enmities, 
including religious, regional, and ethnic passions. Moreover, many new 
democracies need to expand and deepen the transition process beyond a 
periodic vote for national leadership. They need to institutionalize 
community participation at the local level and an accountable, transparent 
style of governance that can ensure citizens a modicum of control over their 
own lives.53 
Therefore, the USAID Strategic Plan for democracy promotion identifies four 
critically important focus areas for building sustainable democracies. The Agency 
says, 
Establishing democratic institutions, free and open markets, an informed and 
educated populace, a vibrant civil society, and a relationship between state 
and society that encourages pluralism, participation and peaceful conflict 
resolution-all of these contribute to the goal of building sustainable 
democracies. The Agency's Strategic Plan, adopted in 1997 identifies four 
strategic objectives in the democracy sector: a) rule of law and respect for 
human rights strengthened; b) credible and competitive political processes 
encouraged; c) development of a politically active civil society promoted; and 
d) transparent and accountable government institutions encouraged. 
Progress toward all four objectives is necessary to achieve sustainable 
democracy.54 
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In the area of Rule of Law and respect for human rights, the USAID says 
the following: 
Without the rule of law, a state lacks: a) the legal framework necessary for 
civil society to flourish; b) adequate checks on the executive and legislative 
branches of government; and c) necessary legal foundations for free and fair 
electoral and political processes. Beyond the democracy and governance 
sector, the accomplishment of other USAID goals relies on effective rule of 
law. For example, civil and commercial codes that respect private property 
and contracts are key ingredients for the development of market-based 
economies. USAID's efforts to strengthen legal systems fall under three inter¬ 
connected priority areas: supporting legal reform, improving the 
administration of justice, and increasing citizens' access to justice.55 
In the area of Election and Political Processes USAID urgues^that, 
Free and fair elections are integral to a functioning democracy. ... USAID 
provides rapid response capabilities in the following areas: conducting pre¬ 
election assessments; training election commissions; training poll watchers 
and/or providing assistance to other polling officials; identifying, 
developing, and procuring election commodities; training indigenous and/or 
international election observers; developing civic and voter education 
techniques; training election officials, legislators, and government leaders; 
and developing programs to address gender, minority and ethnic issues.56 
With respect to the development of civil society USAID says, 
The hallmark of a free society is the ability of individuals to associate with 
like-minded individuals, express their views publicly, openly debate public 
policy, and petition their government. ... USAID is working to strengthen 
commitment to an independent and politically active civil society in 
developing countries. The range of groups receiving USAID assistance 
includes coalitions of professional associations, civic education groups, 
women's rights organizations, business and labor federations, media groups, 
bar associations, environmental activist groups, and human rights monitoring 
organizations.57 
Finally, in the area of governance the agency declares, 
A key determinant for successful democratic consolidation is the ability of 
democratically-elected governments to provide 'good governance.' While 
many citizens of developing countries value characteristics associated with 
149 
democracy . . . they are often equally interested in qualities such as public 
accountability, responsiveness, transparency, and efficiency Because the 
behavior of formal state actors can support or undermine developmental and 
democratic processes, USAID works to encourage and assist young 
democratic governments to reform their structures and processes to make 
them more transparent, accountable, and participatory. USAID works to 
encourage more transparent and accountable government institutions in five 
areas; governmental integrity; democratic decentralization; legislative 
strengthening; civil-military relations; and effective policy implementation.58 
From the above statements drawn from the most recent articulation of the 
role of democracy and governance programs in the development assistance 
mission of the United States Agency for international Development, one can 
discern that for USAID democratization is an essential part of sustainable 
development because it facilitates the protection of human rights, informed 
participation, and public sector accountability. 
United States Democracy Assistance and Africa 
Africa has been a major region for United States democracy assistance 
during the decade of the 1990s. Table 1.0 shows the allocation of USAID funding 
of functions to Africa and other regions of the world. 
The following figures show the proportion of USAID democracy 
assistance provided forelections and political processes, governance, civil society, 
and rule of law between fiscal years 1990 and 1997. 
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TABLE 1.0 














AFRICA 11,740 5,211 23,134 26,651 634 67,370 
ASIA/ 
NEAR EAST 
10,208 5,497 25,212 20,257 3,085 64,259 
EUROPE 
AND NIS 
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Fig. 1.2 
USAID Funding by Region for Governance FY 1990-1997 
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United States Democracy Assistance and Southern Africa 
Of all the regions on the African continent, the one where the United 
States has provided more resources for the promotion of democracy is Southern 
Africa. United States involvement in the sub-region interestingly enough grows 
out of its Cold War policy of containment of communism.59 
United States strategic interest in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Zimbabwe, and South Africa were once articulated as being important to the 
national security of the United States. While that is not the case today, Southern 
Africa is seen as the region that could be the engine for the economic and political 
rebirth of Africa. 
With respect to United States democracy assistance programs in the sub- 
region, most have existed or continued to exist since 1991 thereby making it one 
region of the world where democracy assistance has been provided over a 
sustained period of time. Democracy programs have been conducted in Namibia, 
South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, Botswana, Malawi, Lesotho, Swaziland, 
Zimbabwe and Zambia.60 Additionally, a regional headquarters for democracy 
support by the United States Agency for International Development was 
established in Botswana in 1995. Therefore, the United States presence is well 
established and directly connected with providing some type of democracy 
assistance throughout the entire region.61 
Southern Africa is also a region of focus for the United States because of 
its potential for growth, the existing human resource base and markets, mineral 
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wealth, and the existence of the Southern Africa Development Committee (SADC), 
the regional organization working toward regional integration. Southern Africa 
is currently one of the fastest growing markets in Africa for United States exports 
and United States investment. The United States State Department believes the 
sub-region can achieve its full potential only if the it remains a positive 
environment for democracy. 
USAID Views of the Sub-Region 
A brief overview of United States interests, as presented by the United 
States Agency for International Development in several of the regions' key 
countries, will help establish United States' national interest in Zambia in a 
regional context before proceeding to specifically address United States 
democracy assistance programs in Zambia. 
Angola 
Angola is one of the richest and most materially endowed countries in the 
sub-region. Its enormous deposits of oil and diamonds has caused it to be of 
interest to transnational corporations, multilateral banks and the industrialized 
world. According to USAID, United States' national interest in Angola lies in the 
consolidation of peace, a successful democratic transition, the promotion of U. S. 
economic interests and Angola's meaningful economic integration into the 
region.62 
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The Agency pointed out four meaningful elements in the United 
States/ Angola relationship. The key elements are: 1) the U. S. is currently 
receiving approximately seven percent of its petroleum from Angola and that level 
should increase to about 15 percent over the next decade; 2) Angola is the United 
States' second largest investment site in sub-Saharan Africa, with over $4 billion 
invested to date; 3) With increased stability, the country will play a more 
significant role in the southern Africa economy, which is expected to be an engine 
of future growth for the continent; and 4) In the 1996/1997 period, the United 
States became the largest bilateral donor to Angola, providing $191 million of 
assistance over the two-year period.63 
The Agency also warns that if the peace process does not succeed, large 
quantities of food assistance and/or expensive peacekeeping interventions may 
be required again as a humanitarian response to a continuing man-made disaster. 
Additionally, it stressed that Angola's external debt burden, $11.5 billion in 1995, 
was close to three times its gross domestic product.64 All this should be measured 
against the background of expanded fighting, not only in Angola but also the 
Angolan government's involvement in the conflict in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo. 
In its 1999 Congressional Presentation, the Agency identified the 
development challenge in the following terms: 
Angola emerged from over 20 years of fighting with 500,000 dead, 3.5 million 
internally displaced persons, and more than 300,00 refugees in neighboring 
countries. Most of the country's infrastructure was destroyed, millions of 
158 
land mines were laid, and the economy largely collapsed. Civil society 
ceased to exist. As a consequence, most Angolans were politically 
disenfranchised and economically marginalized— Virtually all non-security 
related organizations function poorly, with the health, education and judicial 
systems the most striking institutional casualties.65 
The United States' democracy assistance program for FY1999 was slated 
to work towards building more democratic institutions and practices in Angola 
at the community level, provide assistance to the electoral process (if municipal 
elections were held), and support efforts to increase the role and participation of 
women in political organizations.66 
Namibia 
According to USAID, its support to Namibia is designed to assist the 
country in becoming a model for democracy and development in Southern Africa. 
The Agency also argues that it was through USAID's assistance that the Namibian 
parliament is actively soliciting and using citizen input on pending legislation and 
promoting public debate on upcoming issues.67 
The background to the transition is presented as follows: 
Eight years after independence, Namibia remains committed to removal of 
the last vestiges of apartheid's social and economic policies. Health and 
education have continued to receive an increasing share of the Government 
of Namibia's development budget. . . . Although Namibia has a per capita 
income of $1,917, the richest5% minority receives 70% of the national income. 
Approximately 60% of the majority black population live in rural areas in the 
north on communal lands, surviving on annual incomes of $100 - 200 per 
annum with limited access to basic social services.68 
The presentation maintains that continued United States support will 
enable greater multiparty participation in planned regional and national elections 
159 
and will continue supportto NGOsand grassroots organizations. In 1999, USAID 
support was supposed to include assistance to the proposed independent elections 
commission; work with parliamentary party caucuses to promote outreach and 
open public debates; and training of NGOs and the media to enhance their roles 
as watchdogs and advocates in the elections process.69 
Mozambique 
With regard to Mozambique, USAID sees its regional importance, prior 
to the massive flooding, in providing ocean access for several landlocked countries 
and its proximity to the Republic of South Africa, political stability and economic 
growth in Mozambique as central reasons contributing to U.S. national interests 
of peace, stability, and economic growth throughout the entire southern Africa 
region.70 Mozambique is also seen as a growing market for U.S. exports and 
investment. In addition, Mozambique continues to attract U.S. investment in its 
vast agricultural land, valuable fisheries resources, and significant mineral and 
natural gas reserves.71 According to the Congressional presentation, 
Mozambique is a major success story of war-to-peace transition in sub- 
Saharan Africa. USAID's support has been vital to this process, which began 
with he signing of the Peace Accord in October 1992, and has encompassed 
the demobilization of opposing armies, resettlement of almost five million 
displaced persons and refugees, successful democratic elections, and the 
installation of a new government that has managed a stellar economic revival. 
. . . The economy grew at 6.6 %in 1997, with substantial increases in 
agricultural production. A streamlined investment code is expected to 
facilitate project commitments worth $6 billion in foreign investments. Land 
tenure reform is critical to economic progress and began in 1997 with new 
legislation that promotes equitable land tenure security.72 
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Several of the main economic and political development constraints 
include the fact that eighty percent of the population lives in rural areas, two- 
thirds in absolute poverty, rain fed subsistence agriculture leaves the rural poor 
particularly vulnerable to recurring drought and natural disasters and the average 
daily caloric intake in Mozambique is just 77 percent of daily requirements, 
therefore, chronic malnutrition is estimated to affect 30 percent to 40 percent of 
Mozambique's children.73 
Also according to USAID, the United States has become the largest 
bilateral donor to Mozambique and in FY 1997 provided over $51 million in 
grants and food aid.74 
The United States democracy assistance program in FY 1999, was 
designed to 
continue to focus on Mozambique's central provinces, which were the most 
affected by war, contain 50% of the country's population, and boast the 
greatest agricultural potential. ... USAID will also support Mozambique's 
second national elections-a critical juncture for this young democracy. The 
program will support capacity building of the National Assembly, civil 
society groups, more effective judicial processes including alternative dispute 
resolution, and new municipal governments.75 
Zimbabwe 
USAID argues that the United States has a national interest in supporting 
Zimbabwean leadership to strengthen regional economic and political stability. 
The agency argued in its Congressional presentation, 
Though Zimbabwe's performance under its economic reform program has 
been mixed, it has made impressive progress toward a market-oriented 
economy which will hopefully lead to greater investment, including 
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investment from the American private sector. U.S. development assistance 
supports the continuation of free market reforms and enhances Zimbabwe's 
prospects of becoming an emerging economic success story in the southern 
Africa region. The U.S. is Zimbabwe's fourth leading import source ... and 
trade flows are increasing. As Zimbabwe's economy grows, beneficial effects 
are an increasingly viable southern Africa regional market and a growing 
market for U.S. goods and services. The United States also values 
Zimbabwe's continued participation in regional peacekeeping activities.76 
USAID also believes that if economic reforms continue, Zimbabwe stands an 
excellent chance of becoming more independent of donor assistance. At the same 
time, the Agency points out that a number of serious challenges will have to be 
confronted. For example, it suggests, 
There are several crisis points in Zimbabwean society ranging from 
inequitable land distribution, to continued economic mismanagement, and 
underlying racial and ethnic tensions that have the potential for increasing 
social, political and economic instability. Recent civil disturbances and riots 
in Zimbabwe, resulting from price increases, steep currency declines and new 
taxation measures coupled with a heavy-handed government response 
demonstrate the vulnerability of the current state of democracy.77 
In Zimbabwe, USAID is moving to phase out of several elements of its 
development assistance program as activities in low-income housing, private 
enterprise development and family planning will all end in FY 2000. However, 
according to the Congressional presentation, USAID will initiate a new activity 
that will focus on increasing Zimbabweans' participation in economic and political 
processes. 
Zambia 
With respect to Zambia, USAID argued in its Congressional Presentation 
that, 
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it is in the U.S. interest for Zambia to remain a friendly, democratic state 
contributing to regional stability and firmly on the path to sustainable 
development. Zambia shares borders with the new Democratic Republic of 
Congo and Angola, and is a buttress against potential chaos. It has played a 
role in facilitating African conflict resolution, including peacekeeping, and it 
is in the U.S. interest for this to continue. Deep privatization reforms have 
created opportunities for U.S. trade and investment as well as for more 
Zambian economic participation in southern Africa. Zambia's large copper 
deposits are encouraging U.S. entry into the Zambian market, and leading 
American mining firms are in the process of acquiring large scale mining 
assets which are being privatized.78 
USAID also argues that there are several fundamental constraints to Zambia 
realizing full economic potential. 
Labor productivity is low: the HIV/ AIDS pandemic increases absenteeism 
and kills many senior managers; education levels, especially for girls, remain 
low and inhibit productivity gains; tire outreach system to farmers is weak; 
rural markets are fragmented and undeveloped; corruption and weak 
governance erode public confidence; drought constantly lurks as a possibility 
in any year. In addition, internal transport links are poor, which makes the 
cost of marketing very high. Zambia is a landlocked country and therefore 
very vulnerable to high transport costs. Inflation . . . remains around 20%; 
public expenditure controls are weak, the banking sector is also fragile; and 
domestic savings are low. Public external debt at the end of 1997 was $7.1 
billion. These constraints are symptomatic of an economy in transition from 
the statist era to a free market regime. . . . Zambia's open trading regime 
presents new opportunities primarily in agriculture, for traders, 
consolidators, producers, and processors. Large companies and multi¬ 
national corporations are ready to take on a major role under the new 
reforms. 
Finally, USAID argues that in 1999 its programs will foster an economic, 
political and social environment that promotes positive gains in living standards, 
increased opportunities for participation in the economy and the political system, 
and improved health for all Zambians. 
With respect to future programming, the Agency says, 
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In line with the Government of Zambia's desire to promote business 
development and encourage competition and investment for recovery and 
growth, USAID will facilitate broad-based participation by private enterprise 
in key economic sectors of the country. Consolidating democracy in Zambia 
remains a challenge. In FY1999, USAID assistance will continue support for 
civil society institutions, to deepen and broaden citizens' understanding of 
and demand for democratic institutions, and to help those institutions 
function better. New activities will include support for the judiciary, which 
has emerged as a defender of democratic values; and assistance to Parliament 
to enable it to be a more effective forum for citizen participation and public 
debate.79 
Post-Cold War United States democracy assistance to Zambia actually 
started in 1990. That assistance was provided to Zambian NGOs by the National 
Endowment for Democracy through the Carter Center and the National 
Democratic Institute. The program activities that were funded included training 
sessions for domestic monitors, and pre-electoral assessments by the two 
institutions.80 Later the National Endowment provided major funding for a joint 
Carter Center and the National Democratic Institute (NDI) international 
observation team for the October 1991 elections.81 
To most of the Western pro-democracy groups, Kenneth Kaunda was a 
five term, twenty-seven year ruling authoritarian leader who had overstayed his 
time. The statist economy constructed by his party, UNIP, was in shambles and 
going downhill fast In addition, the anti-apartheid foreign policy posture which 
was supported by most Zambians, could no longer be used as a domestic excuse 
for lack of sound economic development or democratic governance given the 
developments in South Africa itself. Moreover, the cult of the personality may 
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have prevented even those supporters around Kaunda from sounding the alarm 
that the party was in trouble and that if it were to survive it must change. 
For most Zambians, the October 1991 election was a referendum on the 
one-party, one-person state represented by United National Independence Party 
and its president Kenneth Kaunda.82 For the West, it was an opportunity to 
display to the "Third World" the benefits of the neo-liberal philosophy. Zambia 
would be a model of political liberalization and economic liberalization at the 
same time. Kaunda took the chance to hold elections hoping that they would 
reconfirm him and UNIP. Two interpretations emerge regarding the decision to 
hold elections. Some observers believed that by calling the election, UNIP made 
what was to be one of its first and perhaps most serious miscalculations regarding 
the mood of the people in Zambia. For them, this reflected how out of touch with 
the Zambian people the party was as it had gone from being one of the most 
effective mass based political parties in Africa, to simply being an instrument for 
the personal rule of Kaunda, surrounded by opportunists and dependents. 
Therefore, a quick election would certainly reconfirm UNIP, and be an indirect 
way of supporting the participatory democracy the party had practiced for almost 
two decades.83 
A second view that some suggested was that Kaunda, unlike many of his 
autocratic contemporaries, really did believe in the democratic process enough to 
allow Zambians to decide on the way forward, especially given the increasing 
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international pressure being applied upon the Zambian state by the international 
financial institutions and Western powers.84 
After the devastating loss, UNIP privately blamed the United States and 
the Carter Center in particular for the lost. Some members of UNIP went as far as 
suggesting that the same computers used in Nicaragua were used in Zambia or 
that special paper was used which recorded votes for the MMD in spite of the fact 
that one may have marked their cards for UNIP.85 Nevertheless, UNIP did accept 
the resounding defeat at the polls, and Dr. Kaunda handed over power peacefully 
and made what many referred to as a graceful exit. 
As mentioned earlier, it was in late 1990 when USAID launched its 
initiative focused on the promotion of democratic governance. The dramatic 
changes in Zambia coincided with the new AID initiative. Thus, soon after the 
"Democracy Initiative" had been announced an agreement was reached with the 
new Government of Zambia. A test case and an African example was needed for 
the initiative. Zambia in many ways fulfilled the criteria. The overwhelming 
victory by the MMD-the good guys-and the graceful exit by the internationally 
known and respected independence hero and five-time authoritarian president, 
Kenneth Kaunda, led many to believe that Zambia could be an important model 
for the rest of the African continent to follow. This, according to observers, was 
believed for a number of reasons. Chief among them was the perceived 
importance attached to bringing Zambia back into the fold of nations who 
responsibly serviced their debt. Only a few years before the dramatic 
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governmental change, Kaunda, largely in response to popular resistence to the 
International Monetary Fund's suggested austerity measures, had unilaterally 
decided to limit the payments of loan obligations to ten percent. Zambia's 
international debt was owed to the international financial institutions.86 Kaunda's 
action sent shock waves around the world as the Non-Aligned Movement watched 
to see what would be the West's response to the Zambian action. Therefore, to a 
degree, the IMF and World Bank, the United States, Britain and others, working 
through their official aid agencies or home-based non-govemmental 
organizations, rushed to support the new popular MMD government which was 
also intent on implementing a new structural adjustment program. It is estimated 
that the MMD government received over one billion dollars a year in aid between 
the years 1992 and 1996.87 
Shortly after the elections, the United States government designed a 
bilateral agreement with the Zambian government for political development 
assistance. The original document was signed by the then MMD Minister of Legal 
Affairs, Dr. Roger Chongwe. Thus, one of the first major democracy and 
governance initiatives in Africa was the USAID Democratic Governance Project 
in Zambia. The project was seen by USAID to be "an important venture into a 
challenging new area of assistance programming."88 
The Democratic Governance Project was a five-year $15 million activity 
designed to promote accountable government in Zambia. According to the 
Agency for International Development, the project was comprised of five mutually 
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reinforcing components. USAID described the five components in the following 
manner: 
The constitutional reform component supports the work of the Constitutional 
Review Commission (CRC) appointed by the President of Zambia in October 
1993. The project provides funds for an inaugural meeting of the CRC, the 
establishment of a CRC Secretariat, and advertizing for provincial CRC 
hearings, it is expected to underwrite the costs of printing and dissemination 
of the Commission's draft report to the nation and ultimately for printing and 
dissemination of the new constitution. 
The civic education component comprises a series of activities: (a) 
institutional support to the Foundation for Democratic Process, a civic 
education NGO; (b) assistance to FODEP in carrying out a nationwide civic 
education campaign; (c) a Civic Action Fund (CAF), a competitive small 
grants program for NGOs; and (d) support for a new civics education 
curriculum and texts in government secondary schools. 
The media Independence Component aims to enable independent and 
professional journalism by funding policy studies, short and long term 
training for media specialists, and a resource center for independent 
journalists. Participating institutions are the Zambia Institute for Mass 
Communications (ZAMCOM) and tire Department of Mass Communications, 
University of Zambia (UNZA). Support for the media resource center is 
conditional upon ZAMCOM's devolution from the Ministry of Information 
and Broadcasting. 
The legislative performance component is intended to enhance the 
effectiveness of the national assembly. In the first phase, a legislative 
performance studies group within the assembly was to prepare 
recommendations for institutional reform for adoption by the Office of the 
Speaker. Conditional on the Assembly's acceptance of these reforms, a 
second phase would provide support for Assembly staffing, library and 
publications and for a legal drafting fund. 
The policy coordination component is to facilitate the creation of a Policy 
Analysis and Coordination Division (PAC) in the Cabinet Office by providing 
short-term technical assistance, training workshops, study tours, and 
computer equipment The purpose of PAC is to improve the analytic quality 
of Cabinet decision in line Ministries.89 
168 
A political party component was added after the original project was 
developed and followed the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) funded 
work conducted by the National Democratic Institute beginning in 1993. 
Continuing in 1994 the program gave way to the USAID funded project in FY 
1994-5 as part of the overall governance and democracy program.90 USAID made 
a one-year $500,000 grant to the National Democratic Institute for a project 
designed to strengthen Zambia's political parties in anticipation of the 1996 
elections. The project was expected to provide technical assistance to political 
parties in Zambia, including party training in communications, fund-raising, 
membership recruitment, voter registration, getting out the vote, leadership 
development, and policy development. The emphasis was on the three parties in 
parliament, but other training programs were made available to other parties.91 
From the above, it can easily be seen that the democratic initiative project 
was ambitious. In fact, the Zambia Democratic Governance Project was, according 
to USAID, one of the few in Africa that, "was large enough to embrace almost all 
the key elements of democratic governance identified in AID/Washington 
strategy."92 "Along with the Ethiopia and South Africa projects, Zambia's project 
is more energetic than any other in the region in supporting democratization and 
transparent governance, one of AID'S four principal programmatic objectives."93 
The project reviewers also argued that the Zambian Democracy and 
Governance project's scope was important to acknowledge because of its potential 
important to USAID learning from its successes and failures. Moreover they 
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believed that the project would improve political participation and therebv work 
to ensure democratic consolidation in Zambia. 
The project touches on each of the main elements of democratic 
governance that AID seeks to advance. Prior to the project, the U.S. activity 
supported the 1991 multiparty elections, the first in more than two decades. 
The project has supported the constitutional reform initiative as a means of 
enhancing the rule of law and fundamental human rights. The unique 
cabinet coordination component centers directly on transparency and 
accountability. Strengthening popular participation in decision making is the 
underlying rationale for supporting media development and civic education. 
The civic education and constitutional reform components in particular 
address the issues of participation by women and minorities. All four 
elements address the objectives of improved access and governmental 
responsiveness. USAID support for constitutional reform concentrates on 
building policy dialogue between people and the Constitutional Reform 
Commission (CRC) on the design of the new constitution.94 
In short, the Zambia Democratic Governance project sought to address 
each of the identified underlying constraints to democratic governance that was 
recognized in the original USAID democratization support strategy according the 
project designers and reviewers. For instance, it was suggested, 
Constitutional reform is indispensable to enhancing governmental legitimacy, 
while civic education is perhaps the most effective means of liberating 
individual and community initiative and increasing popular participation. 
The cabinet reform component seeks to streamline governmental performance 
at the highest levels, and in so doing is almost alone in the region in 
addressing the structural prerequisites for governmental accountability."95 
Assumptions Regarding the Zambian Political Context 
Five key assumptions were made by USAID that would have to hold up 
if increased governmental accountability was to be achieved. These included: 
1) Government of Zambia will maintain its basic commitment to 
democracy, human rights, and the rule of law; 
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2) Government of Zambia's economic reform program will provide tangible 
improvements in mass living standards; 
3) The people of Zambia will take advantage of a liberalized political 
environment to participate in elections and policy debates; 
4) Other donors will supplement USAID's assistance for strengthening 
governmental and civic institutions; and 
5) There is no breakdown of public order.96 
These assumptions were derived in part from a series of baseline studies 
conducted by Michigan State University with the assistance faculty drawn from 
the University of Zambia. These studies were conducted under the direction of 
Dr. Michael Bratton, the well regarded Africanist, who had also been part of the 
international observation delegation organized by the Carter Center and the 
National Democratic Institute. 
Based on these five assumptions the project design team identified a mix 
of activities to address the following political development issues including the 
following: 
1) the liberalization of the overall legal rules for democratic governance, 
through constitutional reform; 
2) the strengthening of demand for democracy through citizen participation 
and free expression (through civic education and media independence 
components); and 
3) the supply of improved governance within governmental institutions (via 
the policy coordination and legislative performance components).97 
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United States' Democracy Assistance Strategy 
The United States supported Zambian Democracy and Governance 
Project was conceived as a demand-driven effort, i. e., Zambians would have 
ownership of the project and initiate requests for assistance. The five-year project 
was also conceived of as being implemented in a flexible manner, so as to allow 
for on-the-ground adjustments based on unforseen political developments as well 
as the fact that the entire Democratic Initiative was new to USAID. USAID 
Zambia recognized this and stated as it spoke about the democracy and 
governance project, "because in 1992 USAID's strategy and capacity for DG work 
in Africa was formative the project was designed as a flexible 'learning process 
approach' tailored to the pioneering nature of the initiative."98 
The Democracy and Governance Project Implementors 
The program was managed in Zambia by a Democracy/Governance 
Advisor within the USAID mission, by an on-site contractor, Southern University, 
and by various short term contractors and subcontractors and grantees.99 The 
United States government also coordinated its democracy activities with those of 
other Western countries. "Other U. S. activities in democracy, human rights and 
governance were coordinated with the programs of other major bilateral and 
multilateral donors in the area, principally through an informal donor 
coordination group."100 The level and nature of involvement of the donors in 
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determining Zambia's social and economic policy was even acknowledged by the 
mid-term reviewers. They observed, 
In the absence of credible opposition parties, the quest for leadership 
accountability has been led by other countervailing forces. These include the 
independent press and civic organizations, whose presence is gradually 
becoming institutionalized. More powerful are the international donors. 
Zambia's crushing debt burden and heavy dependence on concessionaire aid 
(which finances over 70 percent of the development budget) endows Lusaka's 
donor community with extraordinary influence. Not only has the 
Consultative Group requested the Zambian government to report quarterly 
on progress on good governance, but embassies and donor missions 
participate aggressively in public decision-making. Key events like the 
termination of tire State of Emergency, the firing of key cabinet ministers, and 
the rescue of independent newspapers cannot be explained without reference 
to donor intervention.101 
Southern University, the largest historically Black college in the United 
States, located in Baton Rouge and New Orleans, Louisiana, was selected by 
USAID to implement the major components of the project. Although the project 
was initiated in September 1992, Southern University only was invited to begin 
managing it in 1994. According to Gloria Braxton, the former head of Southern 
University's Center for International Development, because of the increasing 
complexity of the project, Southern University was brought on board to help 
implement the democratic and governance project. 
Michigan State University, another institution which had bid for the 
coordinator's role, was selected to conduct the mid-term, and final evaluations of 
the project as well as regular baseline assessment studies and the production of 
selected beneficiaries' profiles in cooperation with University of Zambia staff. The 
monitoring and evaluation plan for the project included the following: 
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• baseline studies, consisting of institutional profiles and beneficiary 
profiles; 
• mid-term evaluation; 
• end of project evaluation; and 
• a series of special studies on political and economic reform102 
It is important to point out that there was tension in the relationship 
between the Southern University implementors, and the Michigan State University 
evaluators, as one might expect, given that the evaluators of the project were in a 
large measure the designers of the program and had lost the bid to the institution 
it was now being asked to impartially evaluate. This, however, seems not to have 
played any significant role with respect to the success or failure of the project. 
According to Braxton, Southern University entered into the Cooperative 
Agreement with USAID to implement select elements of USAID Zambia's 
Democratic Governance Project. Those elements were civil rights promotion, 
media independence, legislative performance, cabinet office policy, and 
constitutional review.103 
The purpose of the project, as Southern University understood it, was "to 
render public decision making more accessible and effective."104 Accessibility 
meant "enhanced involvement in decision making by citizens and their 
representatives, whereas effectiveness meant the implementation of public policies 
consistent with stated goals."103 To achieve the project's purpose, Southern 
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University and USAID agreed on intervention strategies in four strategic areas. 
These areas were: 
1) increasing citizen awareness of civil rights; 
2) enabling independent and professional journalism; 
3) enhancing the legislative performance of the National Assembly; and 
4) coordinating policy implementation in the Cabinet office.106 
Democracy and Human Rights Fund 
The United States Embassy in Lusaka operated a small grants fund for 
projects in the democracy and human rights area. Although this was not directly 
a part of the USAID Democracy and Governance project, it was treated as such, 
but completely controlled by the Embassy. For example, during the years of 1994 
and 1995, the focus of Embassy-supported projects was on local initiatives 
designed to address the reform of the judicial system, which had been receiving 
considerable criticism. 
As mentioned earlier, the United States government's view is that 
economic liberalization and political liberalization offer mutual support for the 
successful accomplishment of each other. Hence, it is especially important in the 
Zambian case to note that because of the heavy involvement of the state in the 
economy under the UNIP government during the Second Republic. Thus, it might 
seem normal to expect that a withdrawal of the process was in order and would 
be complementary toward the development of a new Zambia. The activities of the 
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United States in the area of economic liberalization, although not a formal part of 
its democracy and governance program, is important to consider for one to have 
a full appreciation of U. S. democracy assistance activities in Zambia. A critical 
review of the United States' support for the economic liberalization effort of the 
MMD government is undertaken in the next chapter. 
In Chapter II, the literature reviewed suggested that the concept of 
democracy is one of the most contested issues, especially with regards to 
definition or model being referred to. Shivji even speaks of contradictory 
perspectives on democracy, and that the meaning, content and social character of 
democracy is critical given recent world events.107 Thus, in evaluating United 
States democracy assistance, the question must be asked what model of democracy 
is being promoted. 
In an illuminating article on United States' democracy assistance, the 
noted author Thomas Carothers argues the following, 
There is little mystery about the model of democracy upon which the 
basic strategy of democracy assistance is based. It is what might be called the 
conventional western model of liberal democracy, . . . not just a western 
model but in some ways a quite US-specific blueprint. Democracy is equated 
with regular elections, a constitution guaranteeing basic political and civil 
rights, a three-part governing structure (made up of a reasonably competent, 
accountable executive branch, a relatively independent national legislature, 
and an independent judiciary), viable local government structures, national 
political parties, independent trade unions, independent media, and at least 
some advocacy NGOs capable of channeling citizens' demands to the 
government.108 
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Carothers further argues that many programs that are funded are done 
so on the basis of idealized results determined by the providers' view of the 
democratic model being promoted. He says, 
Although US democracy assistance is carried out in a tremendously diverse 
range of countries ..., the basic approach of the assistance is largely similar 
everywhere. The assistance programming is based on a set list of institutions 
and processes, primarily institutions, that U. S. aid providers believe are the 
constituent elements of democracy. The items on the list are set forward as 
desired endpoints. Aid providers assess recipient countries in terms of how 
their major socio-political institutions compare to these endpoints. Aid 
programs are then designed to address the gaps between the idealized 
endpoints and the actual state of the correspondent institutions and processes 
in the recipient countries.109 
Carothers further maintains that there are three major areas within which most 
United States democracy assistance can be located. Those categories, according 
to him, are electoral arenas, governmental institutions and civil society.110 With 
respect to the electoral arena Carothers argues, 
... the main emphasis of U. S. democracy assistance is usually the holding of 
elections-presidential, parliamentary, and local-with the goal being free and 
fair elections. Such aid consists of technical assistance to electoral 
commissions to improve the administration of elections, support for voter 
education campaigns implemented by local civic groups or in some cases by 
electoral commissions, and election monitoring by international delegations 
or domestic organizations formed for that purpose. A second area of 
assistance related to the electoral arena is political party development. In 
many countries U. S. democracy assistance has included programs designed 
to strengthen the main political parties, primarily through technical assistance 
and training on campaign methods and institutional development, with the 
aim being a party system marked by a limited number of national political 
parties differentiated by mild ideological shadings, with genuine national 
institutional reach, and strong campaign capacities.111 
Regarding governance programs Carothers asserts the following, 
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The second category, democracy aid relating to governing institutions, seeks 
to help build democracy from the top down. In countries where the political 
opening or democratic transition includes the writing of a new constitution, 
the United States often offers constitutional assistance, typically expert 
advice, conferences, exchange visits and seminars on Constitutionalism and 
constitutional analysis, to help steer the country toward adopting a 
constitution that guarantees democratic government and a full range of 
political and civil rights.... The most common type of democracy assistance 
within the category of governing institutions is parliamentary assistance. 
Such programs, which usually consist of training staff and members of 
parliament and technical assistance for parliamentary libraries, research units 
and public affairs offices, seek to strengthen the overall institutional 
capacities of parliaments and help them operate in a more effective, 
representative manner.112 
Carothers does not separate rule of law programs from governance programs. 
Therefore, he suggests that, 
Another major area of the U. S. democracy assistance portfolio relating 
to governing institutions is judicial reform. Aid for judicial reform has grown 
to encompass a wide range of activities designed to increase the efficiency 
and independence of judicial systems, including training of judges, 
prosecutors and other legal personnel, technical assistance relating to court 
administration, underwriting the publication of court decisions, providing 
law books and legal materials, and supporting the establishment of 
arbitration mechanisms and other forms of alternative dispute resolution. A 
final type of assistance directed at governing institutions, local government 
strengthening, was not initially a large part of U. S. democracy assistance but 
has been growing rapidly in the past several years. Such assistance typically 
consists of training and technical assistance that seeks to increase the capacity 
of local government officials to perform administrative, fiscal, and 
developmental functions, as well as policy dialogue with the central 
government to encourage it to devolve powers to local government 
structures.113 
Carothers' perspective on most governance programs is that they do not 
normally focus on the executive branch due to of the underlying assumption that 
democratization is best advanced by a relative decentralization of power away 
from the executive to other branches of government.114 This point is very 
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important to the Zambian case study, given that the Cabinet Policy Coordination 
component of the United States democracy assistance program in Zambia did 
explicitly focus on the executive branch. 
Carothers says with respect to the third category of United States 
democracy assistance, civil society assistance, that it 
is potentially very broad given that civil society constitutes the whole range 
of intermediate associations and institutions between the citizens of a country 
and their government. In practice, however, U. S. assistance explicitly 
directed at strengthening civil society in other countries largely falls into 
three relatively bounded categories: advocacy-oriented non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), media, and unions. The single most favored area of 
U. S. civic society assistance is that of advocacy NGOs, such as human rights 
groups, election monitoring organizations, and environmental organizations. 
In the view of U. S. aid organizations, the crucial feature that distinguishes 
such organizations from social service oriented NGOs, or from the many 
other intermediate associations and groups that usually exist within societies 
such as kinship organizations, sports clubs, and cultural associations, is that 
they seek to influence governmental policy on some specific set of issues. It 
is this policy-oriented advocacy function that U. S. aid officials hold to be tire 
crux of the pro-democratic function of civil society-advocacy is considered 
the key mechanism by which citizens' interests are expressed to the 
government. Reflecting this tendency to focus on this subset of civil society 
as though it is the essential part of civil society, USAID in recent years has 
begun to refer to advocacy NGOs as 'civil society organizations.'115 
Finally, Carothers writes that the overall range of democracy assistance 
program areas, types and goals, are highly consistent. He says, 
A certain evolution has occurred since the mid-1980s in the emphasis of U. S. 
democracy assistance among the three categories. Elections were initially by 
far the largest area of U. S. democracy assistance, as the United States 
responded to the wave of transitional elections spreading first across Latin 
America and then across various other regions. As transitional elections gave 
way to newly-installed, elected governments, U. S. democracy assistance 
shifted to a greater focus on governmental institutions, particularly 
parliaments and judiciaries. And in the past several years, civil society 
strengthening has expanded rapidly, eclipsing governing institutions as the 
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major focus of U. S. democracy assistance. This latter shift is the result of 
several factors-some disillusionment with programs in which parliaments 
and judicial systems absorb large amounts of assistance without evidencing 
much change; the arrival to power of the Clinton administration and the 
generally greater inclination among U. S. liberals compared to U. S. 
conservatives to support 'bottom-up' rather than 'top-down' approaches to 
democracy promotion; and the fact of cutbacks in U. S. aid budgets, 
prompting aid officials to eschew large-scale government institution 
programmes for smaller NGO-focused efforts.116 
In assessing basic problems associated with United States democracy 
assistance, Carothers argues that there are four critical areas that merit reflection 
and attention. Those areas are: 1) overspedfidty in the model of democracy being 
promoted; 2) a basic but profound lack of appreciation for the power relations 
often undergirding existing political and economic structures in a given county; 
3) structural or almost mechanical ways of seeing democratic development; and 
4) the absence of any link between development assistance in the economic and 
political sectors.117 
With respect to the first problem of overspecificity Carothers argues, 
The list of institutional components making up the core strategy are intended 
to be a universalistic set of components that can be applied to any society 
undertaking a democratic transition. In fact, however, very US specific ideas 
about democracy are present in almost every part of the list. ... It is often 
quite striking how unaware Americans involved in democracy assistance 
programs seem to be about the variety of political forms and structures in 
other established democracies. Many common elements of democratic life in 
Europe, for example, are absent from and in fact run directly against basic 
tenets of many U. S. programs: parliaments that overlap with rather than seek 
independence from executive branches, civil law systems rather than 
common law systems, tripartite (business-labor-govemment) structures for 
labor relations instead of union-by-union bargaining with management, 
government funding rather than private funding for NGOs, public rather 
than private ownership of television and radio, religion-based political 
parties ... and so on. Consciously or unconsciously, many Americans have 
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a tendency to confuse the particular forms of American democracy with the 
basic idea of democracy itself, either out of hubristic belief that America is the 
most democratic country in the world or out of ignorance about the forms of 
political life in other democratic countries. This way of thinking is frequently 
present in U. S. democracy assistance efforts.118 
Regarding the second problem, Carothers declares that the United States model 
of democracy, 
tends to ignore the power relations that underlie and in many ways 
determine a country's political life. Programs addressing the perceived 
shortcoming of the various institutional sectors are often constructed with 
little reference to the social, political and economic forces that actually shape 
those sectors. Democracy assistance providers operate as though it is possible 
to change the basic functioning of key institutions-to render a parliament 
representative and effective, to help unions become genuinely powerful and 
independent, to increase substantially the role of local govemment-without 
grappling with the deep-seated interests of the actors involved.119 
On this point he further asserts, 
By giving short shrift to the realities of political life in the countries in which 
they operate, U. S. democracy assistance programs take on an artificial 
technical quality. Political change is treated as a desiccated, pseudo-scientific 
process dominated by manuals, courses, 'log frames' specifying intended 
outputs, and outside consultants. The stubborn reality that politics involves 
competing interests, struggles over power, conflicting ideologies, and 
clashing values is ignored until it asserts itself, unwanted, at some later stage. 
Democracy assistance projects often founder on the shoals of this reality: 
training courses often fail to change underlying configurations of interests, 
transfers of equipment and technical expertise frequently are put to no use by 
entrenched elites with other plans, and planned modifications of institutions 
end up producing little change in their actual functioning.120 
According to Carothers, the third problem with the strategy of United States 
democracy assistance is its mechanical view of development generally. He posits, 
"a third problem with the basic strategy of U. S. democracy assistance lies with 
the underlying idea of democratization as a naturalistic process in which a 
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political opening leads to elections, and elections are followed by a period of 
consolidation in which governmental institutions are rationalized and 
democratized while civil society is strengthened and diversified."121 
Finally, with respect to tire fourth identified problem Carothers argues that 
a common article of faith among U. S. assistance officials involved in democracy 
promotion is that political and economic development, though separate processes, 
are naturally complementary. He says, 
Democratization is viewed as crucial to economic development, with the 
precise formulation of this proposition varying by region. Regarding Africa, 
for example, the U. S. optic is that bad governance has been a major cause of 
poor economic development and that democratization is necessary to change 
this pattern. Concerning Asia, it is conceded that substantial economic 
growth has been achieved in some countries without democratization, but it 
is held that democratization is necessary to sustain and further such 
development in the years ahead. At the same time, the other half of the 
equation is equally popular-U. S. assistance officials contend that social and 
economic development contributes to democratization, in a number of only 
loosely-specified but commonly agreed-to ways, relating to education, the 
middle class, and declining severity of struggles over resources. Yet despite 
this strong assumption of the complementarity of political and economic 
development, a striking characteristic of the basic strategy of U. S. democracy 
assistance (and a significant shortcoming) is its disconnection from economic 
concerns. The strategy is essentially a purely political one in which 
democratization stands or falls on exclusively political facts and events, 
socio-economic explanatory accounts of democratization ... are absent from 
view . . . U. S. assistance officials have generally made little effort to build 
bridges between democracy assistance efforts and the often close-at-hand 
world of economic and social assistance. They have not, for example, widely 
explored the possible political implications of agricultural programs that aim 
to give peasants a stronger stake in their land, or to help small farmers obtain 
credit together in co-operative arrangements. They have left largely 
unexamined the political implications of privatization programs that create 
new classes of small business owners. They have only rarely tied literacy 
programs to democratic development In general, the whole question of how 
changing patterns of land ownership, business arrangements, and other 
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issues affected by social and economic assistance would influence democratic 
development has been left out of U. S. democracy assistance programming.122 
United States democracy assistance strategy and the identified problems, 
as outlined by Carothers, was what informed the United States program in 
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CHAPTER V 
THE FOCAL POINTS OF UNITED STATES' 
DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE TO ZAMBIA, 1992 - 1997: 
A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 
Introduction 
This chapter critically examines the six main focal points of United States' 
democratic assistance provided to the Republic of Zambia between 1992 and 1997. 
Additionally, United States' economic assistance in support of neo-liberal economic 
reforms is added as a seventh focal point. U. S. assistance in the area of economic 
reform is included in this chapter because of its centrality to the overall United 
States' conceptualization of liberal democratic development. Moreover, the United 
States Agency for International Development had as its strategic objective number 
one, the reduction of the Zambian states's role in the economic sector. That 
objective was based on the belief that the development of a vigorous private sector 
and market forces would lead to sustained economic development. In fact, as 
shown in Chapter V, one of the explicit assumptions made about the 
implementation of the democracy and governance project was the improvement in 
the Zambian standard of living. Therefore, the activities of the United States in the 
area of economic reform, primarily its program of support for privatization, of 
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necessity have to be reviewed if one is to have a complete appreciation for the 
impact of United States foreign policy on the Zambian democratic transition. 
The focal points are analyzed in the chapter in the following order: 
constitutional reform, legislative performance, policy coordination, media 
independence, civil rights, political parties and economic liberalization. Included 
at the end of the chapter is a general summary that considers the effectiveness of the 
United States Zambia Democratic Governance Project. 
Constitutional Reform 
The United States' approach to constitutional reform in transitional 
countries is generally derived from its concern with the rule of law, and the 
establishment of a predictable and favorable enabling environment for a capitalist 
economic system. While constitutional reform has been seen as a key demand of 
pro-democracy movements in numerous countries, it has also been one of the most 
important issues on the democratic assistance agenda for Western donors. 
Constitutional discourse or constitutionalism is on the agenda of pro¬ 
democracy movements normally because of authoritarian manipulation or complete 
disregard for the legal order prescribed in a country's constitution. Although 
constitutional reform processes are suppose to be a consensus building process they 
often produce tension over the appropriate constitutional system to ensure good 
governance and the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
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At times failure to achieve compromise on issues such as the mode of 
adoption of the constitution, the process of public debate or the issues of group 
rights can be the basis of stalled processes. The creation of a liberal democratic 
model of constitutional reform has inspired an approach that is often seen by the 
recipient country as a way to gain international credibility. For the United States, 
constitutional reform is an opportunity to play a critical role that potentially will 
have practical significance for the new democratic dispensation. 
The assumptions underlying United States democracy assistance in the area 
of constitutional reform can be summarized through the following points: 
□ A liberalized constitution provides for separation of powers between 
the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government; 
□ A liberalized constitution establishes the appropriate and effective 
application of the rule of law and the protection of individual rights, 
including property rights; 
□ A liberalized constitution encourages accountable, transparent and 
effective public decision-making.1 
The evolution of constitutional development in Zambia reflects the 
different periods of the country's political development. From 1964 to 1991 Zambia 
had three Constitutions. The 1964 Independence Constitution was inspired by the 
ideals of liberal democracy and the African nationalism of the independence 
movement. In 1973, largely due to the Cold War ideological rivalry and the 
adoption of the one-party system, Zambia adopted a new Constitution. The need 
to do so was explained by then President Kaunda as accompanying the introduction 
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of a one-party participatory democracy. Such a political system was thought to be 
justified as the type of political system best suited for African conditions. Hence, 
the Constitutional Review Commission, chaired by Mainza Chona, with Humphrey 
Mulemba as his deputy chairperson, had restricted terms of reference to comment 
on how best to implement the one-party state, not whether or not to recommend the 
adoption of a one-party state form of governance. The Chona Commission was 
based on the Colonial Enquiries Act which allowed the executive to accept or reject 
any recommendation. In addition, the power to determine the terms of reference 
and persons to be Commissioners. 
From 1973 to 1991, the one-party state constitution made it illegal for other 
political parties to be formed, thus limiting freedom of association. As pointed out 
earlier, by 1990 internal and external contradictions caused the Kaunda/UNIP 
government to give into citizens demand and abandon the one-party system and 
constitution. 
The Constitutional Reform Component 
Against the aforementioned background and political context, USAID's 
assistance to Zambia's constitutional reform process was intended to assist in the 
production of a "liberalized constitution." Accordingly, the assumptions for the 
design of the constitutional reform component was the United States' government 
view that accessible, effective public decision-making would be produced if a 
liberalized constitution existed. In addition, it was anticipated that a more 
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liberalized constitution would further expand citizens' rights and enshrine greater 
respect for human rights. Moreover, expected program results of the project 
included the following: 
... new powers to the National Assembly vis-a-vis the executive branch, allows 
and yields increased citizen input; is widely circulated among the citizenry, 
and is conscientiously upheld by the GRZ. These changes were to be verified, 
respectively, by comparing the new and 1991 constitutions, perusing records 
of the CRC hearing, court records, and legislative debates and hearings.2 
The constitutional reform process took place during the first term of the 
MMD. It should be noted that this was also a time when the party had already 
experienced a major transition from being a broadly representative social 
movement, reflecting varied interests, to becoming a centralized and personalized 
presidentalist political party, under the patronage of the State President. This 
reality impacted the processes by which the constitution was adopted, in a manner 
tailor made for the reigning President. 
With respect to this component of the Democracy and Governance Project, 
along with the Cabinet policy component, USAID did not provide a contract or a 
cooperative agreement to a democracy promotion implementor. Instead, all of the 
assistance provided was directly between the agency, through its Democracy and 
Governance Advisor, and the Government of the Republic of Zambia.3 
The constitutional reform process for the Third Republic actually began 
under the Kaunda government. As pointed out in Chapter IV, the 1991 
Constitutional Review Commission chaired by Patrick Mvunga, the prominent 
lawyer (who later stood on a UNIP Parliamentary ticket), held hearings at the 
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provincial levels to receive proposals for a new constitution establishing a Third 
Republic. The Mvunga Commission recommendations were produced and used 
as the basis for the October 1991 elections.4 
After the historic October 1991 MMD victory in November 1992, Roger 
Chongwe, who became Minister of Legal Affairs, "presented the new government's 
plans for launching another process of constitutional change."5 According to 
USAID, 
The MMD government believed that its predecessor had ignored many of 
the important recommendations of the Mvunga Commission and that the 
Commission itself had not fully canvassed public opinion on the subject Thus, 
he proposed a seven-member commission of experts to produce a constitutional 
draft based on further public seminars and hearings. He stated that seminars 
would be concentrated on what he termed the political 'hot spots/ Lusaka and 
Ndola. In his presentation he indicated that USAID had promised support for 
the new process Criticism in Parliament and elsewhere that the Zambian 
democratic renaissance necessitated a more representative constitutional 
development commission delayed work in this area for over a year. In 
September, 1993 the Chiluba government announced plans for an enlarged 24- 
member CRC more broadly representative of Zambian society. President 
Chiluba subsequently added a 25th member in response to protests from 
women that they were inadequately represented. The Commission's terms of 
reference included, 'wide consultation with the public and relevant social, 
political, and economic groups on its terms of reference, to ensure a high 
degree of public debate on constitutional proposals for a democratic Zambia/6 
The Zambian Constitutional Review Commission faced severe budget 
constraints. Initially, it was estimated that as much as 70 percent of the funding 
necessary for the Commission's operating expenses were to come from donors. 
However, because of delays in producing a detailed work plan to accompany the 
requested budget, there were further delays moving the start date of the 
constitutional review process into 1994.7 By that time Roger Chongwe was no 
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longer Minister of Legal Affairs as he had been removed from the Legal Affairs 
office during a cabinet reshuffle in April 1993. Although disappointed and 
disgruntled, Chongwe remained in the MMD and continued functioning as a 
member of Parliament. A split in the party had occurred a few months earlier and 
many of the original founders and significant pro-democracy voices opposing 
Kaunda and the UNIP one-party State had now left the MMD because of alleged 
corruption within the leadership of the MMD.8 The group who left included well 
known figures such as Aka Lewanika, and Baldwin Nkumbula who resigned in 
July 1992 and Arthur Wina, Emmanuel Kasonde and Humphrey Mulemba who 
were fired by Chiluba later in 1993. Slow movement on constitutional reform, as 
well as corruption and betrayal of the original MMD agenda, were some of the 
many grievances pointed to by the breakaway group. In fact, this led to a growing 
concern among the public about transparency in the constitutional reform process 
itself. In response to growing criticism of the Commission, President Chiluba 
removed three members of the Commission, allegedly because of complaints of 
biases and corruption and the creation of conflict within the Commission.9 
However, some Commissioners and political observers' view were just the 
opposite. They believed that those who were relieved of their duties were nothing 
more than criminal elements who abused their commissioners privileges by 
engaging in such acts as over spending on accounts, and therefore, the changes 
were not really made in response to criticism against the Constitutional Review 
Commission or the process.10 Moreover, a number of critical political issues taken 
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up by the Commission continued to produce serious tension among its members. 
These issues included the following: proportional representation electoral system; 
the appropriate citizenship requirements for presidential candidacy; whether 
cabinet members had to be members of parliament or intentionally be drawn from 
outside of that body thereby strengthening the separation between the legislative 
and executive branches; the advancement of women's participation and 
representation in the governance of the society; and the processes for adopting the 
new Constitution.11 
The public skepticism over the final product began to grow as many 
Zambians questioned whether a Constitution that could stand the test of time could 
possibly be produced, especially one that would outlast the MMD government and 
institutionalize the new democratic order. 
United States' democracy assistance was seen as critical to the constitutional 
reform process. Besides funding the initial organizational meetings of the 
Constitutional Reform Commission, the MMD government believed that United 
States' support was key to generating broader donor support for the process. In 
fact, to relieve donor concerns about transparency in the process, the next MMD 
Minister of Legal Affairs, Ludwig Sondashi, made specific commitments to then 
United States Ambassador Gordon Streeb that the constitutional reform 
commission's official report would be released immediately and in full to the 
public. In response to this, the United States wrote into its Memorandum of 
Understanding with the Government of Zambia that a direct, complete release of 
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the draft Constitution to the Zambian public would occur.12 That agreement was 
posited on the belief that 
a good draft constitution that is released to the public immediately, 
accompanied by a vigorous civic education effort, and ratified by a constituent 
assembly and/or popular referendum will do much to dissolve the effects of 
the vagaries of the drafting process. Should this course of events occur, 
Zambians will be able to take pride in the democratic progress this 
constitutional process would then represent over previous constitutional 
exercises in 1964,1972 and 1991. To this end, the CRC has made an important 
contribution by adhering to an ambitious schedule of public hearings around 
the country.13 
United States' support did prove to be very instrumental as it represented 
approximately 28 percent of the total budget for the Constitutional Reform 
Commission. In fact, in comparison the government of Zambia's share was 
approximately 29 percent and the remaining 43 percent was shared funding by 
other donor countries, principally the Scandinavian countries.14 
Between March and September 1994, the Constitutional Review 
Commission traveled throughout Zambia collecting recommendations from 
citizens, civil society organizations and political organizations on what the new 
Constitution should look like. The Commission visited all nine provinces and 
received close to 1000 submissions.15 At the end of the process the Commission 
produced two reports. The main report was submitted to the government. A 
minority report, which contained objections by some members of the Commission 
to controversial clauses, was produced by Patrick Mvunga who had been the chair 
of the UNIP Constitutional Review Commission of 1991.16 
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The 1995 review of the USAID Democracy and Governance project noted 
the following observation regarding the Constitutional Review Component. 
The original design of the Project anticipated completion of the constitutional 
reform process within approximately one calendar year. This expectation has 
proved very unrealistic in practice. . . . Whether completion of the 
constitutional reform process in a single calendar year was appropriate in 
principle is an issue on which reasonable minds may certainly differ. 
Certainly, USAID's original expectations were tied to those of the GRZ itself 
and justified at least in part by USAID's confidence in the then Minister for 
Legal Affairs, Dr. Roger Chongwe. USAID's confidence in the process was, 
thus, somewhat shaken by a cabinet reshuffle, early in 1993, that sent Chongwe 
to another ministry to be replaced at the Ministry of Legal Affairs by Dr. 
Ludwig Sondashi. .. . Chongwe has been only one of many reform-minded 
political leaders to depart, or be dismissed from, the Chiluba government. 
Continued lack of transparency and accountability has also become 
uncomfortably evident The leadership transition and the lack of transparency 
have dampened initial popular enthusiasm for the democratic renaissance that 
might otherwise have fueled the process to its completion. .. }7 
The mid-term review concluded that USAID should end its direct support 
of the reform process because of the likely outcome being so controversial that the 
adoption of a new constitution might be jeopardized. The report stated, "It would 
be a poor use of USAID funds to support distribution of the CRC reports of its 
hearings and a draft Constitution only after its editing by the GRZ, given the 
likelihood that the public will consider such a report to have been 'doctored' and, 
therefore, illegitimate."18 
Analysis and Critique 
In June 1995, the Commission submitted its report to the Chiluba 
government. In August of that same year the government responded to the report 
with a White Paper. The Government's White Paper accepted many of the 
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recommendations of the Mwanakatwe Commission but also added many of its own 
recommendations. The White Paper contained controversial clauses including one 
barring traditional rulers from participating in active politics. Another clause 
declared Zambia to be a Christian State and perhaps the clause that would place 
Zambia on the brink of civil war was Article 34(3)(b), that required any person 
vying for the presidency to prove that his/her parents were/are Zambians by birth 
or descent.19 
The opposition parties' reaction to the constitutional changes were extreme 
but predictable. All of the UNIP Members of Parliament walked out refusing to be 
part of the process of even debating or voting against the adoption. Aka Lewanika 
of the National Party remained as the sole opposition member of Parliament to 
speak against the Constitutional Amendment for the Parliamentary record. Amidst 
much heckling from MMD backbenchers, he spoke for two days against the 
manipulation of the process and "doctoring" of the Constitution. The active 
opposition political parties would later use the united position as the basis for 
forming an "Opposition Alliance" to oppose the MMD. According to the Committee 
for a Clean Campaign, "the constitutional impasse, coupled with the disagreements 
over the electoral process, prompted opposition parties and other stakeholders to 
call for dialogue with the Government and the ruling party."20 
During this period, another very dangerous development emerged onto the 
Zambian political scene that was blamed on the opposition. A series of bombings 
tied to a group which the police and the MMD government called the "Black 
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Mamba" rocked several cities. The opposition blamed the MMD government of 
systematically planting the bombs to frighten citizens. Although there were no 
direct links suggesting that opposition political parties were responsible, the MMD 
government blamed UNIP, the main opposition party. The government took action 
in June 1996 against UNIP by arresting eight of their top officials including the 
party's Vice President, Inyambo Yeta, who is also a traditional ruler. The officials 
were held for more than five months before they were released by a court which 
found them with no case to answer. Their release just days prior to the elections 
was pointed to by UNIP as proof that their detention was politically motivated and 
designed by the MMD government to divert their attention and impair their ability 
to organize and effectively contest the presidential and parliamentary elections.21 
The Constitutional Review Commission presented a copy of its draft 
Constitution to President Chiluba as early as September 1995. However, on that 
same day a full draft also appeared in the independent weekly newspaper, The Post. 
The appearance apparently upset the State President and the MMD government did 
nothing with the draft Constitution for months. A new Constitution was finally 
adopted in May, 1996 by the MMD-dominated Parliament. 
Zambian civil society organizations' reaction to the proposed changes were 
strong as well. Citizens' concern regarding the Constitution and transparence in the 
political process increased when the local elections were postponed. Therefore, in 
March 1996 members of civil society organizations held a ten-day Citizens' 
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Convention. Several opposition political leaders, such as Kaunda and Lewanika 
also participated in parts of the meeting. 
The Citizens' Convention produced a document known as the Green Paper. 
The Green Paper was civil society's proposition for a more comprehensive 
constitutional reformation beyond the government's White Paper on Constitutional 
Reform.22 The government refused to receive or review the citizens' contribution 
saying that it had already received citizens' input through the extensive exercise 
undertaken by the Constitutional Reform Commission, and that the citizens' 
representatives in Parliament would be voting on the matter soon. 
In May 1996 shortly, after the Chiluba administration announced that it 
intended to adopt a new Constitution, with the controversial clauses, several 
leading nongovernmental organizations planned a massive march and rally to 
oppose the planned move. During that March, at least 15 NGO leaders were 
arrested. A few day later, students and other supporters of the MMD protesting in 
favor of the reforms were allowed to proceed unimpeded by the police.23 
The influential donor community's reaction was mixed and initially 
difficult to read. In response to the heavy handed tactics of the MMD government 
and the nature of the proposed constitutional reforms, a number of Western 
governments expressed outrage. The donors reacted strongly with statements and 
announcements of aid withdrawal or cuts. According to observers, President 
Chiluba met with the Danish Ambassador and assured him that he would not sign 
into law the controversial constitution passed by the MMD-dominated Parliament. 
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One day later, despite such assurances, Chiluba on May 28,1996, assented to the 
amended constitution making it law in Zambia.24 
The United States State Department threatened to impose sanctions if the 
changes to the Constitution were made. In a subsequent statement once the 
Constitution was amended, the head of the United States Agency for International 
Development announced major cuts in the aid program.25 The United States was 
followed by other bilateral donor countries including Japan who almost never 
would make public statements, Denmark, Sweden, Germany and Zambia's largest 
donor, the British government.26 Allast Mwanza has argued that the donor 
displeasure with the MMD over the constitutional reform led to "freezing" of aid 
totaling $105 million in 1996 alone. Additionally, he suggests that the spill over into 
1997 actually cost the country significant resources needed for balance of payment 
support, social projects and foreign debt servicing.27 
Zambia's neighbors were also alarmed at the path being pursued by the 
MMD government. The Southern African Development Community (SADC), the 
regional body composed of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, 
South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe became formally 
involved in September 1996. Many of the leaders of SADC countries had received 
financial and military support and political solidarity from the Kaunda government 
during their fight against apartheid in South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe, and 
fascist colonial rule in Mozambique and Angola. Therefore, most did not maintain 
good relations with the more conservative and explicitly pro-Western Chiluba who 
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had never been a strong supporter of the different Southern African liberation 
movements. Following the September 1996 SADC Summit in Maseru, President 
Chiluba, only one week before the Zambian elections, traveled to South Africa to 
meet with South African President Nelson Mandela. Following their meeting 
Mandela told the media that they had found a possible solution to Zambia's 
political situation but that he would not disclose the outcome of those discussions 
in order to allow President Chiluba time to consult with his colleagues.28 
Mandela then dispatched noted Judge Richard Goldstone to Zambia. 
Goldstone reportedly went to Zambia to explore the possibility of postponing the 
November 18 elections. Goldstone promptly left Zambia once he recognized that 
the MMD was not at all serious about reaching any type of political compromise 
with the opposition.29 
The MMD government made public announcements by its vice president 
through the press, and at a major campaign rally by its president that the elections 
would go ahead as scheduled. Additionally, Chiluba announced from Northern 
Province that he had neither the power, or the desire to hold off the elections. 
Conclusion 
The new Constitution did not significantly improve individual rights. In 
fact, in a number of ways all the changes in the constitution placed further 
limitations on the exercise of those rights and freedoms. Moreover, the political 
behavior of the MMD government on the mode of adoption, public debate of the 
draft constitution, and the inclusion of controversial clauses not recommended by 
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the Constitutional Review Commission or added by the MMD, meant that the 
process was doomed to create the type of political tension that could lead to a 
popular rejection of the constitution, or worse, to civil war. 
One can say that the technical and financial assistance provided by the 
United States to the Constitutional Review Commission, and the reform process in 
general, was well intended and did make a significant contribution to a more open 
process for citizens' input. The assistance was most visible in the financial support 
area. However, the popular displeasure with the constitutional reform process and 
the adoption of controversial clauses, which did impact the immediate political 
process, including the 1996 elections, created a temporary rift between the major 
donors and the MMD government, and a permanent rift between the MMD 
government and opposition political parties, as well as certain sectors of civil 
society. Nevertheless, the MMD once again called the donor's bluff, by ignoring the 
public statements, and systematically going around to the important donor 
embassies to repair the diplomatic damage. Perhaps this was done on the 
assumption that the donor community cared less for the political rights of Zambians 
than for assurances that the MMD government would continue to stay the course 
on the macroeconomic reforms that they had all agreed upon. In fact, Chiluba was 
quoted as saying in response to donor pressure that "Zambia has, since 1991, 
struggled to repair a severely shattered economy and Zambians have made 
enormous sacrifices and thanks to the very substantial support from the 
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international donor community we have made some progress which, if sustained, 
will provide a sound base for sustainable economic growth."30 
The United States' response, of cutting back on selected democracy 
assistance aid, while significant, also allowed the United States embassy and USAID 
to address a few of its internal concerns. For instance, the USAID director did not 
agree with the proposed procurement of more than one million dollars of 
equipment for the proposed Zambia Institute for Mass Communications 
(ZAMCOM) Media Resource Center. Thus, the announced cuts also shocked the 
Southern University program director, and the ZAMCOM director who were not 
initially informed. Second, the United States Embassy and USAID privately had 
expressed displeasure with the National Democratic Institute's team that was based 
in Zambia at the time. Therefore, NDI officials were placed in a precarious 
predicament. Although it was clear that USAID had reservations about the 
effectiveness of the NDI team, no official statement, verbal or written was ever 
presented to the NDI President when he visited in April 1996. Nevertheless, a 
gentleman's agreement was reached. NDI would not request any additional 
funding to continue its program and USAID Zambia would not provide any 
additional funding. 
The statement released by NDI on its withdrawal from Zambia, however, 
did reflect the institution's real concerns aboutthe electoral process and the unlikely 
probability that a free and fair result could be attained given the constitutional and 
regulatory changes that had taken place.31 
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The Legislative Performance Component 
Introduction 
Thomas Carothers argues that the United States has often sponsored 
programs to foster institutional development of national legislatures in other 
countries. He says, 
Such assistance has multiplied in the past ten years as part of the general 
growth of U.S. democracy assistance. Parliaments seem to be almost irresistible 
targets for U.S. officials devising democracy assistance programs. They are 
highly visible central institutions that often bring together the major political 
forces of a country Improving the main law making body in a transitional 
society could in principle have far-reaching effects on the society as a whole. 
In addition, parliamentary assistance programs are usually easy to sell in 
Washington, particularly to the U.S. Congress, whose approval is often very 
critical to funding. U.S. Congressmen tend to respond positively to arguments 
that legislatures are fundamentally important to democracy and that 
institutional development of legislative bodies is needed in other countries.32 
Carothers further argues that the assistance to legislative bodies is explicitly 
based on the American political system model. 
The predilection for parliamentary assistance is rooted in the U.S. political 
model, in which the legislative branch is very strong and quite often 
independent of the executive branch. Using this model as their norm, 
American assistance officials analyzing the situation of democracy in other 
countries tend to conclude that the parliament of most other countries are 
institutionally underdeveloped and overly subordinate to the executive branch. 
The fact that national legislatures in parliamentary systems are by definition 
much less independent than the U.S. Congress does not stop Americans from 
habitually concluding that foreign parliaments are too weak and need 
strengthening.33 
The Zambian legislature or National Assembly is the highest law-making 
body in the country. It is composed of members representing 150 constituencies. 
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All 150 are directly elected by eligible voters on the basis of a party list system 
designed by political parties. The cabinet ministers are drawn from members of the 
Parliament. A House of Chiefs is allowed for in the constitution, but is not formally 
a part of the National Assembly. 
It is a disputed, but generally assumed view that most members of the 
National Assembly rarely visit their constituencies, in part, due to the party list 
system as many may have been elected from areas where they do not live, although 
members do receive a small sum of funding to visit their constituencies. According 
to members that sum is inadequate to maintain any type of office to address 
citizen's concerns or to make periodic visits. 
The Zambian National Assembly prior to 1991, was seen by most Zambians 
as a body with little power because the UNIP party structure was supreme. The 
Assembly or parliament was basically a "rubber-stamp" mechanism utilized from 
time to time to maintain the facade of participatory democracy. Cabinet Ministers 
were significant players in the legislative process, in that they put forth cabinet 
decisions related to their ministries. 
The National Assembly, especially after the advent of the one-party state 
in 1973, had played a secondary role in the policy-making process. In many ways 
it was an impotent body wherein members' independence was severely 
compromised. For instance, under the UNIP one-party participatory democracy 
system, the parliament's decisions could be overridden by the central committee of 
the party.34 Moreover, parliamentary candidates could be vetoed, i.e. notapproved, 
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by the central committee if it was determined that they were not prepared to further 
the interest of the state (read party). Thus, internal, sometimes regional patronage 
systems, and ambitions of moving from the back bench to the front bench, often 
helped to further sensor members from expressing independent views. Even a 
perceived weakening of party discipline could mean the lost of support and 
therefore one's livelihood as many members of parliament were not financially 
secure outside of the benefits derived from being a member of Parliament. In fact, 
the popular perception was that many ran for office not to perform public service 
but to have easier access to the state treasury and to find easy avenues toward 
enriching themselves. 
Several political observers of Zambia's political process have suggested that 
the aforementioned behavior is exhibited by the MMD today, even after a return to 
multiparty rule. For example, because of its overwhelming parliamentary majority 
the MMD party caucus objectively becomes more important than debate in the 
National Assembly. It is in the party caucus that the issues to put forth in the 
parliament are initially discussed. In addition, caucus meetings are not chaired by 
the secretary general, they are normally chaired by the State President, who is also 
head of the party. Therefore, the notion of separation of powers between the 
legislative and executive branch is seriously compromised by such a reality. 
United States Assistance 
The USAID Legislative Performance component sought to implement a 
collaboratively designed and funded two phased program. Phase one consisted of 
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a series of three baseline studies on the following topics: Parliament's relationship 
to other decision making institutions; the structure of the National Assembly, 
especially the distribution of functions within the committee system; and 
Parliamentary administration including personnel administration.35 The findings 
and recommendations were to be presented to the Speaker of the House. 
Phase two "provided for the augmentation of National Assembly staff, 
international study tours, creation of a legal drafting fund, library resources, and 
technical/material assistance to facilitate documentation and publication of 
Assembly document's."36 
A Memorandum of Understanding was signed by USAID and the Deputy 
Speaker of the House in February 1993. However, it was signed after the budget 
of Parliament had already been approved. Therefore, the expected share of the 
funds had not been appropriated. USAID nevertheless informed the Speaker of its 
initial funding for the Legislative Performance Component in the amount of $75,000 
(U. S.).37 
The National Assembly of the Third Republic continued to follow a pseudo 
Westminster model with the President's cabinet ministers being chosen from elected 
members of Parliament. At the same time, the structure is a hybrid parliamentary- 
presidential constitutional system, because the head of government is elected 
through direct vote by citizens during national elections held every five years.38 
The mid-term evaluation of the governance and democracy program said, 
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In order for the National Assembly to perform as an autonomous participant 
in policy-making, individual Members must be willing to do so. Members 
constrained by reliance on political patronage and scarce Assembly resources 
cannot be expected to act as effective monitors of government activity. The 
effectiveness of democratization programs comes from altering the incentives 
actors have to behave in selfish ways. Electoral pressures will not motivate 
legislators to act independently if the costs of their independence outweigh the 
benefits.39 
The mid-term review also stated that the USAID design team knew well 
in advance that working with the legislature could be difficult The review 
suggests, 
USAID/Z recognized from the outset that programming in the Zambian 
National Assembly was likely to be problematic. The project design team 
acknowledged this difficulty by creating a two-phased implementation plan 
based on the Assembly's demonstration of a commitment to organizational 
reform. According to the MOU of February 26, 1993, USAID/Z would 
implement investments targeted at institutional strengthening only after a 
series of conditions precedent were met. . . . The Project Paper, completed in 
September 1992, outlined a two-phase work program. Phase one was a series 
of three baseline studies on (a) Parliament's relationship to other decision¬ 
making institutions, (b) the structure of tire National Assembly, especially the 
distribution of functions within the committee system, and (c) Parliamentary 
administration, including personnel administration. The findings and 
recommendations of these studies were to be presented to Mr. Speaker. Phase 
two provided for the augmentation of National Assembly staff, international 
study tours, creation of a legal drafting fund, library resources, and 
technical/material assistance to facilitate documentation and publication of 
Assembly documents. The contents of the Project Paper were negotiated and 
agreed to by the Deputy Speaker and the Clerk of the National Assembly.40 
Perceiving that a good deal of the problem could have been the result of a 
personality clash between the Speaker and the USAID Michigan State graduate 
student who had been assigned by USAID to implement the program, Southern 
University attempted to locate a Zambian implementor. The Southern University 
Chief of Party approached the human rights organization, AfroNet, to see if it was 
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interested in becoming the prime implementing agent. The AfroNet executive 
refused after learning of the already existing problems and the small resources 
allocated to the program component.41 It is also doubtful that the Zambian National 
Assembly would have respected a Zambian civil society organization such as 
AfroNet. 
The mid-term review of the Zambian democratic assistance program 
argued that the program was failing and should be ended. The report stated in 
part, that 
capacity-building programs atthe National Assembly will notsucceed until the 
Assembly administration allows greater transparency and participation in 
Assembly procedures. The Review Team endorses USAID/Z's decision to 
terminate funding on the grounds that, by electing to prevent the development 
of reform recommendations by the LPSG, the Speaker's office did not meet the 
condition precedent in the MOU.42 
Analysis and Critique 
It is apparent from the foregoing that the legislative component was in part 
rejected by the leadership of the Zambian National Assembly. More importantly, 
however, it is clear that the project was not demand-driven but reflected the U. S. 
perception, burdened with arbitraness and confusion, regarding how best to 
construct a working liberal democracy in the African context. 
The USAID intimation is that the Speaker of the House never intended for 
the project to be successfully implemented. Perhaps his view was that the type of 
technical assistance being offered was not necessary. According to several former 
members of the Cabinet and Parliament, the failure of USAID to recognize sooner 
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that institutional resistence was evident and that it probably could have been 
overcome by working more directly with the members, was a major shortcoming 
of the project.43 Despite its criticism of the Speaker's office and the lack of 
transparency, the mid-term evaluators of the USAID program did specifically 
acknowledge who bore the responsibility for the failure of this component. The 
mid-term review said, 
USAID/Z was responsible for overemphasizing the legislative and policy¬ 
making responsibilities of the National Assembly at the expense of 
constituency relations. This shortcoming was partly rectified by a proposed 
study on MP-constituency relations, which was never implemented. But the 
main design flaw was the focus on an institution in the capital city without 
adequately addressing the communications gap between MPs and their 
constituents, especially in the rural areas.44 
The mid-term review team recommended that USAID transfer part of the 
Legislative Performance component's budget, approximately $100,000 (U. S.), to the 
Civic Action Fund so that non-governmental organizations with interest in 
improving constituent relations could conduct that work.45 
After suggesting that most of the activities of the Democracy and 
Governance Project were effectively implemented, even though there may have 
been further development of the program design, the Southern University final 
report had this to say about the component that it did not directly manage. 
Such was not the case, however, with the legislative performance 
component. The Speaker of the National Assembly, the Honorable R. 
Nabulyato, has remained the speaker throughout the MMD administration. 
Failure to implement the legislative performance component seemed to have 
emanated from the inability of United States representatives and the Speaker 
to agree on what should be done. One questions why this disagreement should 
remain after having designed the legislative performance component.46 
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Conclusion 
The legislative component of the program obviously failed. Program 
design problems were apparent from the very beginning but were ignored. Why 
USAID decided to directly administer this component is not exactly clear. 
However, what is clear is that a complete lack of ownership was apparent early on 
but ignored. At the same time, it must be recognized that the National Assembly 
did adopt several wide-ranging laws which were consistent with United States 
stated economic interest and policy toward Zambia. These changes will be 
discussed in more detail in the section on economic liberalization. 
The Policy Coordination Component 
Introduction 
United States' democracy assistance programs usually do not target the 
executive branch. Politically sensitive issues are much more visible and could 
easily create problems for friendly governments. Because the USAID democracy 
portfolio was so new, and because Zambia presented such an interesting and 
important case, it was decided that a policy coordinating program would be in 
order with the executive branch of government. 
Under the UNIP government, especially during the Second Republic, the 
Cabinet Office had been reduced to the role of passively circulating memoranda 
and Cabinet decisions to ministries. According to USAID, it did not perform any 
meaningful role in policy coordination, monitoring, and evaluation.4' 
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The USAID policy paper argued, "under Kaunda, the Office of the 
President was an all-powerful center of decision-making, and the Cabinet and civil 
service were reduced to the role of implementing presidential policy directives. 
The contributions of technocrats to policy analysis was denigrated, leading to low 
morale throughout the executive branch."48 Hence, the policy coordinating 
component was designed to correct the perceived flaws. In other words, successful 
implementation of the program would result in an increased role for the cabinet 
office with respect to coordinating policy. More specifically, the Program design 
rationale for the component was stated in the following terms. It was 
aimed at providing support to the Cabinet Office so that it could become the 
'nerve center' of Government. It was, therefore, proposed to create a unit 
which would have responsibility in such areas as policy coordination and 
monitoring ministries1 implementation of Cabinet decisions. The Public Service 
Reform Program (PSRP), which is funded by the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP) and other donors, had already embarked on an exercise to 
re-organize the CO by creating a number of Divisions which have very specific 
responsibilities. The creation of the Policy Analysis and Coordination (PAC) 
Division in the Government of the Republic of Zambia (GRZ) Cabinet Office 
was formally approved through Cabinet Circular Number 12 (July 30,1993). 
PAC was created by merging the now defunct Economic and Finance stream 
with the Cabinet Affairs stream. The rationale for the formation of PAC was 
that Cabinet's constitutional policy-making responsibility needs to be 
supported by professional management of the functions that Cabinet must 
perform... .49 
The program design for the Policy Coordination Component suggested that 
there was a twofold approach which was 
to examine and analyze ministerial submissions to Cabinet with the aim of (a) 
assessing their consistency with overall government policy ; (b) determining the 
implications of ministerial submissions for other units of Government; and, (c) 
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providing an independent analytical assessment perspective, to Cabinet. The 
second function was that PAC would facilitate ministries' implementation, 
monitoring and evaluation of Cabinet decisions. To undertake this latter role, 
PAC would, necessarily, have to carry out a coordinative role, especially where 
more than one ministry is involved. The Project Baseline Study (June 1993) 
observes that PAC does have an additional function, that of taking and 
producing Cabinet minutes.50 
Analysis and Critique 
It was reported that the Cabinet Policy Component was successful in 
supporting the creation of a Policy and Analysis Coordination (PAC) Division 
within the Office of the Cabinet. Additionally, die implementation of this 
component provided a computer network and training for the Policy and Analysis 
Coordination's staff on the use of computers for the analysis, monitoring and 
planning of policy.51 
Conclusion 
USAID engaged the Cabinet Office in an attempt to improve the policy 
review and decision making process at the executive level. However, the 
assumption that the Cabinet Office would be able to play that role was shortsighted. 
Constitutionally, the cabinet office is only an advisory body and in the context of 
an African-Westminister styled National Assembly that usually plays a supporting 
role to the executive branch as opposed to holding it in check, (as in the US system), 
the assumption was incorrect and based more on wishful thinking than a serious 
analysis of what existed and what the approach of the new MMD government 
would likely be. Again the lack of ownership of this component by the Zambian 
government meant that even if there was general agreement on the direction 
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projected by the program component, it would not have been implemented as 
envisioned. 
The Media Independence Component 
Introduction 
Thomas Carothers argues the following with respect to United States 
democracy assistance to the media in transitional societies, 
... Americans attach tremendous importance to the electronic and print media, 
which within American society are viewed as fulfilling two functions crucial 
to democracy. The media serve as a check on governmental power-that is, they 
are a primary means of ensuring accountability and transparency of 
governmental action. The media also keep citizens informed about what is 
going on withing the society; they provide a sort of informational glue that 
helps hold together a large, heterogenous population. Given the centrality of 
the media in contemporary American society, it is almost inevitable that 
Americans who go abroad to promote democracy will make media 
developments one of their priorities. As U.S. democracy assistance has 
expanded over the past ten years, media assistance-programs to train 
journalists, various forms of support for newspapers, radio, and television 
funding of media watchdog organizations-has been a growing activity. U.S. 
media assistance generally emphasizes two key principles: that media should 
maintain strict independence from government in determining the content of 
their publishing and broadcasting and that media should strive toward 
professionalism and nonpartisanship, clearly separating fact from opinion and 
pursuing a high degree of factual accuracy. Because private ownership is a 
cardinal feature of the U. S. media, the private ownership model is often 
explicitly and implicitly part of U. S. media assistance programs abroad.52 
Once again this line of thinking seems to have been present when the Zambian 
Democracy and Governance Project was being developed. 
The media under the one-party state was completely dominated by the 
UNIP Government. Before independence, the media in Zambia was completely 
dominated by the colonial state. In fact, during both periods, the media was often 
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referred to as the government's media. Until 1991, the entire media industry was 
dominated by government owned media institutions. Their role was defined by 
those in power and any departure from the role was "seriously" dealt with. 
Zambia has two daily newspapers owned by the government, one 
independent daily and seven weekly papers. Of those seven weeklies, four are 
independent, and three are party related papers, while one is church sponsored. 
None of the papers has a circulation of more than 30,000 copies. Moreover, all the 
newspapers are mainly limited to urban areas. The government owned papers are 
the Times of Zambia and the Zambia Daily Mail.53 
With respect to broadcast media, public broadcasting services are provided 
by the Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC), created under Section 
3 of the Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation Act, 1987. The functions of the 
Corporation, as stated in the ZNBC Act, are to carry on broadcasting services for the 
information, education and entertainment of listeners and, subject to the directions 
of the Minister of Information and Broadcasting Services, to carry on broadcasting 
services for such purposes as he may specify for reception by listeners outside 
Zambia. Operational control of the Corporation is vested in the Board of Directors, 
comprising of a chairman and no less than six and no more than nine directors, 
appointed by the Minister. The Minister directs the Board with respect to the 
carrying out of the functions of the Corporation. The Board is authorized to appoint 
a director-general for the Corporation who is to be responsible for the day-to-day 
management of the business of the Corporation. 
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The Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation Act gives the government 
control over the editorial decisions, management and financing of the ZNBC. 
According to the Media Institute of Southern Africa, 
there are no mechanisms for making complaints against the Corporation. A 
change in government entails change in the Board of Directors and the Director 
General, since the continuation of tenure of Board members or of the Director- 
General is subject to the continuation in power of the government which 
appoints them. This compromises any effort to manage the institution in a 
professional way for the public benefit. And during elections this clearly 
makes it impossible for the Board and Director-General to remain non¬ 
partisan.54 
Further, it is apparent that those wishing to offer broadcasting services have to do 
so in accordance with the terms and conditions of a license issued by the Minister 
and on payment of fees as the Minister may prescribe. However, according to the 
Media Institute for Southern Africa, the Minister may, at any time, cancel or refuse 
to issue a license, or to renew a license issued to a broadcaster, if he is satisfied, after 
due inquiry, that the cancellation or the refusal to issue or renew the license is 
justifiable in the public interest55 
United States Assistance 
The USAID Media Independence Component operated under a 
Memorandum of Understanding executed May 7,1993 between USIAD/Z and the 
Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Services. The Media Independence 
Component project, as pointed out in Chapter V, was designed to enable 
independent and professional journalism by funding policy studies, short- and 
long-term training for media specialists, and a resource center for independent 
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journalists. The project also envisioned the creation of a Media Resource Center for 
Zambia and Southern Africa. However, USAID support for such a resource center 
was conditional upon ZAMCOM's becoming completely independent from the 
Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. 
The project consisted of a series of trainings for Zambian journalists and 
support for professional journalists who would pursue studies for a master's degree 
in the United States. It is interesting to note that the United States program never 
had an explicit goal of encouraging the MMD government of privatizing the media. 
MMD and the Media 
The MMD government was expected by most observers and donors to 
change the laws and institutions which sustained one-party rule, especially the 
media that the MMD had so openly complained about and even taken to court 
before the 1991 elections. In fact, most believed that "in relation to freedom of 
expression, the government was expected to create an atmosphere in which the 
media, both print and electronic, could operate effectively and contribute 
meaningfully to the democratization process."56 
However, after assuming power the proposed reforms to enhance media 
freedom suffered a setback as the MMD government made a decision not to grant 
broadcasting licenses to opposition parties. The government said that it would only 
entertain applications for broadcasting licenses from religious and commercial 
groups. That announcement was made after UNIP announced plans to establish its 
own radio and television station in Lusaka. Other opposition parties accused the 
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MMD of monopolizing the national media since its "Press Freedom Proclamation" 
during the run-up to the historic October 1991 elections. In response to such 
criticisms, the MMD said that it would not bow to demands to privatize ZNBC and 
the two daily newspapers because the government needed its own mouth-piece. 
The MMD would later explicitly state that it had no intentions of privatizing the 
media. During the pre-election campaign, the Press Association of Zambia urged 
the government to privatize the media organization it controlled before the elections 
were held so that the media would be able to operate above a perceived partisan 
basis. In response to the association's call for a privatized media, the deputy 
minister for foreign affairs said, "the MMD clearly states in its manifesto that it 
would not sell the state-owned media. Radier it would use such media to promote 
national unity, development and international co-operation."57 
The somewhat ridiculous policy behavior of the MMD can be seen in the 
case of William Banda v. the Attorney General. Banda was a leading member of 
UNIP and had applied for police permits on several occasions to hold public rallies. 
The application for the permits was done in connection with the Public Order Act. 
On all occasions his name had been deleted from the list of speakers with no reason 
given. Banda went to court arguing that his freedom of expression had been 
violated and sought a declaration by the court to that effect. It was argued, on the 
behalf of the state, that Banda was a non-Zambian, and therefore he should not be 
permitted to address any public rallies in Zambia. It was further stated, that 
members of the ruling party, the MMD, were against his speeches and that his 
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previous speeches were provocative.58 In this case the court observed that "the 
freedom of expression rests on the assumption that the widest possible 
dissemination of information from divergent and antagonistic sources is essential 
to the welfare of the public. Such freedom is the foundation of the government of 
a free people. The purpose of such a guarantee is to prevent public authorities from 
assuming the guardianship of the public mind."59 
In Zambia, as in most other countries, there is no licensing system or 
registration of journalists. However, the MMD government wanted to set up a 
statutory body to regulate the "ethical conduct" of journalists, which would include 
licensing. The proposed statutory body would replace the Press Association of 
Zambia (PAZA), a voluntary association of journalists that was constituted to 
promote and defend the ideals of the profession. In June 1995, the Minister of 
Information and Broadcasting Service, who is chief spokesperson for the 
government, accused PAZA of being a toothless body which had failed to discipline 
its members who were "abusing" press freedom. The Minister had also accused 
some sections of the media of waging a campaign to undermine the integrity of 
President Chiluba.60 Therefore, the MMD government proposed the creation of the 
Media Association of Zambia (MAZA). Once created, MAZA would ensure that no 
media organization could operate without subscribing its staff to the association. 
Anyone who withdrew from the association would lose his or her status as a 
journalist.61 
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In another significant case, in February 1996, President Chiluba declared 
an issue of The Post newspaper a "prohibited publication" under Section 53 of the 
Penal Code. The independent weekly had consistently drawn the ire of the 
government. However, when it printed issue Number 401 that contained an article 
about government plans for a referendum the following month relating to a revised 
Constitution, a decree was issued banning that edition of the paper. The 
Presidential decree also warned the public that anyone caught in possession of issue 
Number 401, including the version put out on the Internet, would be liable to 
prosecution. According to some observers this represented the first act of 
censorship of the Internet in Africa.62 
The Post journalists responsible for the article were initially charged under 
Section 4(3) of the State Security Act and Section 54 of the Penal Code for being in 
possession of six copies of issue Number 401 of The Post which had been found at 
the printers. But when the case went to the court, the charge under the Penal Code 
was dropped, and they faced charges under the State Security Act alone. The 
journalists were kept in police custody for two days until they were released on bail 
by order of the High Court63 
Also in February 1996, the two editors and a columnist of The Post were 
found guilty in absentia of contempt of Parliament after one of them had written 
articles attacking the Vice-President and other members of Parliament for criticizing 
a decision of the Supreme Court ,in which the Court had found Section 5 of the 
Public Order Act to be unconstitutional. Three days later they were summoned 
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before the National Assembly to be informed of the nature of their punishment. 
The three refused to appear before the National Assembly, and a few days later 
commenced judicial review proceedings challenging the findings and decision of 
the House. They went into hiding pending the hearing of their application. The 
Speaker of the National Assembly had issued a warrant directing the Inspector- 
General of Police to arrest the three and have them detained at any prison in 
Zambia until they showed 'contrition for their conduct' ,or until a further motion of 
the House.64 Aka Lewanika, an opposition Member of Parliament, who wrote to the 
Speaker to disassociate himself from the decision on the grounds that it represented 
a threat to Zambia's democratic process, was subsequently expelled from the 
Parliament as a result of his action. Lewanika would eventually win his case in 
court three years later.65 
Analysis and Critique 
Southern University worked directly with ZAMCOM on the 
implementation of the program. At the end of the program through ZAMCOM 
initiatives the following had been achieved. 
Thirty-three workshops were held for working journalists and media 
managers throughout Zambia which cost roughly $300,000. Workshop topics 
ranged from political reporting to desktop publishing. Workshop evaluations 
revealed that participants found the workshops highly beneficial. In 
conjunction with ZAMCOM workshops, four individuals were selected to 
complete a six-week internship in the U.S. (two from The Post, one from The 
Times of Zambia and one from The Sun). Interns were not selected during the 
final year as agreed upon by the PU and USAID. The final ZAMCOM initiative 
was that of seeking independence from their statutory-board status to an 
educational trust. The process was long; however, by late 1996 ZAMCOM 
became an independent educational trust. A condition precedent, which 
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stipulated that ZAMCOM would receive over $1M worth of equipment after 
becoming independent, was only partially met. Budget changes and decisions 
made by one of the three USAID Directors who served Zambia during the life 
of the D/G Project prohibited the procurement of the originally projected 
equipment.66 
The Media Institute for Southern Africa, in analyzing the Zambian situation 
in 1997, made the following appraisal. 
The one-party system introduced in 1972 was a re-creation of the pre¬ 
independence system, which the post-independence leaders knew very well. 
The experience of the past five years has shown that peaceful transition from 
a one-party constitutional order to a multi-party arrangement does not 
necessarily signify the beginning of responsible government sensitive to the 
needs and demands of the people. The combined effect of these factors on 
media institutions is that there is no legislation enabling or protecting the 
media, but pieces of legislation have been enacted by past governments which 
undermine their independence and role in the consolidation of democracy in 
Zambia.67 
Conclusion 
The independence of the media in Zambia remains unrealized. The MMD 
government has continued to refuse to privatize the state owned media while it has 
undertaken a vigorous privatization campaign of every other sector of society 
where state involvement was significant. Self-censorship is very prevalent among 
working journalists and libel laws requiring journalist to reveal their sources 
continue to constrain the development of serious investigative journalism. 
The USAID project did result in the devolution of ZAMCOM from the 
Ministry but has not resulted in an independently functioning institution. 
Additionally, the development of a media resource center has been established. 
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However, the center has not received adequate financial support to operate at the 
level envisioned and its sustainability remains questionable. 
The Civil Rights Component 
Introduction 
Carothers argues that it is almost an article of faith that U. S. democracy 
assistance programs will seek to work with elements of civil society. He furthers 
suggests that liberals and conservatives tend to agree on this article of faith. 
Carothers says, 
It is an article of faith within much of the U. S. democracy promotion 
establishment that the rise of civil society was critical to communism's demise 
in a number of Central and Eastern European countries and that the continued 
expansion of civil society is crucial to democracy's long term success in the 
region. In some other parts of the world, promoting civil society has been a 
contested and sometimes deliberately neglected element of U. S. democracy 
assistance. In Latin America, for example, the U. S. government generally 
avoided "bottom-up" democracy assistance during the 1980s for fear of 
encouraging populists movements thatmightbe hostile to U. S. anti-communist 
goals in the region.... Conservatives are favorably disposed to it because of 
the association developed in the 1980s between anti-communism and civil 
society development. For liberals, civil society promotion concords with their 
general inclination toward a populist 'bottom-up' approach rather than an elite- 
oriented 'top-down' approach to democratic development.68 
Civil Society in Zambia 
Civil society organizations in Zambia prior to 1990, like most of the 
institutions, did not function independently of the party or the state. Women's 
organizations, peasant farmer's association, professional associations, etc existed. 
However, they all were related to the one party state structures. In fact, even the 
powerful trade unions and churches had to constantly negotiate with the party and 
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state institutions relationships regarding political space that would be open to them 
to express their concerns. Thus, at best those institutions could be considered semi- 
autonomous. It also should be noted that some political space did exist for 
associations to play a role in the political process and debate regarding public 
policy. The Trade Union Congress and the Economic Association of Zambia are 
examples of this. Further, it should also be noted that in spite of the limitations and 
constraints that generally did exist, Zambians were still quite politized and 
informed citizens, perhaps more about international affairs than domestic realities. 
As anticipated, with the advent of multiparty politics and the withdrawal of the 
state from various sectors of the economy, newly formed Zambian civil society 
organizations attempted to address citizens concerns. 
USAID Assistance 
The United States' assistance program in the area of its civil rights 
component was aimed at strengthening the role of civil society in the decision 
making process. Specifically, it sought to improve citizens' understanding of their 
basic civil rights and responsibilities in a democratic society. The program design 
of the Civil Rights Promotion component of the five-year Democratic Governance 
Project was based on the baseline assessment conducted by Michigan State 
University professor Michael Bratton, and his Zambian colleagues for USAID. As 
pointed out in Chapter V, the civic education component of the USAID Democracy 
and Governance Project was comprised of a series of activities that included 
institutional support to the Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP); assistance 
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to FODEP in carrying out a nationwide civic education campaign; and a 
implementation of Civic Action Fund (CAF). The Civic Action Fund was designed 
as a competitive small grants program for NGOs. The fourth activity of the 
component was support for a new civics education curriculum and texts in 
government secondary schools. The latter was not originally part of the USAID 
program. It was an aspect of the civic education program proposed and developed 
by Southern University. 
FODEP was selected in part because of the monitoring role it had played 
during the October 1991 elections and its claim of a large membership in each of the 
provinces. According to Southern University, by the time the project had ended, 
FODEP was instrumental in carrying out over 200 workshops reaching more 
than 70,000 people at a cost of $1,487,063. Activities ranged from the training 
of trainers to discussions with the ordinary citizens about civic education. 
Additionally, politicians, election officers and other elected leaders were 
important target groups in conducting civic education. Over the last three 
years, FODEP has been able to move from a weakly-run organization with 
approximately 10,000 followers (fewer members) to a more efficiently run body 
with field offices in each province and an ever-growing membership.69 
It was clear from the outset of the project that FODEP, like most other 
domestic monitoring organizations, could conduct specific types of work. But it 
was not at all clear as to whether or not the organization would be sustainable 
without significant donor support. Moreover, it was recognized from the outset of 
the project that FODEP, again like other domestic monitoring organizations, would 
experience a transition period and that such a period would be filled with the 
organization's leadership trying to discover and define the group's mission given 
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the new circumstances existing in the country. Leadership problems appeared early 
on. Several significant players in the FODEP of the election period were now part 
of government. By the start of the project the organization had already experienced 
turnover. Given that history, it is little wonder that in its final report Southern 
University stated, 
USAID and the designers of the D/G Project were aware that in spite of 
FODEP's capability to promote civil rights, they were faced with management, 
administrative and board problems. The Board of Directors, who were 
primarily composed of members of the clergy, viewed FODEP as their creation; 
consequently, it became difficult for the board to release tire day to day control 
over FODEP's operations when they became large enough to establish a 
secretariat. Thus, at the time of the establishment of the PAU, there was 
constant strife between the FODEP board and the secretariat. An institutional 
strengthening clause was placed in the cooperative agreement that would 
enable the FODEP board and secretariat to first understand their differences 
and then eliminate any destructive conflicts. Additionally, it was expected that 
during the three-year life of the PAU, FODEP would develop the needed 
human resources to meet their objectives, mobilize other financial support 
which would enable them to be less dependent on USAID and other donors 
and acquire needed physical plant and facilities.70 
The Southern University final report presents a rather interesting analysis 
regarding the leadership and management of FODEP. The report argues that 
earlier intervention was necessary, or at least the serious management and 
leadership problems should not have been ignored by USAID. The report states 
that 
at the time that the PAU was established . . . the services of the second 
executive director of the FODEP secretariat had been terminated; there was a 
part-time book-keeper and the longest serving employee had been appointed 
as acting executive director. ... By January 1996 and two more executive 
directors later, the fifth executive director as well as a full-time 'qualified' 
accountant had been employed. These two individuals brought a level of 
optimism to the PAU and USAID for some degree of efficiency at FODEP.71 
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Civic Action Fund Grants 
The Civic Action Fund was a more direct form of assistance to civic groups 
in Zambia. The program was certainly one of the more popularly supported 
aspects of the entire USAID Democracy and Governance Program during the five- 
year period. According to the Southern University Final report, "It was expected 
that there would be 12 civic action fund grants throughout the life of the D/G 
Project Project activities ranged from drama performances in the rural areas to 
the encouragement of women to enter politics. The most often cited theme was 
"understanding one's rights and responsibilities in a democracy."72 Although only 
a small number of grants were initially envisioned, by the end of the program the 
Civic Action Fund had provided 78 grants to 61 different organizations with close 
to $900,000 having been spent.73 
Civics Education Curriculum 
Southern University's final report argues that the civics education 
curriculum was the least defined of all aspects of the USAID Governance and 
Democracy Project. The report states that 
this component was the least defined in the cooperative agreement. It was 
recommended as though it were a last minute thought that nationwide civics 
curriculum standards be developed and established and civics textbooks be 
written specific to Zambia. Moreover, the cooperative agreement suggested 
that the revised curriculum and the textbooks would be for pupils at the senior 
secondary level. The primary rationale was that there were fewer pupils at the 
senior secondary level; therefore, the D/G project would not have to invest as 
much as would be invested if activities were pursued at the junior secondary 
level (large numbers of pupils drop out of formal education after grade nine). 
Little thought was given to the activities that must transpire before reaching 
these two stages.74 
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The civics curriculum activities ranged from the assessment of the state of 
civics in Zambia, to the placement of teaching materials in all junior secondary 
schools in the country. By the end of the project more than 800 civics teachers were 
trained to use the new teaching material. Examinations incorporating the new 
syllabus were developed and close to 200,000 pupils' books were distributed to 
more than 700 junior secondary schools. Roughly $800,000 was spent on civics 
education curriculum activities.75 
The MMD government's behavior toward the project was generally one of 
indifference with the exception of the civics curriculum work with the Ministry of 
Education. However, its attitude and behavior toward the Zambian civil society 
sector was quite hostile. The civil society organizations and individuals heading 
selected groups had been the backbone of the popular movement to unseat Kaunda, 
therefore, some inside of the MMD may have feared the sector more than they did 
the opposition political parties. A second major reason for the almost paranoid 
behavior toward the civil society sector was the weakness of the all political parties 
themselves. Thus, intimidation tactics, disinformation and outright political 
repression became the favorite tools employed against the civil society 
organizations courageous enough to speak out against corruption, or stand up for 
human rights. 
One example of the government's behavior that directly impacted the 
existence of the USAID project was the seizing of FODEP funds by the MMD 
government. 
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On December 31, 1996, over K 56,000,000 was confiscated from FODEP's 
account at Stanbic Bank by the Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA). The PAU 
questioned why FODEP would have such a large amount in their account on 
the last day of the quarter. FODEP's argument was that they were unable to 
carry out all of their civic education activities because of the Presidential 
Elections that took place in November 1996.76 
The government claimed that FODEP had not been paying taxes on its 
income for a long time. Therefore, in the opinion of the MMD government and its 
supporters the Zambia Revenue Authority was well within its right to confiscate the 
funds within the organization's bank account Most honest observers saw this 
action for what it really was, political repression against civic groups who dared to 
suggest that the November 1996 elections were not free and fair. 
Analysis and Critique 
The continued support of FODEP, in spite of the organization having five 
executive directors in three years, suggests that USAID did not understand how to 
assist the organization or that FODEP was the wrong organization to be supporting. 
The Small Grants Program was very successful and proved that more direct 
grassroots type of assistance could be more valuable than supporting one 
bureaucratic structures' national organization. The long-term impact of the civics 
curriculum program is difficult to measure. However, continued support of such 
a program could have been very significant given that one-half of the country's 
population is under the age of 18. The short-term impact of the structural 
adjustment program, however, may render the program ineffective because many 
of the teachers who were trained may have moved on to find better paying jobs and 
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many of the would be students cannot afford to attend school as subsidies for 
education have been eliminated. 
With respect to the domestic monitoring support provided to the 
Committee for a Clean Campaign such support was not an original part of the 
governance and democracy program. That such crucial support could be provided 
does suggest that a flexible approach to political developments is warranted by 
USAID in similar political environments. The CCC support may have been one of 
the most important contributions made by USAID. 
The Political Party Component 
Introduction 
United States' interest in providing democratic assistance to political 
parties is controversial. In the past such support was usually associated with the 
CIA and covert attempts to influence the political outcome in another country. 
Currently, United States' support is posited on the belief that strong political 
institutions are necessary to achieve democratic consolidation in transitional 
societies. Therefore, improving the ability of political parties to be representative 
and practice internal democracy is seen as part of building stronger political 
institutions. USAID seems to be less enthusiastic about this type of support than its 
other programs. In the Zambian case it was the National Endowment for 
Democracy that initially supported the National Democratic Institute's political 
party program in Zambia. 
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Contemporary Political Parties in Zambia 
The development of political parties in Zambia, to be properly understood, 
must consider the historical circumstances surrounding the settler colonial state 
structures, and the subsequent independence agreement as well as the declaration 
of the one party state. 
The history of political parties during this initial step toward a democratic 
society is quite interesting. As pointed out in Chapter IV, the Northern Rhodesia 
Congress was the first and main African political party. It was succeeded by the 
African National Congress under the leadership of Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula. 
A split within the party between the more radical and accommodationist elements 
led to the formation, in 1958, of the Zambian African National Congress (ZANC). 
The Zambian African National Congress, which was effective in organizing those 
discontented with the colonial administration, was banned by the colonial 
government and many of its leaders jailed. The banning of ZANC led to the 
formation of the United National Independence Party (UNIP), under the leadership 
of Kenneth Kaunda. 
From 1964 to 1972 Zambia maintained a multiparty system of government. 
Several major political parties existed in the opposition, the most prominent among 
them being the African National Congress. Between 1972 and 1991 the "One-Party 
Participatory Democracy" system was in place under UNIP. During the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, two political parties came into being but were banned by the UNIP 
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government, and some of the leaders were jailed. In 1991, once the constitution was 
reformed, a number of political parties registered to compete in the scheduled 
elections. Some observers believed that a few of the parties had actually been 
started by Kaunda to limit the support for the MMD. Nevertheless, there were 
some other parties that did receive a hearing from the Zambian people. The two 
main competing parties during the 1991 presidential and national assembly 
elections were the United National Independence Party (UNIP) and the Movement 
for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD). 
The impact of the changing political situation, also discussed in Chapter IV, 
led to the emergence of five new political parties by the end of 1995. They were the 
Zambian Democratic Congress (ZDC), the Real Democratic Party (RDP), the 
National Congress Party (NCP), the Liberal Progressive Front (LPF), and the 
National Alliance for Reconstruction (NAR). In addition, calls for a unified "third 
force" to oppose the two dominant parties, UNIP and MMD, were led by the then 
National Party MP, the Honorable Aka Lewanika. 
In June 1995, the United National Independence Party's extraordinary 
Congress was held to decide who the leadership should be to contest the 1996 
presidential and national elections. Kenneth Kaunda made a stunning return, 
trouncing his former protege, Kebby Musokatwane, by an official vote count of 
1,910 to 400. Popular accounts suggest that Musokatwane had not marshaled 
enough votes in each of the nine provinces represented in order to have his name 
placed in nomination, which would have proved to be quite embarrassing for 
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Musokatwane, but Kaunda said no, there must be some competition or people will 
think the election was rigged. Thus the former president, told some of his loyal 
supporters to vote for his opponent, thereby allowing him to stand for the 
presidency of the party.77 
Kaunda's return for Zambian politics completely changed the political 
equation in Zambia. A number of key factors that would later prove to be central 
to the 1996 presidential election, and which therefore, merit careful analysis. First, 
it appears as if a concerted effort was launched by the MMD government to limit 
Kaunda's ability to participate in the presidential elections. MMD was actively 
trying to co-opt the leadership of UNIP. Kebby Musakotwane and then UNIP 
secretary general Benjamin Mbenga both believed that Kaunda had not been 
"reformed" and that his return would destroy the party.78 In fact, they were 
planning to concede the 1996 elections to the MMD. Kaunda's forces within UNIP 
were aware of all these developments and systematically started a lobbying effort 
to have a draft Kaunda movement to make his return to active politics look as if it 
were a popular call from the grassroots. While MMD officials maintain that 
constitutional reform measures were being discussed and while the former 
president had retired from politics, the government's attempts to arrest and deport 
him on the basis of his citizenship, (i. e., accusing him of being a Malawian,) 
backfired in October 1995. In addition, the revelation of "secret tunnels" under the 
State House in September 1995, that were supposedly used as torture chambers, 
was dismissed by most Zambians, and failed to taint Kaunda further as a human 
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rights violating "dictator." In fact, in some cases it was the opposition that scored 
points in the propaganda game by arguing that president Chiluba should be 
impeached for revealing such state secrets. 
Kaunda, for his part, did not cease to criticize the MMD government's 
policies, and his party, engaged in acts of intimidation and violence which they 
claimed were either in response to thugish behavior of the MMD supporters or 
because of the illegal and unpatriotic activities of the MMD. Kaunda purged the 
party of large numbers of supporters of previous party president, Kebby 
Musokatwane. UNIP under Kaunda's leadership however, has scored impressive 
electoral gains outside of its Eastern province stronghold and the party clearly had 
massive support at the grassroots level. 
At the beginning of 1996, there were 35 registered political parties in 
Zambia. However, only three parties, the MMD, UNIP and the National Party, had 
representatives elected to the National Assembly. 
U.S. Democracy Assistance and Political Parties 
Under the terms of an agreement signed on September 30,1994, between 
the USAID/Zambia and the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs 
(NDI), a year-long program of assistance to political parties in Zambia was begun. 
The purpose of the program was to assist in the development of the political 
organizations most directly impacted by Zambia's transformation from a one-party 
state to a constitutional multi-party democracy.79 
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The NDI program, "Zambia: Strengthening Political Parties," was 
developed to provide technical assistance to Zambian political parties on the basis 
of request emanating from previous short-term projects NDI had organized with 
political parties following the 1991 elections. Building on the recommendations 
from a series of meetings with representatives from political parties and 
nongovernmental civic organizations in 1993 and early 1994, NDI's training 
program was designed to foster all-party dialogue while at the same time address 
the specific organizational weaknesses of individual parties.80 
NDI offered technical assistance to the three political parties represented 
in the National Assembly and consultative services to a number of non-elected 
political parties.81 Specifically, NDI assisted the parties in training their leadership 
and activists in techniques of membership recruitment, public accountability, 
message development, resource development and the involvement of youth and 
women in the political process. 
In the design of its party program, NDI entered into formal cooperative 
relationships with the parties. The memorandums of understanding stressed the 
parties' participation in the design and implementation of the project activities. 
Several challenges to the outlined NDI program of work were evident from the 
outset and manifested themselves during the life of the project. Those challenges 
included factionalism and leadership wrangles within each party, dramatic changes 
in the leadership of the two main opposition parties, at extraordinary party 
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congresses, and an inability of the political parties to distinguish clearly between 
themselves ideologically or organizationally.82 
The three major political parties in Zambia at that time which had 
representation in the National Assembly-the MMD, UNIP, and National 
Party-were all characterized by problems of disorganization, inadequate internal 
governance and poor financing. In addition to these three parties there were some 
thirty other registered political parties, maneuvering for position at the provincial 
or regional levels.83 Efforts to build coalitions among the parties had been 
unsuccessful because of a lack of trust and constant party changing. These 
shortcomings contributed to a growing public cynicism and disillusionment with 
the entire political process. Therefore, voter turnout for parliamentary by-elections 
was alarmingly low, and declining. Complaints were common from all political 
party leaders at the local level regarding the failure of members of parliament to 
visit their constituencies since the time when they were originally elected. 
It was believed that the NDI program would also assist the political parties 
in assuring their role in an evolving pluralistic political culture. Finally, the NDI 
technical assistance project to the three parliamentary political parties, as well as 
consultative services to other parties, was designed to increase their knowledge and 
use of modem organizational skills while at the same time fostering inter-party 
dialogue. 
Several specific objectives for the program were: 
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1. To assist the political parties to expand their membership and resource 
base; 
2. To offer techniques to the parties that will improve their ability to conduct 
party affairs in a responsible manner and according to agreed upon ethical 
procedures; 
3. Assisting the parties to develop their ability to communicate effectively 
with the public, other political groups and within the party organization; 
4. To give special attention to women political activists in developing the NDI 
training program.84 
In the program, NDI identified three teams of political party trainers who 
were each assigned to a specific party over the life of the project. The trainers were 
volunteers from the United States, Great Britain, and Ireland who each made at 
least two visits to Zambia ,and acted as resource persons assigned to the party 
between visits.85 In addition, NDI was to identify a media expert to work with the 
parties on methods and techniques of modern political communication.86 
Throughout the duration of the project, NDI had two professional political 
organizers "in country" to provide ongoing training and technical assistance with 
emphasis on regional development outside of Lusaka. 
The implementation of the program was divided into four phases. Each 
phase coincided with a quarterly reporting period. It was also anticipated that NDI 
would design and produced materials that would be used throughout the training 
program. Toward that end, NDI produced a political party organizers' manual 
with specific reference to the Zambian political environment. 
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The first phase of the project was the organization and development 
period. NDI was to coordinate with the political parties and various non¬ 
governmental organizations so as to inform the "training of trainers" program and 
to liaise with other on-going donor-supported Governance and Democracy 
activities in Zambia. Several of the major aspects of the first phase included the 
development of a schedule for training, the topic agendas, plans for the Training of 
Trainers program and the presentation of a work plan to USAID that reflected the 
consultations which occurred. In addition, "user friendly" training materials were 
collected and analyzed.87 
During the second phase of the project, political party trainings took place 
in the capital city, Lusaka. NDI conducted individualized week-long party 
workshops which addressed issues and concerns identified by the national 
leadership of the parties. 
During the third phase of the program, NDI organized a series of one-day 
all-party workshops in the provincial capital of each of Zambia's nine provinces. 
The conferences brought together party leadership from the constituent, district, 
and provincial levels to discuss the role of political parties in the political process. 
NDI's workshops focused on the importance of organization and structure, the 
relationship between national and local leadership, and the development of party 
policy goals and message. 
The fourth phase of the Zambian program focused on improving 
communications within the parties, between parties and with the public. NDI's 
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international trainers continued their work on party development with the political 
parties represented in parliament and the Zambian party trainees played an active 
role in the second set of conferences and also provided follow-up on information 
gained during the provincial workshops. In the second set of Lusaka trainings, a 
critical review of activities needed to strengthen the party at the local level was to 
be undertaken. The review would be based on data generated during the 
provincial workshops and consultations.88 
NDI also co-sponsored, with the political parties and selected non¬ 
governmental organizations, two specialized conferences: one on the involvement 
of women in the political process and another on youth involvement in the 
democratic process.89 
NDI's conferences with the MMD, UNIP and the National Party had three 
main effects on strengthening the internal and external organization of the party. 
First, participants were able to discuss issues of concern with independent and 
impartial experts in political party management. The three teams of experts 
provided in depth technical assistance throughout the meetings and agreed to 
become resource persons throughout the year. Second, participants were able to 
receive training on a number of different subjects: message development, ethical 
conduct, fundraising, grassroots organizing, membership recruitment, and 
leadership development (particularly of women and youth) that emphasized their 
unique needs. Finally, the conferences helped to bring together party activists from 
the provincial and urban areas to address issues of communication, coordination 
244 
and support. Consequently, through a combination of interactive workshops and 
intensive technical assistance, NDI believed that it was able to affect positively the 
internal and external dynamics of each political party.90 The media reflected the 
aspect of message development in articles and television spots in which the 
National Party and UNIP each sent out their urgent message on the need for voter 
registration. 
NDI Zambia joined with members of the women's committees of the 
parliamentary political parties, and the National Women's Lobby Group to plan a 
seminar which would bring together party activists and NGO's to discuss gender 
and democratization with the aim of encouraging women to work together on civic 
education and empowerment of women who wished to stand for elected office. 
The seminar was held on March 29, 1995 and was a forum where women could 
formally call on all Zambian political parties to nominate more women for offices 
and generally include more women in the decision-making functions of the parties. 
At that seminar skills building workshops were held on grassroots organizing, 
message development and communications, fundraising and resource 
development. A closing plenary was held at which a statement by Zambian women 
on political participation was adopted. The following quote reflects the spirit of the 
document's preamble: "Recognizing that the majority of the population and an 
even larger majority of voters are women who ought to be ably represented but are 
hindered from participating fully in the political process through structural barriers. 
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These are lack of finances for campaigns, lack of backing by political parties or 
simply lack of information... Z'91 
The women's seminar was the first of its kind bringing together the women 
leaders of the political parties in a multi-party setting along with women activists 
from across the spectrum of the Zambian non-governmental community. It was 
also the first time women from the grassroots community attended and participated 
in such an important meeting and addressed the meeting in their local languages.92 
It was significant that top male leaders of several political parties were present at 
the reception following the conference, at which the conference communique was 
read. 
The impact of the innovative meeting was three-fold. Women were able 
to forge a coalition that transcended inter-party rivalry and were brought together 
from a variety of public sector organizations; Zambian women activists were 
trained intensively in methods of grassroots organizing to encourage greater 
political participation in general; and finally, NDI was able to provide a context in 
which women could have an honest and open discussion regarding their status in 
the social, political, and economic context.93 
As a result of these discussions, the content of the communique stressed the 
need for political education and encouragement of women to stand for office 
regardless of their party affiliation. It stated that. 
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The Women's Committees of the Political Parties and the Women's NGO's 
participating in the Women and Democratization seminar. . . . Call upon all 
Zambian political parties: 
1. To recognize the absence of democratic change in the area of involvement 
of marginalized groups in popular participation in decision-making and 
to eliminate all remaining barriers to women's full participation in political 
life; 
2. To commit themselves to concrete action in the areas of registration of 
women voters and skills building and leadership development of women 
in the parties -beyond the women's committees- with an aim to closing the 
gender gap in decision-making; 
3. To assist committed women to stand for office in upcoming local and 
national elections.94 
NDI's work with women involved in the political process continued throughout the 
course of the Strengthening Political Parties Program. 
On April 29,1995, NDI sponsored a Youth Consultation and Leadership 
Meeting. The consultation was a planning meeting designed to assist the 
participants in identifying critical concerns and outlining possible joint projects. 
The youth movement was obviously in need of coordination to build its 
participation in the democratization process.95 
The April consultation was the first ever meeting of the parliamentary 
parties youth wings. The results of the consultation was a request by the youth 
wings and participating NGOs, for NDI to work together with a secretariat of youth 
drawn from the consultation, in order to developed a work plan for a larger and 
more inclusive conference to be held in September. The national youth and student 
symposium would be co-sponsored by the Ministry of Youth, Sport, and Child 
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Development, and would bring young people from around the country to map out 
strategies appropriate for more systematic involvement in the political process. 
The National Youth and Student Conference co-sponsored by NDI and the 
youth wings of the three political parties was held September 29, 1995 at the 
Mulungushi Conference Center. The conference brought together more than 120 
participants from 31 organizations, representing political party youth wings, the 
Department of Youth Affairs of the Ministry of Youth, Sport, and Child 
Development, religious organizations, NGOs, the University of Zambia and other 
student leaders. 
Participants tended to focus on the issue of political marginalization facing 
youth in Zambia today. Planning for the eight workshops met with obstacles 
stemming from the reconstitution of the UNIP and NP leadership at extraordinary 
party congresses. Several of the participants noted that this was the first time the 
parties had come together to engage in a dialogue, and only in Eastern Province 
was this not achieved when the "all-party" workshop was canceled by NDI due to 
the perception that the meeting site was not neutral and complaints by UNIP's 
leadership that proper consultations had not occurred with them prior to NDI 
meetings with the MMD. 
NDI worked with the secretariat of each party to define areas that should 
be covered in an all party format and from their party individually. Each 
secretariat had the responsibility to inform and organize their party activists to 
participate in the all-party conference. In each province NDI first held individual 
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consultations with each party prior to the all party conference. The agreed upon 
schedule by the three parties was as follows: Wednesday, MMD; Thursday, UNEP; 
Friday National Party and Saturday, the All Party Conference. 
The provincial workshops, in a number of cases, represented the first 
opportunity that some of the participants had to air their views of their party and 
its role in a multi-party democracy. The site visit meetings and the individual 
consultations before the all-party workshop were essential to build the parties' trust 
in NDI, and recognition of the institute's impartiality. 
The party participants who were trained as trainers in Lusaka were helpful 
in setting up the provincial workshops. However, the internal party communication 
networks were very weak in many areas so the appropriate notice and/or 
background to the meetings was not always given. 
NDI conducted a workshop with political parties who were not elected to 
Parliament September 7-9, 1995 in the city of Ndola, located in the Copperbelt 
Province. The Labor Party (LP), National Democratic Alliance (NADA), National 
Party for Democracy (NPD), Independent Democratic Front (IDF) and Zambia's 
newest political party at the time, Zambia Democratic Congress (ZDC) all sent at 
least five representatives. A total of 40 party representatives participated in the 
meetings, which began with an evening consultation with four of the parties, 
focusing primarily on the role of the opposition in a democracy. 
The workshop covered fundraising and resource development, 
membership recruitment and retention and coalition building. In light of some of 
249 
the problems the opposition coalition had faced, the participants were very 
interested in the points presented as to how to discern the benefits or liabilities of 
joining a coalition. Other issues raised by participants included use of the media, 
intimidation and corruption. The workshops were designed to be interactive, and 
provide practical examples of political tolerance, intra-party communications, 
mutual respect and political party ethics. Participants identified lack of resources 
as well as poor party organization as the most serious deficiencies facing the parties. 
Participants strongly criticized the ruling party describing it as the 
"common enemy" who had betrayed the trust of the Zambian people. The session 
devoted to party organization focused on administration, financial management, 
political research and training. Several important issues were raised, particularly 
concerning the misconception among opposition parties that the role of the 
opposition is to oppose every policy pursued by the ruling party. The need for 
serious, well-organized opposition parties was stressed. A few of the other key 
issues addressed included the following: 
1. A misconception among opposition parties that when you are in 
opposition you have to oppose everything the ruling party does 
2. A need for serious opposition parties with a real vision and alternatives to 
the current programs or policies that are being managed by the current 
government 
3. Opposition parties should insure that levels of corruption and 
incompetence on the part of government are checked and insure 
accountability and transparency. 
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4. A need to respect and assist in the building of democratic institutions 
because one day the opposition party may be in government and will want 
to protect the respectability of the office (e.g., the presidency)96 
Analysis and Critique 
The NDI program was presented to USAID as having been "highly 
successful." That assessment was in part accurate. The objectives set out by the 
organization were for the most part achieved. The number of proposed meetings, 
conferences and trainings were held. Those gatherings were appreciated by most 
of the party members who participated. However, what became clear somewhat 
later was the fact that the tension in the party structures, which already existed, in 
some cases was exacerbated especially between the elected provincial party 
leadership and the politically appointed provincial leadership. More importantly, 
the leadership style of the top level leadership was unaffected by the series of 
trainings. This was important because almost all the leadership of opposition 
parties either had been or still were part of the UNIP structures and continued to 
exhibit the old UNIP attitudes that the party was first and all else secondary. Thus, 
party loyalty and "discipline" were seen as essential principles of belonging. 
Conversations with members of other political parties was often seen as paramount 
to trading with the enemy and could result in expulsion. 
The NDI political party program was not long enough nor did it have the 
resources to have a major impact in providing the parties what they needed. The 
changes in the National Party and UNIP also prevented the political party 
component of the USAID Democracy and Governance Project from having a greater 
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impact. The NDI program design did not consider ethnic basis of some of the 
political alliances, historical or contemporary, that constituted the support blocks 
for the three parties in parliament. In fact, the NDI program in an attempt to 
promote the strengthening of outreach to all sectors of the society consciously 
ignored the ethnic factor. The NDI trainings were designed in that manner in part 
because Zambia, unlike some of its neighbors, had made significant strides in 
addressing the ethnic question, albeit through a crude form of political patronage. 
The NDI program also did not fully appreciate the rural/urban distinction and the 
different needs of party officials and members. Although Zambia is more 
urbanized than most African countries, still one has to remember that a majority of 
its citizens live in the rural areas. Moreover, the NDI program had no appreciation 
for the political patronage system in place in all of the political parties. Perhaps, 
one of the weaknesses of the program that probably could not have been foreseen, 
but could have been instrumental toward the implementation of a more effective 
program, was the lack of recognition of the political role traditional authorities 
continue to play and their interaction with and understanding of multi-party 
political systems. 
Conclusion 
The program design team for the NDI program approached Zambia in a 
manner that did not fully appreciate its special historical circumstances. There also 
was a generalized assumption that the MMD was committed to promoting the 
consolidation of democracy in Zambia. Because of the lack of appreciation by NDI 
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program design for the difficulties associated with transportation logistics, 
communications challenges, the clash between traditional authority and modem 
democratic practices, party organization and development, especially in the rural 
areas, the NDI program led to the party that needed the least help bet benefitting 
the most. In fact, more time and resources should have been devoted to the 
opposition political parties given the absolute dominance of the MMD, the lack of 
funding and resources that the opposition had access to, and because if systematic 
assistance was not received the development of another authoritarian one-party 
state was more than likely guaranteed. 
The Zambia Project and Economic Liberalization 
Introduction 
The review of the literature earlier showed that in much of Western 
discourse on democracy, as a political system and the democratization process, is 
associated with capitalism, or the free market system and an assumed positive 
linkage between political and economic liberalization. United States foreign policy 
toward Zambia explicitly drew this link during the 1992-1997 period, and continues 
to do so today. 
There are five basic assumptions regarding economic liberalization that have 
particular relevance to the Zambian context. They are as follows: 
□ Macroeconomic stabilization is necessary to reduce government 
expenditure as a way of eliminating budget deficits, raising government 
savings and correcting past state involvement in the economy which led to 
heavily subsidized industries, and an inefficient and uncompetitive public 
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sector that has worked against the development of the local private sector 
and the attraction of foreign investments. 
□ By putting a structural adjustment program in place exports will grow, 
generating the much needed foreign exchange to sustain imports and debt 
servicing. 
□ Structural adjustment will succeed if a variety of measures are utilized 
such as ending the regulatory and interventionist roles of government in 
the economy by implementing policies that emphasize deregulation, trade 
liberalization, privatization of state-owned enterprises and the removal of 
government subsidies on key social services such as education, health, food 
and housing. 
□ Devaluation of the local currency is necessary for incomes to be enhanced, 
for higher prices to be realized on export crops and to shift demand from 
foreign to domestic goods and to improve the country's balance of 
payments. 
□ A more meaningful and long-term economic growth and stability can be 
achieved by implementing tough SAP policy choices, that are the best 
solution to the problem of internal and external financial imbalances, in the 
short run.97 
In each of the aforementioned assumptions, a key role, as implementing agent, is 
outlined for the state. 
The World Bank in its 1994 World Development Report focused on the role 
of the state in transitions from planned economies to market driven economies. In 
the bank's view, what the state should do, how it should do it, and how it could do 
it better in a rapidly changing world, was an issue for developed and developing 
countries alike. The report says, 
For many, the lesson of recent years has been that the state could not deliver on 
its promises: transition economies have had to make a wrenching shift toward 
the market economy, and much of the developing world has had to face up to 
the failure of state-dominated development strategies. Even the mixed 
economies of the industrialized world, in response to the failures of 
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government intervention, have opted for a decided shift in the mix in favor of 
market mechanisms. Many have felt that the logical end point of all these 
reforms was a minimalist state. Such a state would do no harm, but neither 
could it do much good.98 
The report goes on to argue, on the basis of evidence drawn from the East 
Asian experience, that development requires an effective state, one that plays a 
catalytic, facilitating role, encouraging and complementing the activities of private 
business and individuals. This, according to the World Bank, can be achieved 
through the framework of a two-part strategy: 
□ First, focus the state's activities to match its capability. Many states try to 
do too much with few resources and little capability. Getting governments 
better focused on the core public activities that are crucial to development 
will enhance their effectiveness. 
□ Second, over time, look for ways to improve the state's capability by 
reinvigorating public institutions. The Report puts particular emphasis on 
mechanisms that give public officials the incentive to do their jobs better 
and to be more flexible, but that also provide restraints to check arbitrary 
and corrupt behavior.99 
Obviously, the exact role of the African state in the development process 
continues to be a hotly debated topic. Nigerian scholar Claude Ake was explicit in 
his view regarding the African state in the development process. He noted, 
It is important to avoid thinking of Africa by making analogies and easy 
comparisons with the experiences of others, especially the NICs of East Asia. 
Political authoritarianism has its own specificity, which markedly affects its 
consequences. While East Asia autocratic states are well established and in 
control, in most African countries there is really no state, liberal or autocratic. 
What exist is a public force that should be the state but that is only nominally 
so because it is essentially privatized. Being privatized, the so-called state is 
not able to rise above the struggles and conflicts of contending social groups. 
It becomes itself a contested terrain where contending parties vie for the 
appropriation of resources, including the power of the state. ... In most of 
Sub-Saharan Africa, unlike East Asia, the state not only is very rudimentary, 
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if it can be said to exist at all, but was also displaced. It was displaced by 
colonialism, which in the course of its violent assault on indigenous society 
directed loyalties to primary groups, and also by the state-building project of 
the post-independence era, which was almost as coercive as the colonial state¬ 
building project and had roughly the same effect.100 
The Zambian State and Economic Liberalization Process 
Lloyd Sachikonye has argued that there is a direct relationship between 
contemporary political and economic changes. Sachikonye argues, 
the current political and economic reforms in most African countries have 
stimulated debate on the definition and content of democracy and civil society 
in the African context. These reforms were largely initiated by popular 
struggles in the late 1980s to force the unseating of authoritarian regimes. 
Strident demands for the dismemberment of the one-party state, military 
regimes and statist economic controls were articulated in much of Sub-Saharan 
Africa. These demands still persist where the incumbent regimes have not yet 
conceded to democratic change. The popular demands for political and 
economic change have been influenced by debates on the relationship between 
democracy and development, between state and civil society, and on the 
significance of the role of international forces in contributing to the reform 
process.101 
The important point here is that economic liberalization or even 
progressive economic reforms cannot and do not occur in a political vacuum. In 
other words, the state remains central to developments including the 
implementation of economic liberalization policies. As Ake has argued, in the 
African setting the state is called upon to use the public force that it is to solve the 
usually intense struggle regarding which development paths will be pursued. 
In the Zambian situation, with nationalization associated with the UNIP 
one party state, the Zambian State was involved in almost every aspect of the 
economy, from copper mining to sugar production and distribution. Therefore, 
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when the MMD came to power, the policy recommendations provided by Western 
advisors practically meant that the only role for the State, was one of facilitating its 
own withdrawal from participating or intervening in the economy. In other words, 
the Zambian state as it relates to economic development, was being asked to 
commit suicide. Hence, after the historic October 1991 elections the MMD 
government and its backers wasted little time in introducing drastic economic 
reforms under a newly revised structural adjustment program developed by the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. 
The MMD used its brief honeymoon period to make fundamental reforms 
that the Kaunda government would never have been able to do. But because most 
citizens believed that the changes would "in the long-run" result in economic 
development and democracy, the MMD government was able to implement some 
of the same changes that Kaunda had attempted, only the MMD was not met with 
the riots that had greeted the last UNIP government. Those reforms resulted in the 
rapid movement of Zambia from a planned economy toward becoming a market 
democracy. For instance, as part of the structural adjustment program, the MMD 
undertook perhaps the most "radical" economic liberalization, privatization and 
liquidation program ever instituted in any African country.102 
As pointed out in Chapter IV, it was during the first Chiluba 
Administration that the MMD government either adopted macroeconomic policy 
reforms or introduced and passed legislation through the National Assembly that 
was designed to bring about the following: 
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□ Decontrol of Prices and Marketing 
□ Liberalization of Trade 
□ Exchange Rate Adjustments 
□ Debt Servicing and Management 
□ Privatization of State Enterprises 
□ Reduction of the Civil Service 
Several of the major pieces of legislation adopted included the Privatization 
Act of 1992, the Private Investment Act of 1993, the Banking and Financial Services 
Act of 1994, and the Land Bill of 1995.103 Obviously, all of this legislation provided 
for policy reforms that were seen as being central to the neo-liberal economic 
program designed by the IMF and the World Bank. In the Zambian case, because 
of the international financial institutions focus on policy reforms, it is clear who the 
real policy makers were and who the "policy takers" were. 
Just as in other African countries, the de-control of prices was supposed to 
eliminate the high level of demand for imported and domestically produced 
consumer goods that was promoted by the system of price controls, which kept 
prices relatively and artificially low. In the Zambian context, the de-control of 
prices, removal of subsidies and liberalization of marketing resulted in higher 
prices for foodstuff and diminished the ability of many households to purchase 
adequate quantities to meet the basic needs of an average Zambian family. 
Moreover, although the elimination of marketing was designed to ensure that 
trading in primary commodities was dissipated among a large number of traders 
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who could not collude to increase prices, the result in Zambia led to disadvantages 
for peasant farmers, as the emerging private traders had little motivation to visit 
areas that were difficult to access. The degree of difficulty was increased when the 
Zambian Bus Company was liquidated. The liquidation of the bus company did 
give rise to numerous private entities, including one owned by the Minister of 
Finance, Ronald Penza. At the same time the liquidation not only impacted 
transportation, especially to rural areas, but also marketing and other essential 
services such as the distribution of mail within the country. 
Trade liberalization policies were supposed to provide for reduced import 
barriers that would permit cheap imports to enter the country. However, in the 
Zambian case trade liberalization has resulted in the reduction in demand for 
domestic goods, the destruction of domestic industries and the removal of 
restrictions on exportation of strategic commodities. One example of how this 
manifests itself is through the distribution of South African agricultural products. 
At supermarkets built and operated by South Africans, such as Shoprite, South 
African produce is sold at prices cheaper than Zambian produce. Given that the 
South African products are more plentiful and often of better quality, one can easily 
understand why more and more Zambian farmers are selling out and moving into 
other areas of work. Some of the large and underutilized agricultural lands are 
being sold to South African farmers, who in turn hire Zambia peasant farmers as 
workers. The Zambian market is so flooded by South Africans that even the street- 
children and young hawkers on Cairo Road sell the commodities. 
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Exchange Rate Adjustment 
The devaluation or depredation of a country's currency is one of the major 
aspects of structural adjustment programs. The exchange rate adjustments are 
designed to reduce the external value of a currency, thereby resulting in a reduction 
in export prices and therefor a growth in the demand from abroad for commodities. 
The increase in import prices will also induce a reduction in demand for imports. 
The Zambian currency, the Kwacha, between 1991 and 1999 was 
depredated by more than 2,000 percent The kwacha was trading at 68 to one 
U. S. dollar in 1991 when the MMD took over government In 1999, the exchange 
rate had reached, 3,000 to one U. S. dollar. The constant deprecation of the kwacha, 
coupled with massive redundancies in the dvil service and state enterprises, and 
lack of any meaningful wage increases for those lucky enough to be formally 
employed, severely impaired Zambian dtizens standard of living. In fact, as Fig. 
2.0 graphically outlines, the depredation of the kwacha has left most Zambians 
today living lives of desperation that threaten to undermine the country's sorial 
fabric and the stability needed for the country to have a chance of achieving 
sustainable economic development The drive to obtain foreign exchange, at 
whatever cost, has led to an exodus of those with skills and the turning of the dties 
into red lite districts and playgrounds for Europeans. Additionally, the 
psychological impact on the collective self-esteem of Zambians is immeasurable. 
Europeans have money, better vehicles, better homes, and better jobs and therefore 
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The familiar results of such devaluations was the deterioration, in terms of 
trade due to an erosion of the competitiveness of exports and import substitutes. 
Additionally, high rates of inflation were a by-product of the devaluations. The 
inflation rate during the decade averaged nearly 100 percent. Moreover, the 
Zambian citizens' purchasing power plummeted drastically as the average monthly 
wage remained at 30,000 kwacha a month, the equivalent of 12 US dollars monthly 
or 55 cents per day for an average of 22 working days (most Zambians who are 
employed typically work more than 22 days per month). 
Debt Management 
The reduction and eventual elimination of the Zambian debt was a high 
priority for the MMD government. The support from donor countries was posited 
on the Chiluba Administration meeting Zambia's obligation to pay its debt of over 
seven billion US dollars. However, as Fig. 2.1 indicates, during the decade of the 
1990s Zambia's external debt virtually remained unchanged. At the same time, 
debt servicing grew and accounted for between 70 and 80 percent of the country's 
foreign exchange each year. Moreover, debt servicing, as a percentage of exports 
of gross domestic product averaged between 200 and 380 percent. This has resulted 
in the country's inability to purchase needed raw materials and supplies, and 
furthered eroded its manufacturing sector, which was small to begin with. More 
importantly, this has resulted in the elimination the country's ability to provide 
basic services for its citizens, if it were inclined to do so. Perhaps the most noted 
FIGURE 2.1 










1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Source: Southern Political Economic Monthly & 
UNDP Human Development Reports 1992-1999 
262 
263 
aspect of the structural adjustment program was the privatization project supported 
by the United States government. 
The USAID Program and the MMD Government 
Although economic liberalization was not a focal point of United States 
democracy assistance, an a priori link had been established by USAID in its 
strategic plan which was reinforced by the US Embassy and was generally 
understood to be United States policy. In fact, when the NDI project director was 
quoted in The Post newspaper as saying that the structural adjustment program 
(SAP) could jeopardize the Zambian democratization process, the United States 
Ambassador called him in to remind him that his statement was not reflective of the 
policy position of the United States of America.104 Therefore, it should come as no 
surprise that one of the major assumptions of the Zambian Governance and 
Democracy Project was that there would be increasing improvement in the standard 
of living of Zambians during the period when the democracy assistance was 
provided. 
Thomas Carothers argues that the complexities and points of contradiction 
in simultaneous transitions to democracy and market economies do not figure 
significantly in the U. S. policy formulations. Therefore, the United States' 
democracy assistance program in Zambia, as in other parts of the world, was 
posited on the view that 
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... transitions to democracy and market economies are mutually reinforcing. 
By increasing the free flow of information, empowering individuals, and 
making governments more accountable, U. S. officials argue, democratization 
will facilitate the transition to a market economy. In parallel fashion, by 
establishing private property, reducing the leverage of the state over tire lives 
of individuals, and raising the overall socio-economic levels of the population, 
the transition to a market economy can strengthen democratization.105 
Zambia was and is viewed as being important to United States national 
interests for several reasons. In the introduction to the 1998 Congressional 
Presentation it is stated that 
Zambia is pivotal to southern Africa's prospects for peace, economic 
integration and growth Today Zambia is a beacon of growth and stability. 
The Government of the Republic of Zambia (GAZ.) has pledged to stay the 
course on privatization and economic liberalization. In time, this will result in 
increased investments-especially in the mining, agricultural and industrial 
sectors, . . . Since 1991, Zambia has moved from total government control of 
prices, markets, and general economic activity to a market determined 
economic system. A major privatization campaign began, selling government 
owned enterprises to the private sector. Agricultural prices were liberalized 
with input subsidies and fixed output pricing eliminated. Commodity trade 
was opened, allowing commercial traders to begin handling the majority of 
products. The private sector was encouraged to take an increasing role in the 
economy. For the first time in over two decades, market signals began to 
determine prices and guide decision making by producers and traders The 
challenge is to sustain the Zambian Government's and people's commitment 
through a difficult transition until the implementation of reforms accelerates. 
Zambia is nearly five years into its transition. The euphoria that greeted the 
reforms has worn off. We have to show results if we are to be able to move 
forward to keep the promises.106 
Between 1993 and 1997, the United States government also provided 18 
million dollars worth of technical assistance and infrastructural support to the 
Zambian Privatization Corporation.107 In fact, the Privatization Support Project was 
3 million dollars larger in financial, as well as personnel and verbal terms, than the 
Democracy and Governance project. Additionally, the project has been singled out 
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as one of the great achievements of USAID in Zambia. According to USAID even 
the World Bank has singled out the Zambia Privatization Agency as the best run 
privatization effort in Africa.108 
To highlight these achievements at empowering the private sector in 
Zambia, the agency's success story listed on its web page is as follows: 
Zambia is a good case study of USAID's effort to empower the private 
sector in Africa. USAID has assisted the Zambian government in privatizing 
state-owned enterprises, in ending inefficient subsidies and in providing 
business know-how-including banking, legal analysis, marketing and public 
relations-to nascent small and medium-sized enterprises. One way USAID 
provides this business expertise is through the International Executive Serive 
Corps (IESC), a group that sends volunteers from many of Americas best 
companies to help other businesses around the globe. In Lusaka, Zambia, an 
IESC volunteer helped the Oven Fresh Bakery in Lusaka modernize and 
develop a long-term business plan. Within three years, the bakery's revenue 
increased from $57,000 to over $1.2 million, and employment increased from 
an unskilled work force of eight in 1992 to a skilled work force of 60 by 1995 
... in 1994, USAID officers interviewed Fabian Mungule, a high school student 
selling 28 bags of maize in the Monze market, one of Zambia's drought hit 
areas. Fabian had brought the maize from Kabwe, a maize-surplus area. 
During the school vacation, this student had started small-marketing one bag 
in the Kabwe district market, using his bicycle for transport. Fabian was now 
moving maize between districts, renting transport on large, 10-ton trucks. He 
parlayed his initial investment of $8.50 into a total gross sales revenue from his 
28 bags of $574. More importantly, he responded to free-market incentives by 
broadening his own employment and income opportunities, while providing 
a valuable service to consumers in areas suffering a food shortfall due to poor 
rainfall. Zambia reflects USAID belief that economic development can be 
driven by national level reforms and grassroots efforts to encourage 
entrepreneurship.109 
In tire Zambian context a decade of privatization has not generated wealth, 
better efficiency, new employment, or higher rates of growth and sustainable 
economic development. In fact, for most of the decade of the 1990s Zambia has 
experienced negative growth rates in major sectors of the economy. Additionally, 
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what was achieved, is massive retrenchment, newly privatized companies that have 
not been able to stay in business, (those that have are either barely making a profit), 
and a growing inequitable distribution of income and wealth. 
Analysis and Critique 
Despite the clear need, the MMD did not have a national economic 
development plan. The annual budget process came closest to being an articulation 
of development priorities. Agriculture was clearly neglected year after year, in 
spite of severe drought in Southern province where agriculture dominates. 
Southern Province is the region of the country where the Tonga ethnic group are in 
a overwhelming majority of the population. It is also a location of stiff opposition 
to the MMD government. Baldwin Nkabula, one time National Party president and 
Kebby Musokatwane, the former UNIP president, were both from Southern 
Province. It would seem that to the extent the MMD believed a national plan 
existed, the party and government evidently thought that the structural adjustment 
program was it. 
USAID Zambia had as its number one strategic objective the "reduction of 
the State's role in the provision of good and services which are more efficiently 
produced by the private sector and to increase the efficiency and productive 
capacity of rural non-farm enterprises."110 Moreover, as its greatest achievement in 
Zambia, USAID in Congressional presentations, lauded its work at supporting 
privatization. For example, in its FY 1998 testimony USAID said, 
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The 1992 Zambian Privatization Act called for the transfer of control and 
management of 90% of the industrial sector (except for public utilities) to 
private ownership. USAID is the main donor in supporting the Government 
of the Republic of Zambia's (GAZ.) program by facilitating the privatization of 
state-owned enterprises and improving the efficiency and business acumen of 
small and medium sized enterprises The projected target of privatizing 50 
to 75 companies by 1997 had already been reached by early 1996. As of 
September 30,1996,137 of 150 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) initially listed 
by the GAZ., had been privatized . . . USAID has supported technical 
assistance to the Zambia Privatization Agency (ZPA) by a team of privatization 
consultants (merchant bankers, property consultants, business analysts) who 
assist the ZPA in the marketing and sale of SOEs. The project, which ends in 
November 1997, now focuses on the ten largest organizations, which are to be 
privatized over the next two years. By the end of the project, the privatization 
process will be complete for half the companies. The remaining companies will 
have reached the negotiations stage... USAID's program to assist... is having 
a direct impact on the privatization program by assisting the smaller privatized 
companies to survive, through the provision of specialized technical assistance 
and training in business and marketing skills, as well as through computer 
literacy and quality control.111 
The real issue is not how well the privatization process proceeded, but what impact 
did privatization have on the country and the people of Zambia, and democratic 
development. 
Lewis Sakala, writing in the popular magazine, Southern Political and 
Economic Monthly, has argued that the Zambian crisis of democracy and 
development is best understood as an 
unprecedented emphasis on a free market economy, privatization, attracting 
foreign investment, removal of exchange controls, state withdrawal from 
agriculture, removal of consumer subsidies, deregulation and rapid promotion 
of trading and a religious adherence to the Structural Adjustment Program 
(SAP) have led to many dislocations in the country. Stubborn pursuit of marco- 
economic stability, radical changes to the taxation regime (including the 
introduction of Value Added Tax (VAT), a strange operating cash budget... 
blind reliance on Treasury Bills as broad money supply regulatory mechanism, 
absence of minimum protections of local manufacturers and the substitution of 
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indigenous economic and Bilateral determined economic plans and policies 
have combined to wreak havoc to the economy of Zambia... .112 
While Sakala is very accurate in his description of the MMD government's 
approach to implementing the structural adjustment program, it is important to go 
further and briefly review some of the social costs associated with the program. 
Therefore, we shall now turn our attention to a review a few of the well known 
consequences of adjustment programs, with an aim of understanding their impact 
on the democratization process in Zambia. 
Results and Impact of the Structural Adjustment Program 
The reduction of the civil service not only had an impact on the absolute 
number of people employed in the formal economy it also had an indirect impact 
on ethnic relations. Under the UNIP system, different ministries were assigned to 
individuals from particular regions of the country, where a certain ethnic group 
may represent the majority of the population. Because of the way in which the civil 
service was reduced, accusations of Bemba domination were levied against the 
MMD. For example, the Great West Road leading to Western Province where the 
Lozi ethnic group live, repairs had not taken place as late as the November 1996 
elections. Most residents in Western province believed the roads were in the 
condition they were because relations between the political leadership and the 
MMD government are extremely bad. In Eastern Province, a stronghold of 
Kaunda's UNIP, the provision of state resources either were smaller or did not 
come at all when compared to other regions of the country. 
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The adoption of a "cash budget" further affected the government's ability 
to institute social programs, even those designed to ease the crushing burden of 
"shock therapy" associated with structured adjustment programs. Such a method 
of planning left the economy more subject to the international fluctuations and 
unanticipated domestic calamities. In fact, 
The vulnerability to external shocks of the World Bank/IMF bilateral 
agencies macroeconomic stability regimes, was glaringly exposed during the 
1993/94 drought period. Zambians were promised great things once macro- 
economic stability was achieved. In order to drastically reduce the chronic and 
huge budget deficit, massive cuts in social spending on services such as 
education and health had to be made. In order to arrest government spending 
induce inflation, the Ministry of Finance resorted to the so-called cash budget. 
... Out of all this economic conundrum, the financial sector appeared to show 
signs of fast growth. Several new banks were opened, only to close shortly 
afterwards. The fall of Meridian BIAO in 1995 further worsened the Budget 
Deficit scenario as more than K100 Billion was pumped into the Bank in an 
effort to rescue it by the government.113 
Unemployment 
The contraction of employment in the civil service and state parastals was 
tremendous. Between October 1991 and October 1994 over 300,000 people had been 
retrenched. Chiluba was quoted as saying in 1994, "I do not want SAP, but I kiss 
it every morning, at noon and in the evening because it is the reality for us. Unless 
we face reality, we will not move. SAP sounds evil, but it is the only readily available 
instrument to turn the economy for the better."11* Due to the rapid changes taking place 
in the structure of the economy, agriculture and mining, the largest contributors to 
Zambia's gross domestic product, suffered drastic drops in output from 1993 to 
1997. In fact, according to the United Nations Development Program observed, 
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Many poor countries are suffering lower export prices due to shrinking world 
demand. Petroleum exporters have been hit particularly hard, and Angola and 
Kuwait could lose about a quarter of their export earnings and have their GDPs 
decline by 14-18%. The impact has also been severe for African countries 
dependent on primary commodity exports. Because of the collapse in the 
copper market, Zambia can expect a 26% decline in its copper exports and a 9% 
decline in its GDP.115 
Unemployment in the formal sector has also led to an exponential growth 
of the informal sector. Former middle class professionals are now setting up stands 
in the local markets. Because of the surging unemployment, as mentioned above, 
real wages have declined dramatically. The job losses have hit families with 
children particularly hard. The shortage of disposable income has caused families 
to stop sending children to school, either because of the inability to pay school fees 
or pay for school uniforms, or to chose between which child will receive an 
education. Usually, it is the girl child that suffers. Additionally, the families that 
can send children to school often choose to pay for boys to attend rather than girls. 
Some of the children who should be in school are on the streets hawking cheap 
goods. Reduced schooling at the primary and secondary levels is the net result. 
Poverty 
Rising poverty has become a main by-product of structural adjustment 
programs in Africa. In Zambia, contrary to early assessments, such as that 
conducted by the MMD, government seems not to be interested in poverty 
alleviation.116 In fact, Ronald Penza, the late Minister of Finance, as late as 1995 was 
arguing against the necessity of the Zambian government maintaining a poverty 
datum line in spite of the fact that close to 90 percent of the Zambian population 
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lives on less than one US dollar per day, thereby falling well below the poverty 
datum line.117 
A 1996 report by the Zambian Coalition on Debt and Development, was 
critical of the government's attitude toward what it called the misery and suffering 
caused by the structural adjustment program. 
The ruling party itself seems to have been converted to a pure brand of 
capitalism and is carrying out the reforms with rare devotion and speed, 
paying little attention to the impact of reforms on vulnerable groups. 
Assuming that the hardships will be short-lived, these could still be toned 
down by less strict implementation of SAP.118 
The results of a survey conducted by the Coalition showed that in October 
1993, a monthly basket of goods for a typical Zambian family of six cost kwacha 
46,360 (U. S. $67.20). Eight months later, in June of 1994, the same basket cost 
Kwacha 78,700 (U. S. $114.10). Between January 1993 and July 1994 the price of 
maize meal, the staple food, more than doubled while the average wages declined. 
The economic contraction that began in the mid-1970s continued into the 
early 1990s. As a result, Zambia's per capita income dropped from $500 U. S. in 
1980 to $200 U. S. by 1992. One of the main reasons for the expansion of poverty 
is debt servicing. Because of debt servicing the Zambian government does not have 
the resources to implement programs designed to alleviate poverty in any 
meaningful way. 
Access to Health Care 
Access to health care has been one of the areas most affected by the 
structural adjustment program generally and privatization in particular. There is 
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a shocking decline in access to health care. At the insistence of donors, 
decentralized models for the delivery of services has been employed. Subsidized 
access has been replaced by a pay to receive services scheme. Most Zambians just 
do not bother to try and obtain medical attention under the existing circumstances. 
A majority of the time there are no medicines to be used or administered. The 
common folk logic is that you only go to the University Teaching Hospital to die. 
Moreover, the extremely low pay and sickening working conditions for senior 
doctors, junior doctors and nurses has often resulted in labor disputes with the 
government. 
Access to Education 
One of the most often mentioned accomplishments of the UNIP 
government was providing free education. Primary education was free for all who 
could get school places. With respect to higher education, technical and vocational 
colleges were established and the University of Zambia was opened in 1966. 
The need for educated Zambians was obvious given the lack of educational 
opportunities that had been afforded to Africans during the colonial era. In fact, the 
denial of education was intrically tied to the denial of job opportunities to Africans 
as skilled laborers. Today access to education is a privilege even for the children 
of middle class Zambians, the people who are suppose to be the driving force of 
development 
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Economic Liberalization and the Zambian Middle Class 
The Zambian middle class, as pointed out in Chapter IV, was mainly an 
administrative bourgeoisie during the first and second republics. Most people 
considered to be part of the Zambian middle class were managers of state 
enterprises, managers of government departments, or small business owners. 
Others such as doctors, lawyers, religious ministers, mining engineers, technicians, 
and teachers were generally seen as being part of the Zambian middle class. The 
businesses traditionally owned by Zambians are small, family run, and have 
problems securing credit from the financial sector. With economic liberalization, 
privatization and the zealous pursuit of the structural adjustment program with the 
aim of keeping the donors pleased, the nationalistic attitude has been lost. In fact, 
Gilbert Mudenda, has argued that a "de-Zambianization" process has set in and 
that it now seems as if the MMD government is even reluctant to use local 
professionals as consultants, even on topics such as socio-economic studies. The 
MMD prefers to hire foreign consultants, who in turn hire local talent to "assist" 
them in conducting such studies.119 Mudenda also argues that the above described 
process is tied to the economic downturn that began in the 1980s and has continued 
throughout the 1990s. He says, 
The collapse of the economy had a number of effects on the process of 
indigenizing the Zambian economy. First, it lowered the income of local 
professionals. Secondly, it slowed the reproduction of highly skilled 
manpower. Thirdly, it unleashed the unbridled power of donors over the 
decision making process in tire country. The combined effects of loss of income 
together with the poor conditions given to local staff led to a massive exodus 
of local professionals to neighboring countries.120 
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Mudenda further asserts thatmost international companies tend to resist employing 
Zambians at high management levels and that bringing in professionals from their 
organizations or countries as technical support staff is the norm. With respect to the 
private sector and the process of privatization he suggests, 
This is not because there are no Zambians to fill up these positions, but simply 
because donors prefer to have their own people in those sectors which are 
supported by their institutions or home governments. For example, most of the 
senior positions at the central bank are now filled with personnel supported by 
various donors. Similarly, the most influential policy advisory group at the 
Ministry of Finance comprises the Harvard Team which advises the Zambian 
government on macroeconomic issues and policies ... and with the advent of 
privatization, the Zambian executives of companies being privatized are losing 
their jobs as the foreign companies which takeover these enterprises bring their 
own management teams. This trend is on the increase and it is most likely that 
in the near future, the only Zambians who will be in management positions 
will be those in charge of personnel functions.121 
Mudenda's argument is a familiar one repeated over and over again in countries 
where structural adjustment programs have been undertaken. The stark conclusion 
is, "It is likely that the majority of the Zambian people will revert back to menial 
positions of clerks and laborers. And this will largely be due to the fact that 
Zambian authorities have succumbed to the fallacy that development could be 
achieved not by the enterprise of locals but by benevolence of outsiders."122 
Economic Liberalization and Democratization in Zambia: Some Observations 
Sachikonye has also asserted that economic conditions, especially those 
associated with structural adjustment, have not provided the requisite stability for 
irreversible democratic transition. In the Zambian case, this is perhaps the area 
where the MMD government has most misunderstood the democratization process. 
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That there was and remains a need for structural adjustment in Zambia is not really 
the question. The question is what structure(s) are being adjusted for whose benefit 
and at whose expense? The question, more precisely put, is what type of structural 
adjustments are required for achieving sustainable development in Zambia? Given 
the massive debt problem, nationwide poverty, extensive unemployment, and lack 
of access to education, health care and housing, the structural adjustment program 
prescribed by the international financial institutions, and supported by Western 
donor countries appears to have been running at cross purposes with their 
articulated support for open and transparent government, and greater citizens 
involvement in the policy debate and decision-making processes. 
Once again, the Zambian case proves that adjustment policies contribute 
to rising poverty levels. Moreover, privatization of state-owned enterprises and 
civil service reforms led to retrenchments, thus worsening the unemployment 
situation. For example, the layoff of more than 1,300 employees at Zambian 
Airways may have directly affected over 20,000 Zambians. Reduction of 
government spending price liberalization or subsidy withdrawal exposes large 
sections of the population to consumer price increases. 
USAID's faith in the free market program, even to the exclusion of reality, 
is simply amazing. Privitatization has been a failure. Yes, the companies have been 
privatized and for those who believe, contrary to the open facts that many of the 
privatized enterprises have collapsed or scaled back, that the private sector 
performs better than government, then one could say that the program was 
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successful. However, the facts are otherwise. The majority of the businesses that 
were privatized, according to journalists and even some officials within and 
supporters of the MMD government, no longer exist, or are now bankrupt.123 Those 
that are functioning have been purchased by foreign investors, a majority of whom 
have come from South Africa. Stories abound regarding new apartheid like 
practices being imposed on a somewhat hapless Zambian employee and public. 
Moreover, the South African's are importing their products directly from South 
Africa and selling them at a cheaper price then those same products produced 
locally. The result is the collapse of the indigenous market that was somewhat 
artificial to begin with. The Indian business-class, that for the most part is Zambian, 
has been hard hit by this development So has the traditional business class in 
Barotseland, the western province of Zambia. There, the traditional authorities had 
throughout the colonial period limited the number of persons of foreign origin in 
the trading sector. Thus, it is the native business class that has all but been 
completely wiped out by the structural adjustment program. 
United States' "diplomatic silence" was also crucial inside the international 
financial institutions and at important donor meetings such as the Paris Club. For 
example, just prior to the 1996 elections the World Bank provided the Chiluba 
government with $60 million. Not only was the funding crucial for the floundering 
economic program of the MMD, it was widely perceived as a vote of confidence by 
the international financial institutions in the MMD and was portrayed as such by 
the Chiluba Administration. The major opposition political parties, those 
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competing in the elections and those boycotting, to one degree or another, 
supported the structural adjustment program, thus there was nothing critical that 
could be said regarding that development. The Agenda for Zambia, which won 
two Parliamentary seats and pulled more votes than the MMD in six constituencies, 
categorically rejected SAP in its campaign. This was tire only exception, but merits 
mention for the future challenges to the fundamentals of SAP and the pro- 
democracy movement 
The United States' mission did not do anything to argue against the loan, 
even though it was at the same time raising, in a very public way, criticisms of the 
Chiluba administration for its constitutionally engineered exclusion of Kaunda and 
his party's vice president Inyouibo Yeta, who was additionally jailed for six months 
before the courts charged him with treason, and subsequently released him and 
others. 
Political conditionality associated with the Zambian SAP program calls for 
strict adherence to conditions that give effect to large reductions in budget deficits, 
massive retrenchments, and huge cuts in allocation to social welfare services such 
as health care, education, housing and food. The impact of the implementation of 
such policies often is rejection of what is perceived to be the democratization 
process. 
The MMD seems to have paid little attention to market failures and 
structural barriers to development in the Zambian context. Its form of 
marcoeconomic management has left the party or government unable to respond 
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to serious national issues such as the AIDS/HIV epidemic. In Zambia AIDS/HIV 
is widespread but largely a poor peoples epidemic. When added to realities such 
as over 60 percent of the population not having access to clean water, another 30 to 
40 percent lack access to proper sanitation, the pay for service system has limited 
Zambian citizens' access to health care. At a time when more people need to rely 
on the public health system, public expenditures have decreased in absolute terms. 
The lack of access to quality health care and the prevalence of treatable diseases that 
go untreated because of lack of money or medicines has led to a decline in life 
expectancy. Today life expectancy for Zambian men is 39 years and 40 years for 
Zambian women.124 Another area detailing social cost of structural adjustment 
program is the rise in crime, prostitution, increased domestic violence, and suicides. 
The increased social fragmentation in Zambia is visible. 
There has been a general failure to generate significant foreign currency to 
do anything but service the enormous external debt. In fact, foreign aid for balance 
of payment has been more than 70 percent of the national budget. What this 
amounts to is selected donor countries providing the MMD government with funds 
to pay the international financial institutions or bilateral loans to financial 
institutions located in one of the donor countries. 
Criticisms of how Presidentalism is played out in Zambia have some merit 
to it. In fact, many of the issues the original movement had criticized the Kaunda 
government for are present and practiced by the Chiluba regime. In fact, on one 
level it begs the question that Donald Horowitz has exclaimed, what good is it 
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simply to change from a Nyanja dominated regime to a Bemba dominated 
regime?125 
In the area of economic development, despite fully acknowledging the 
existence of institutionalized corruption, USAID continues to promote the view that 
privatization is the best course of action to bring about the necessary stimulus for 
the anticipated take off in market forces led economic development. In fact, the 
USAID reported to the United States Congress, 
Privatization of the remaining major parastatals (especially the mines) will lead 
to significant new investment, more productive employment, and increased 
demand for local goods and services. Zambia's open trading 
regime-domestically, regionally and internationally-presents new 
opportunities, primarily in agriculture, for traders, consolidators, producers 
and processors. Large companies and multi-national corporations are ready to 
take on a major role under the new reforms. ... In social sectors, there is 
potential for arresting the shocking decline in health and educational status. 
The high death rate for Zambian babies, the lack of educational opportunities 
for many Zambian girls, the huge social burden imposed when over 25 percent 
of urban dwellers in some areas are infected with HIV/ AIDS-these all mandate 
the use of radical changes to halt the slide. New decentralized models for the 
delivery of services, built from the ground up to be responsive to the needs of 
the customers, are required. Resource limits from the government budget 
reinforce the need to re-invent social services. Zambia is ready for a new 
approach but the transition to the new concepts is a time consuming process.126 
For the United States and apparently the MMD government, the key 
constraints to growth and development in Zambia are unmotivated government 
staff bound to an old way of doing business by tradition and custom; limited 
financing for new directions; reluctance to take increased personal financial 
responsibility for social services; and a population growth rate of over 3 percent, 
which places an increasing burden on the social services. 
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The contradictions of the economic liberalization program may directly 
contribute to the democratization process in Zambia, but more than likely it will not 
be because of the success of the program. It probably will be, as — has observed 
in the South Korean context, 
The irony may be that if economic liberalization does contribute to 
democratization it may be because of the contradictions and dislocation the 
process creates, rather than because of its linear progression... Economic 
liberalization does not unfold in a vacuum. It does not act on existing political 
and economic structures from a position outside them. Rather, the process is 
part of these structures, mediated by and through them.127 
The uncontrolled retreat of the Zambian state from economic activities, the 
debt crisis, the rushed privatization, the lack of public debate on economic 
development policies, and a general lack of political consensus on the transition 
strategy, or the economic policies aimed at building the market system will 
continue to be major problems for the MMD government (or any other government) 
and could led to civil unrest. 
Conclusion 
The state of democracy in Zambia today cannot be evaluated on the basis 
of process issues alone. There are functioning institutions and regular elections. 
However, any realistic democracy assessments has to consider substantive 
democratic issues such as equality, human rights and the socio-economic welfare 
of citizens. 
The conclusions drawn from the analysis of the various components of the 
USAID governance and democracy program suggest that the overall project was a 
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general failure despite some important successes in key areas. Further, the findings 
of this chapter, especially the section on economic liberalization and the graphic 
display in selected areas suggest that the state remains central to development 
possibilities in Zambia. Moreover, that economic liberalization has not particularly 
helped the democratization process, or brought about the reform of the state itself, 
which was one of the main aims of the original "Movement" for Multiparty 
Democracy. Thus, the obvious undemocratic nature of the economic liberalization 
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CHAPTER VI 
UNITED STATES' DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE 
AND THE NOVEMBER 1996 PRESIDENTIAL AND 
PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN ZAMBIA 
Introduction 
The September 1997 Southern University final report on the USAID 
Governance and Democracy Project suggests that most of the originally outlined 
project activities were successfully accomplished.1 Therefore, one would assume, 
that because of the project and its reported success, that some actual results or 
impact of the work undertaken by the implementors would be measurable, or 
manifest themselves in the Zambian political process. In other words, a reasonable 
expectation would be that there should be (1) a positive correlation between the 
civil rights/education component of the project and increased citizens participation 
in the political process; (2) the constitutional reform process should have led to a 
widely accepted common understanding and agreement on the rules and 
regulations governing the entire political process; (3) the media's ability to report 
more independently on political developments of consequence would have been 
enhanced; and (4) political parties would have been more organized and therefore 




In this chapter, a critical analysis of the impact and effects of the 
Governance and Democracy Project on Zambia's transition to democracy is 
undertaken. This is achieved by reviewing the national and parliamentary elections 
of November 1996. Specifically, citizens' participation in the electoral process, as 
voters and monitors, is reviewed. Additionally, the role of the media and political 
parties during the national elections are analyzed. Finally, the impact that the 
structural adjustment program had on the electoral process and the electorate, in 
particular the privatization and liquidation aspect, is critically discussed. 
The 1996 Elections: Was the Proof in the Pudding? 
On November 18,1996, Zambia held its second multiparty elections since 
the end of one-party rule. The Movement for Multiparty Democracy won 131 of 150 
parliamentary seats and the MMD leader, Frederick Chiluba, won over 68 percent 
of the vote for presidency.2 The United National Independence Party (UNIP), the 
main opposition party, and seven other political parties boycotted the elections 
claiming widespread fraud, manipulation of the voters lists, and the systematic 
exclusion of the main opposition candidate from the presidential race.3 
Zambia was once heralded as a model for democratic transition in Africa 
as a result of its October 1991 national elections, especially because of the peaceful 
transition in government.4 However, the 1996 elections and campaign results were 
like a premonition of sorts for the complexities and contradictions associated with 
democratic development on the African continent. Although the results do suggest 
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that the MMD did have a strong national following, and probably could have won 
in an open and fair contest with UNIP, the 1996 electoral campaign season provided 
for a number of activities by the MMD government that seriously constricted the 
possibility of a free and fair election being held. 
The list of actions include the adoption of controversial constitutional 
reforms a few months before the elections (May 1996) that effectively eliminated 
major opposition candidates; electoral reform which led to the establishment of a 
new electoral commission only three weeks before the elections; the adoption of a 
statute that prevented challenges to the identity of presidential candidates from 
being considered by the courts until 14 days after the election; restrictions on the 
freedom of assembly and association through the existence of a "public order act1' 
that negatively impacted political parties' ability to get their message out to the 
public; biased press coverage, including the refusal of paid advertisements from the 
opposition political parties; the political repression of selected opposition political 
and civil society leader and the inability of numerous political parties to gain access 
to die final voters list.5 Moreover, there seemed to be a continuation of the "blurred" 
distinction between the ruling party and the state that existed under the UNIP one- 
party state regime. Various MMD government officials toured the country in 
government vehicles at the State's expense while campaigning for the MMD. This 
blurred distinction also extended to the expansion of the paramilitary police with 
MMD supporters just prior to the elections. The chairman of the MMD security 
committee sent out letters to party leaders requesting that each branch submit 
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twenty names of candidates to become part of the Zambian police force prior to the 
elections.6 
In addition, a number of other allegations, which if proved, would suggest 
that the elections were anything but free and fair. These allegations included the 
issuing of duplicate National Registration Cards to some voters, vote buying, 
registration of underage voters, and the omission of other eligible voters from the 
voters rolls.7 
The contracting of a foreign firm, NIKUV Computers of Israel, to conduct 
an essential government duty, at a cost of $18.7 million to update the Zambian voter 
registration lists was opposed by almost all opposition groups and major civil 
society organizations.8 The original contract between NIKUV and the MMD 
government, represented by its Defense Minister, Mr. Ben Wila was signed in 
November 1995.9 The contract was granted to NIKUV, according to the 
government, because the organization was the only bidder capable of having the 
voters list prepared in time for December 1995 local elections and that all other bids 
were higher.10 
The conflicting stories and stonewalling regarding information on the 
granting of the contract to NIKUV Computers was also a source of discord. This 
prompted calls for the elections to be delayed, for the use of the 1991 voters register 
as the basis for the 1996 elections, an independent electoral commission, and for 
continuous registration process in the future.11 
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The MMD government continued with the exercise despite the fact that 
both the Zambian High Court and Supreme Court viewed the exercise and contract 
as unconstitutional. The courts reasoned however that since the process was 
already underway that it should continue. In essence, the Court legitimized a 
tender process and NIKUV's employment of registration officers, a constitutionally 
defined governmental function of the Elections Commission as being allright.12 
Skepticism surrounding the process, court challenges, the semi-secret 
operating methods of NIKUV, fading voter cards that had been billed to last for 
fifteen years, the registration of underage voters, in addition to some unfounded 
accusations by opposition political parties, seriously undermined public confidence 
in the process, and no doubt contributed to low participation rates.13 Moreover, it 
was not clear who was in charge of determining eligibility of voters whose cards 
had faded or been lost, i.e. NIKUV or the Elections Commission.14 
Zambia's Electoral Framework 
Zambia's electoral framework was governed by an Electoral Act and the 
electoral process was administered by an Elections Commission which until 
immediately before the elections was connected to the Vice President's office.15 
Under the Electoral Act, registration of an individual as a voter requires the 
production of a National Registration Card and a potential voter must register as 
a voter.16 Upon registration, they were to be given a voters card which has to be 
produced on the day of the elections. A voter who lost his/her card could not vote 
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but had to obtain a "voter's certificate" which would be recognized by elections 
officials so that the bearer would be allowed to vote.17 
The appointed Electoral Commission was responsible for the overall 
conduct of elections. The Electoral Commission was an official semi-autonomous 
body whose members are appointed by the President The Commission was 
assisted by an Election Directorate. The Election Directorate was a body of civil 
servants whose responsibilities include carrying out the Commission's decisions 
and implementing regulations made by the Commission. Practical tasks include 
preparation and distribution of ballot boxes, delimitation of constituency 
boundaries, the training of presiding officers and the actual registration of voters.18 
In the past (both during the Second and Third Republic), the Commission and the 
Election Directorate had been criticized for various reasons. The following had 
been a few of the more commonly stated criticisms regarding the constraints on the 
Zambian Electoral Commission: Inadequate Resources; logistics, i.e. poor networks 
in remote areas; poor communications systems; lack of adequate transport; lack of 
confidence from the electorate; and lack of independence from the ruling party19 
The 1996 election date was announced by President Chiluba on October 
18, 1996 at a MMD party rally in the Copperbelt Province, a stronghold of the 
MMD. Human Rights Watch/Africa observed, 
On September 10,1996, President Chiluba addressed the nation on radio 
and television. He announced the setting up of an independent electoral 
commission. The Election Office had been under the control of the office of 
the vice-president but this would be transferred and brought under the direct 
control of the Electoral Commission, which would enjoy autonomous status. 
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Three members of the commission would be appointed from among suitably 
qualified people such as high court or supreme court judges who would be 
subject to ratification by parliament. He also announced that counting of 
votes would take place at polling stations and that the Electoral Commission 
would assist in giving all parties fair and equitable access to the state-owned 
media. Five members of the new Electoral Commission, among them a 
retired magistrate, judges and two professional women were ratified by 
parliament on October 17 after parliament passed the Electoral Commission 
Bill. With the general elections scheduled for November 18, the new Electoral 
Commission had just a month to become operational, build up its reputation 
and gain the confidence of all the electorate and the political opposition 
parties. There was too little time for this to happen.20 
The one-month notice was discounted by some because most political 
parties, at least those with resources, had already been informally campaigning. 
Nevertheless, it shocked many others, including members of the diplomatic 
community and most opposition leaders. In addition to the constitutional concerns, 
the Public Order Act, the NIKUV voter registrations, access to the final voters roll, 
access to the public media and the independent electoral commission had not been 
addressed in all party dialogue manner either.21 In other words, consensus on the 
basic mechanics of the electoral process did not exist. The Committee for a Clean 
Campaign observed the following, with respect to the electoral administration 
process 
one month was too short for the Commission to perform to the satisfaction of 
all the parties, the Code of Conduct it wanted to use could not be used 
because of inadequate time for preparation; there were very few meetings 
between the Commission and the parties; voting materials could not be 
deployed in all the places on time because those contracted could not do the 
job on time. The result was that voting started late in some areas and in 
others, ballot papers were inadequate.22 
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The new Zambian Electoral Commission, which was announced at the 
MMD's Copperbelt rally on October 18 and sworn in on October 22, announced on 
that same day that they were ready to conduct presidential and parliamentarian 
elections nationwide.23 The time the commission allowed itself to even gain an 
understanding of the complexities associated with conducting a national election 
was questioned by monitors almost immediately. 
The Elections Commission immediately announced deadlines for 
nominations. For presidential candidates, the nominations period was set for 
October 25-28, 1996. Nominations for the Parliamentary seats also were set for 
October 28,1996.24 This left only a two and one-half week window of opportunity 
for campaigning. 
It should be noted that many of the larger parties had been campaigning 
for some time and may not have been affected by the short period. However, most 
opposition parties were affected by the existence of the Public Order Act even 
though the notification time to the police had been reduced to the original seven 
days as it had been when ruled unconstitutional. 
The elections period was in full swing as early as April 1996 and was 
characterized by debates about many of the unresolved issues and lack of dialogue 
during the pre-election period. Policy differences tended to be secondary to 
personality concerns or citizenship status. The main form of campaigning 
continued to be public rallies, grassroots outreach and press conferences. 
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In the referendum like October 1991 elections, the MMD had won 125 of 
150 seats in Parliament and its presidential candidate, Frederick Chiluba, received 
76% of the popular vote for president.25 After the election, the MMD, believing that 
it had a popular mandate, instituted the most vigorous structural adjustment 
program on the African continent The program was even described by the resident 
World Bank expert, Gedion Nkojo, to The Washington Post in the following manner: 
"This country has undergone economic surgery without anaesthetic."26 
As a result of the 1991 elections, Zambia was able to receive between one 
and two billion dollars in aid annually from donor countries and multilateral 
financial institutions, principally the World Bank and the IMF. This amounted to 
close to 70 percent of the country's gross domestic product.27 However, the general 
economic situation did not improve for the majority of Zambians. In fact, according 
to Oxfam, most Zambians were worse off under MMD rule than during the 
extremely difficult days of the late 1980s under the UNIP one-party state.28 
The MMD was fearful of the coming national elections because of the 
gains that UNIP had made in by-elections and because the MMD's structural 
adjustment program had so negatively affected the living standards of most 
Zambians. Poverty, unemployment and a lack of access to health care and 
education were the norm. Moreover, the agricultural sector was still being 
neglected in each of the annual budgets. Added to this was a severe drought in 
several of the provinces throughout the country. The growing impoverishment, 
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expanding unemployment and underemployment led to what was perceived to be 
a very hostile Zambian electorate suffering from a diminished standard of living. 
Also during the pre-election period the Vice President of UNIP and 
several of the party's central committee members were arrested, charged with 
treason, and accused of involvement in an allegedly existing shadowy organization, 
labeled the "Black Mamba" by the media. According to the local press reports, the 
"Black Mamba" were bent on a campaign of violence to prevent the enactment of the 
then proposed constitutional reforms.29 The UNIP officials' arrest and the 
subsequent refusal of the MMD to initiate or participate in an all-party dialogue on 
the contentious electoral issues led to an acute political impasse including threats 
of boycotting the elections by major opposition parties.30 It was not until September 
27,1996 that the state closed its case against the defendants.31 On November 1,1996 
all the accused were acquitted of treason and murder charges because of the lack 
of any evidence linking them to the so-called "Black Mamba."32 
Zambia's political landscape during and after the elections, therefore, 
became increasingly fragmented, suffering from new divisions, that in the past 
were not as significant as in other countries in the region or on the continent. Issues 
of ethnicity and race had taken on a new life. In fact, the historical dilemma of who 
was a "real" Zambian emerged as a tool of political repression often used by the 
ruling party against its detractors.33 It is also an issue used by the opposition who 
claim that President Chiluba was bom in the Congo and that Frederick Chiluba is 
not his real name but one borrowed from a childhood friend's educational 
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certificate that was used by the former labor leader to secure work.34 Challenges to 
the President's citizenship status and identity were raised but rejected by the courts 
because they could only be raised "legally" 14 days after the state President had 
been elected.35 
The growing impoverishment and massive unemployment of the 
population also contributed to the perception of political instability, as promised 
growth and development had not arrived for the average Zambian. 
Finally, the emergence of five new political parties in the 1995-96 period 
was also reflective of the fact that a good number of political activists had become 
fed up with the one-party state behavior of their political leaders.36 Most of those 
starting new political parties were former members of the Movement for Multiparty 
Democracy. 
Because of serious differences of opinion on the contentious issues, and a 
lack of political will on the part of some of the key political actors, meaningful 
dialogue or compromise was never achieved on any of the major points outlined 
previously. Instead, the political parties talked to each other through the media or 
on the street often in a language of brute force. The lack of this dialogue was 
discouraging to most observers, especially, because it had been dialogue between 
the MMD and the UNIP at a critical point in 1991, that was able to keep Zambia 
peaceful during the electoral season. Traditional leaders, religious leaders and 
trade union officials, all made pleas to no avail for inter-party talks to occur.37 The 
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failure of inter-party dialogue may well end up being remembered as one of the 
most important setbacks for the process of democratic consolidation in Zambia. 
As stated earlier, the October 1991 elections in Zambia were hailed as a 
watershed event for democratic development on the African continent. Headed by 
Frederick Chiluba, Zambia was almost presented as a prototype model for 
democratic transition in Africa as a result of the election's process, and the peaceful 
change of government from the authoritarian one party rule of five time president 
Dr. Kenneth Kaunda to the Movement for Multiparty Democracy. 
The MMD in 1991 had promises change, a liberalized economy and a 
democratic political system. The party had denounced the heavy-handed policies 
of Kaunda’s UNIP regime including the constant state of emergency, the lack of 
distinction between the party and the State, and the lack of protection for human 
rights especially from the dreaded state security.38 In 1993, the MMD reaffirmed 
many of the aforementioned promised at its second party convention. 
Constitutional Reform and the Elections 
Three of the most contentious political issues that remained unresolved 
in the pre-election period of the November 1996 elections were: 1) the unpopular 
constitutional reforms, and whether or not the 1996 elections would be conducted 
on the basis of the 1991 or the 1996 Constitution; 2) the continued existence and use 
of the colonial era Public Order Act that restricted fundamental human rights, such 
as freedom of association, freedom of assembly, and freedom of speech; and 3) the 
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extent to which a legal and adequate voter registration process had been 
undertaken by the government prior to the 1996 national elections. All three of 
these issues were directly related to the constitutional reform process partially 
funded by the United States and other Western donors. 
One of the primary factors associated with these contentious elections was 
the May 1996 Constitutional Amendments. The constitutional reforms had been 
vigorously challenged by opposition parties, civic associations, and human rights 
and women's groups. In fact, civil society organizations organized, in December 
1995, a week-long Citizens' Convention to consider the proposed changes and mode 
of adoption.39 Their views, listed under the title, "The Green Paper," were 
forwarded to the government and promptly ignored. Not only were civic leaders 
upset by the content of the proposed government changes but also by the proposed 
mode of adoption. MMD wanted the Parliament, which it dominated, to be the 
body charged with amending the Constitution.40 However, the Citizens' 
Convention sought to have the Constitutional Review Commissions recommend a 
constituent assembly to be the mode of adoption. 
Perhaps the most controversial constitutional amendments ruled that only 
second generation Zambians could contest for the presidency. Article 34 of the 
Constitutional Amendment Act states that a person would be qualified to be a 
candidate for the presidency if he/she met the following criteria: 
(1) He is a Zambian citizen. 
(2) Both his parents are Zambian by birth. 
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(3) He has attained the age of thirty-five years. 
(4) He is a member of, or sponsored by, a political party. 
(5) He is qualified to be elected as a member of the National Assembly.41 
The amendments, which were passed by the MMD-dominated Parliament 
over the protest action of the opposition parties, also declared Zambia to be a 
Christian nation and required traditional leaders to relinquish their formal roles if 
they wished to be active in public politics.42 The Christian Council of Churches of 
Zambia, the largest religious organization in Zambia, publicly opposed the 
constitutional amendment declaring the country a Christian nation. They were 
joined in their opposition by the Catholic Bishops and a number of other religious 
organizations. 
UNIP's president, Dr. Kaunda, was affected by the citizenship clause and 
another clause that a presidential candidate can only be elected to office twice. The 
latter issue was later thought only to apply to Kaunda as well because the MMD, 
likely in preparation for a third Chiluba term, has said that the amendment does not 
apply to Chiluba since he was in his first term when the Constitution was changed. 
UNIP's Vice President, Senior Chief Inyambo Yeta from the Western province, was 
affected by the traditional ruler clause which states that "a person shall not while 
remaining a chief join or participate in partisan politics."43 UNIP thus believed that 
the MMD's recommended changes had been specifically aimed at eliminating their 
leadership from challenging the governing party during the 1996 elections.44 The 
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perceived ethnic implications associated with those developments were not lost on 
Zambians and obviously created problems between Bembas and Lozis. 
The Constitution of Zambia Act was passed by the MMD-dominated 
Parliament during a walkout by the UNIP Members of Parliament on May 22,1996 
after its second reading and signed into law a few days later at a ceremony at the 
State House, just after President Chiluba had assured at least one Nordic 
Ambassador that he would not sign the Act45 The Act provided for classifications 
of Zambians and prevents any "second generation" Zambian from seeking election 
to the highest office. As pointed out by Human Rights Watch/ Africa, "the 
requirement that not only the candidate, but the candidate's parents be bom in the 
country, was viewed as being extreme and unreasonable" especially given Zambia's 
colonial history and unique state formation process.46 
It was therefore believed by the opposition that the Presidential 
Qualification Clause in the Act rendered any electoral process unfair. The Act, 
perhaps in anticipation of a possible boycott of the elections, also allowed a 
presidential candidate to be declared duly elected if there were no contenders.47 
An Independent Electoral Commission? 
As mentioned above it was only in October 1996, responding to ongoing 
public criticism, that the National Assembly enacted a law which paved the way for 
the creation of an "Independent Electoral Commission."48 The names of the 
proposed Commissioners were also ratified by Parliament on October 17, 1996.49 
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In part, because of this, the impartiality of the Commission was seriously 
questioned. The Commission's impartiality, according to the Committee for a Clean 
Campaign, was further undermined because "it failed to punish the hundreds of 
cases of election offenders. Offences such as vote buying, abuse of state resources, 
intimidation, character assassination and violence, were committed under the noses 
of the election officials with impunity."50 One Commissioner admitted that they 
were MMD supporters and said after being referred to as MMD cadres, "so what?"51 
Further, it was believed that Judge Bwalya's refusal to discuss seriously the 
electoral crisis in Zambia with South African President Nelson Mandela's 
representative, the renowned Judge Richard Goldstone, did not inspire public 
confidence in the "independence" of the commission.52 
The effect of setting the nominations period for president pushed UNIP 
to announce, sooner than it would have liked, a boycott of the elections at a pre- 
Independence Day press conference (October 23).53 The UNIP announcement 
caught a number of opposition parties by surprise because a meeting to consider the 
boycott option was scheduled for that very evening.54 
Political Parties and the Elections 
The return of Kaunda to active politics and the UNIP presidency were 
major political developments in Zambian politics in 1995. Kaunda's return along 
with the untimely deaths of Baldwin Nkubula, the one time National Party 
President and son of the renowned anti-colonial leader Harry Nkubula, and Kebby 
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Masokatwane, Kaunda's one time protege and hand-picked successor, meant that 
the main candidates for the presidency of the country would once again be Chiluba 
and Kaunda.55 What this meant for party politics was quite clear. UNIP would 
automatically be seen as the main opposition party and Kaunda would instantly be 
seen as the main challenger to Chiluba. However, the unthinkable did happen. 
UNIP announced that it was boycotting the 1996 elections. 
On October 23,1996 (one day before Zambian Independence Day), UNIP 
announced that it was not going to participate in the elections because of the lack 
of movement on the "discriminatory Constitution and fraudulent electoral 
process."56 UNIP further cited eleven reasons why it was not participating. Among 
the most prominent of these reasons was the view that NIKUV and the Government 
of Zambia had mismanaged the entire registration exercise with the result that of 
the 4.6 million eligible voters only 2.2 million had been registered with less than*" 
900,000 having received their voter cards by the end of the exercise.57 
Despite the Opposition Alliance boycott, the National Party (NP), the 
Zambian Democratic Congress (ZDC), the agenda for Zambia (AZ) and the 
Movement for Democratic Process (MDP) all fielded presidential and parliamentary 
candidates.58 The ZDC leader, Dean Mung'omba, said since the new Constitution 
was law and Parliament had been dissolved that his party was ready to take part 
in the polls.59 The National Party refused to be constrained by the opposition 
alliance's boycott option as well. Humphrey Mulemba, the party's president, sent 
mixed messages regarding his opinions about the possibility of the elections being 
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conducted in a non-partisan manner; however, he did sanction the nomination and 
participation of National Party candidates. The Agenda for Zambia presidential 
candidate, Aka Lewanika, said that the entire process was fraudulent, but that it 
was equally important that vital public policy concerns consequential to the 
country's future be communicated and debated by a credible opposition.60 
The MMD fielded 150 parliamentary candidates; the ZDC fielded 142; the 
National Party, ninety-nine; the National Lima Party and Agenda for Zambia, 
eighty and eleven respectively; the National Congress, Real Democratic Party, 
Movement for Democratic Process and Poor Peoples' Party had a total of eight 
candidates. There were also ninety-six candidates who contested as independents.61 
By all accounts, including opposition parties that participated, opposition 
parties that boycotted, from domestic monitors, and diplomatic observers, election 
day was one of the most peaceful days Zambians have had in recent memory. 
However, differences exists as to why this was the case. The opposition claimed 
that this was due to extensive campaigning for their supporters to stay calm and 
protest by boycotting the elections.62 The government likewise said that the 
peaceful day confirmed the public's rejection of the opposition boycott and attempts 
to incite violence.63 The November 1996 elections, according to observers, were the 
first in Zambia to be manned so heavily by armed personnel. 
Most political parties were unable to have party agents at all 4,600 polling 
sites. Therefore, they heavily depended upon reports coming from official sources 
or the domestic monitoring agencies. A few irregularities were mentioned in initial 
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reports on election day by the monitoring groups such as late opening of several 
polling areas, duplicate voter registration cards, the disappearance of a few ballot 
boxes and some harassment and intimidation.64 
The Public Order Amendment Act of 1996 
Freedom of assembly and freedom of association continued to be very 
important civil rights that were restricted by the government in the pre-election 
period. The major expression of this was found in the colonial era Public Order 
Act. The existence and selective enforcement of the Public Order Act placed a 
heavy disadvantage on opposition political parties by demanding 14 days notice for 
a permit for any public meeting, or rally that was to be held.65 It was widely 
understood that the same requirement did not apply to the MMD party activists 
and officials.66 Therefore, efforts of opposition political parties to get their message 
out and to have contact with the public were often frustrated or completely 
curtailed, and the political playing field thereby tilted in favor of the ruling party. 
One of the key principles of free and fair elections is the ability of political parties 
to get their message to potential supporters and not be impaired from doing so. 
The Public Order Act practically operated to place an undo burden on the 
exercise of freedom of association, assembly and speech.67 UNIP challenged the Act 
after its President had been arrested and threatened with deportation for violating 
it. The high court agreed and said the colonial-era law was unconstitutional, and 
had no place in a new democratic Zambia.68 However, after a short period, wherein 
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civic organizations made use of the new freedoms, the MMD government initiated 
an amendment in Parliament that would re-establish the Act and once again give 
government control over public assemblies. Upon learning of this, the opposition 
walked out of the session. The MMD dominated parliament went ahead during the 
walkout and extended the time period from the original seven to 14 days notice.69 
The Amendment in part stated, "Any person intending to assemble or to convene 
a public meeting, procession or demonstration shall notify the police in writing of 
such intent fourteen days before the meeting."70 
Access to the Final Voters' Roll 
Political party access to the final voter list cost 11.7 million Kwacha ($U.S. 
9,500), thereby rendering it inaccessible to almost all the political parties and almost 
all of Zambia civil society organizations.71 In fact, with the exception of perhaps 
five political parties most other political parties did not have a budget of 11 million 
Kwacha. In all previous elections, including 1991, the final voters' list had cost as 
little as 500 kwacha. Most opposing political parties pointed to this as a maneuver 
by the ruling party to limit access to registered voters and / or to "hide planned 
rigg^g"72 
When one copy of the voters' roll was purchased by the civic association 
FODEP, so that the political parties could have access, the payment had to be made 
directly toNIKUV not the Zambian Elections Commission.73 Obviously, this further 
inspired the opposition view that NIKUV was working with the MMD to rig the 
elections. 
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Access to the public-owned media by opposition parties was curtailed by 
strict government directives not to broadcast any advertisement associated with an 
election boycott.74 Observers documented the almost unimpeded access of the 
MMD and its candidates to the media as compared to the lack of coverage and 
impeded access of most opposition parties, even when they were having rally 
where thousands of Zambian citizens were attending.75 In fact, paid advertisements 
were refused, and at least one ZNBC journalist and national talk show host, Ben 
Kangwa, was suspended simply for announcing that the UNIP had issued its 
statement informing Zambians of the party's intention to boycott the 1996 national 
elections as a major news item.76 
The Media and the Elections 
The media in Zambia during the election, state control and privately run, 
faced severe constraints imposed by the MMD government before, during, and after 
the elections. The posture of independence from the official line was viewed as 
treasonist behavior. In fact, the MMD's press secretary was even suspended 
apparently for suggesting that an investigation into President Chiluba's family 
background would prove that he is a Zambian. 
Perhaps the most glaring interference was experienced during the actual 
election period. According to the Committee for a Clean Campaign, 
Apart from the Government-controlled media which leaned more toward the 
ruling party, the MMD had at least three pro-MMD newspapers which 
reported positively on its activities. These included The Weekly Express, The 
Sun and The Confidential newspapers which mounted negative campaigns 
310 
against opposition parties. A number of independent newspapers, notably 
The Post and The Chronicle gave extensive coverage on the activities of the 
opposition parties, including those who boycotted the elections. The 
President extensively used the media. The Republican President also abused 
his power by using the media to propagate MMD propaganda instead of 
national issues. For instance, on the eve of election day, the President's 
address was an MMD campaign speech rather than a national address, for he 
kept on calling upon the people of Zambia to vote for the ruling party for 
another term of office. In most of the instances where the President was 
supposed to use State Media to address national issues, he instead used the 
same to promote MMD ideals and castigated his political opponents.77 
An analysis of the month preceding the November 1996 elections reveals 
further media bias. For example, during the month of October, one of the two State 
controlled newspapers, the Times of Zambia (including its Sunday edition, the 
Sunday Times of Zambia) carried a total of 368 articles on the elections and political 
parties. Additionally, of the 368 articles, the MMD received coverage in 155 of them 
with 83 presenting positive information and only four suggesting negative 
information about the party. Therefore, the MMD was mentioned in over 42 
percent of all forms of coverage of political parties in that paper.78 At the same time, 
UNEP, the main opposition party, received the second highest rate of coverage by 
being mentioned in 80 of the 368 articles. However, of that amount only 16 stories 
were positive and 38 were clearly negative. In the other 26 articles UNIP was 
mentioned only as a passing reference. Thus, UNIP was mentioned only half as 
much (21.7%) as the MMD during the same period in the most read government 
controlled newspaper.79 
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Citizens' Participation and the Elections 
Because of the UNIP boycott, increasing voter apathy (apparent even 
before the boycott announcement), flawed voter registration, and the 
implementation of a new electoral framework just prior to the November elections, 
no single view exists on how to interpret voter participation figures for the 
November elections. UNIP and the Opposition Alliance members claimed that the 
boycott not only had an impact on voting behavior, but also served as a pressure 
valve for those who might otherwise have turned to violence. The MMD, on the 
other hand, argued endlessly that the UNIP inspired boycott was a miserable 
failure.80 Political scientists Michael Bratton and Daniel Posner have also suggested 
that the boycott had no demonstrable effect at all on the electoral outcome.81 
To prepare for the 1996 elections, the Zambian government awarded an 
electoral registration contract to NIKUV Computers of Israel, on a bid of $18.9 
million. Justifying the contract in a speech in September 1995, Defense Minister Ben 
Mwila, who had signed the contract on behalf of the government, said that an 
American firm had offered to do the job at $27 million while a British company 
made a bid of $22 million.82 The facts were other than what Mr. Mwila stated. The 
Nikuv bid was the largest one made and further, the granting of the contract to the 
agency was publicly stated by the government as a decision made in the interest of 
having the voters rolls ready in time for local government elections. These were the 
same elections postponed by the President in November 1995, and only conducted 
by the government in late December 1998, between Christmas Day and New Year's 
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Day, which is also the middle of the rainy season.83 Public speculation as to why 
the government was so determined to give the contract to NIKUV ranged from the 
"bom again" perspective that considers, by being good to Israel, God will bless 
Zambia to those who believed that a secret security pact had been arranged with 
Israel. 
The registration of Zambian citizens for the 1996 elections was originally 
set to take place between December 1995 and January 1996.84 The registration 
period was extended three times subsequent to the original dates thereby providing 
an additional three months period of opportunity to get registered. 
At the conclusion of the registration period, a provisional voters' list was 
prepared by NIKUV. The list was viewed as being seriously flawed and rife with 
mistakes. For instance, in August 1996, 30,000 names were reported to have been 
omitted from the provisional voters' lists in Eastern Province, the UNIP 
stronghold.85 In August 1996, the Luangwa district provincial register recorded 
more than 3,000 extra names.86 The Committee for a Clean Campaign reported, 
. . . the registration exercise began in December, 1995, but the provisional 
register was only released in July 1996 for public inspection. The over 130,000 
mistakes detected by the CCC staff and officials in the 9 provinces further 
eroded the credibility of NIKUV and increased the level of apathy. Thus 
some people who registered did not even bother to go and verify their names, 
especially, since the verification period was only two weeks from 21st August 
to 2nd September, 1996 instead of the stipulated statutory period of three 
weeks.87 
NIKUV admitted in September 1996 that 52,703 duplicate National 
Registration Cards had been entered into their data base.88 By September 13,1996, 
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there were 2,162,907 registrations; however, only 1,348,616 people had collected 
their cards.89 These and other problems further caused opposition parties to 
question the integrity of the registration process, especially since it was estimated 
that at least two million more Zambians were eligible to vote. 
The Zambian population was estimated to be between 8.5 and 9 million 
people. The number of eligible voters was estimated to be 4.6 million by the 
Zambian Elections Commission in 1995.90 The number of Zambians registered 
under NIKUV, the Israeli firm contracted to register Zambian voters, for the 1996 
November elections totaled 2.1 million compared to a little over 2.3 million voters 
in 1991.91 
During the election period more than 1.3 million votes were cast at 4,600 
different polling stations throughout the country and 1.1 million were accepted as 
being valid.92 Voter participation therefore was determined to have been close to 
50 percent of the registered voters and approximately 25 percent of the total eligible 
voting populace.93 When closely analyzed this reveals that the MMD won with only 
15% of the eligible Zambian voting population. 
Although the MMD only won close to 60 percent of the parliamentary vote 
the party won an overwhelming numerical majority. The final total showed the 
party winning 131 of the 150 seats in the National Assembly. Ten independent 
candidates won seats in Parliament as well. It is interesting to note that of the ten, 
eight were former MMD members.94 The opposition parties that participated in the 
election, and had expected to do well given the general view that the MMD had 
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grown unpopular, only won a total of nine seats combined. In part because of their 
poor showing, the National Party and Zambian Democratic Party presidential 
candidate cried foul, and accused the MMD of rigging the elections.95 The table 
below presents the final results for total votes received, the percentages of total 
votes cast, and percentage of the vote received against the total number of 
registered voters for the 1996 presidential vote. 
TABLE 2.0 
1996 Zambian Presidential Election Totals 
AGAINST 
CANDIDATE VOTES RECEIVED % CAST % REGIS. 
Chakomboka, Chama (MDP) 41,471 3.13 1.83 
Chiluba, Frederick (MMD) 913,770 68.96 40.30 
Mbikusita-Lewanika, A. (AZ) 59,250 4.47 2.61 
Mulemba, Humphrey (NP) 83,875 6.33 3.70 
Mung'omba, Dean (ZDC) 160,439 12.11 7.08 
Source: CCC Final Report - National total for presidential candidates. 
Citizen participation also took place through the nation-wide domestic 
election monitoring project, largely funded by the donors just as monitoring had 
been in 1991. A new monitoring coalition, entitled the Committee for a Clean 
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Campaign, emerged in 1995 out of a series of meetings sponsored by the National 
Democratic Institute and USAID. 
Monitoring the November 1996 elections proved to be very different than 
the October 1991 elections. In 1991, two main domestic groups monitored the 
Zambian elections, they were Zambian Independent Monitoring Team (ZIMT) and 
ZEMCC. In addition, international monitoring teams representing the 
Commonwealth, the Organization of African Unity, and a joint team organized by 
the Carter Center, and the National Democratic Institute were all present96 
For the November 1996 Zambian elections, the following international 
organizations who had monitored the 1991 elections had either refused to monitor 
the November 1996 elections, or were not invited to send monitors to the elections. 
These were the Commonwealth States, the European Union, the Carter Center, the 
National Democratic Institute, the West European African Institute, and the 
Southern African Development Committee. At the conclusion of the polls, the 
European Union issued a statement that, in part, expressed its concern over the 
inability of the elections to be held on a basis acceptable to all parties.97 The United 
Nations and the Organization of African Unity sent two and four observers, 
respectively. Neither of the latter two institutions commented on the election 
results. 
Because of the international community's lack of interest in monitoring the 
elections and the MMD government's skepticism toward some international 
agencies, despite their 1991 roles certifying the elections as being free and fair, 
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greater responsibility and attention fell on the shoulders of domestic monitoring 
agencies. 
The main domestic monitors were the Foundation for Democratic Process 
(FODEP) and the Zambian Independent Monitoring Team (ZIMT) along with the 
major NGO coalition involved in ensuring a peaceful process, the Committee for a 
Clean Campaign (CCC).98 All of these groups had significant experience with 
monitoring elections and were also very familiar with the internationally accepted 
view that the purpose of an independent monitoring operation is mainly to 
guarantee the integrity of the election process. There were also a number of other 
domestic election monitoring organizations, a few that were allegedly established 
or supported by the MMD government 
In March 1996, the CCC was officially launched with a mandate to 
advocate for a peaceful campaign, and free and fair elections. The Committee was 
a coalition of 19 civil society organizations. The coalition had five key objectives 
that included the following: 
1. To promote a peaceful and clean election campaign; 
2. To build confidence and trust among and within political parties; 
3. To level the political playing field; 
4. To pro-actively increase citizen participation in the 1996 elections; and 
5. To promote equitable access to both private and State-owned media." 
The CCC issued regular statements on the conduct of the electoral process 
and the behavior of the contesting political parties. The CCC also launched a 
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weekly newspaper, The Monitor, that reported in more detail on meaningful 
electoral and otherwise political developments associated with the planned 
November elections. 
At the conclusion of the November elections, all these groups ruled that 
the election did not meet internationally accepted standards of having been free and 
fair.100 Other newly formed monitoring groups issued statements contradicting 
those of the major bodies. One group, the Patriotic Rescue Monitors (PREMO), said 
that the elections were free and fair solely based on a peaceful election day. The 
Christian Council of Zambia (CCZ) also issued a statement saying that the elections 
were free and fair. Shortly thereafter, some of the religious leaders who had been 
invited from outside the country contradicted this statement by saying that they 
had only visited ten polling areas in Lusaka, and were therefore not in a position 
to declare the entire elections free and fair.101 
The major monitors responded by stating that judging the electoral 
process and impartial electoral administration does not begin on election day, and 
because of this it is imperative that the entire process be scrutinized. 
Despite the statements of domestic monitors and cries of rigging by some 
opposition leaders, President Chiluba was inaugurated for his second term on 
November 21,1996 at the Supreme Court in Lusaka. The swearing-in ceremony 
was conducted by Chief Justice Matthew Ngulube at 1:00 p.m., the exact time that 
symbolizes the MMD slogan, "The Hour Has Come." The Chief Justice announced 
that out of the votes 1,190,025 cast, that Mr. Chiluba received 835,537 against his 
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closest rival Mr. Mung'omba (ZDC) who polled 144,366, and was therefore the duly 
elected president of the Republic of Zambia.102 Mung'omba would later be jailed 
by the MMD government for over one year without charges being brought, or his 
having an opportunity to go to court. 
The audience attending the ceremony was largely made up of MMD 
members and supporters, members of the diplomatic corps, selected civil servants, 
the press and members of the armed forces. The event was perceived by observers 
as a "party affair" rather than an important national ceremony. The only election 
monitoring group in attendance was the pro-government Patriotic Rescue Monitors 
(PAREMO). In fact, no opposition leaders attended the ceremony and unlike 1991, 
a heavy military presence was noticeably present as the Zambian armed forced 
remained on high alert. 
In his inaugural address, Mr. Chiluba warned Zambia's neighbors thathis 
new government would not tolerate unnecessary interference. He said that Zambia 
cherished good relations with other countries in the region but that did not mean 
allowing the country to be treated with contempt. He further stated that Zambia 
had always respected the sovereignty of its neighbors and the gesture needed to be 
reciprocated.1*® 
The President also castigated non-governmental organizations for their 
declaring the elections to be less than free and fair. In the eyes of the MMD 
government the NGO's apparent anti-government stance needed to be addressed. 
President Chiluba said in his address, "Let us have genuine and indigenous NGO's. 
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We love freedom of expression and freedom of speech and we will promote NGOs 
but they have to be genuine in their operations."104 He continued by stating that 
as much as government appreciated the role of NGOs these groupings should not 
overstep their limits because his government would not accept a situation where 
those organizations appeared to be instructing authorities. 
"We will not tolerate any invitation from NGOs to discuss bygones. My 
resolve is to be firm but fair. I am in control and my government has a duty to 
maintain law and order. We will deal with all trouble makers."105 
The President's address also ridiculed suggestions that the elections were 
rigged. He said, "I lost two ministers and some deputy ministers in the polls and 
if the elections were not free and fair, I do not know how they could have been 
better."106 With respect to the opposition, Mr. Chiluba said that there is need for 
dialogue with opposition parties and that the MMD government would intensify 
the process for the good of the nation. 
"Without dialogue, democracy is at stake and it cannot succeed. I invite 
my colleagues in all parties to come and dialogue with me. Even parties that exist 
for the sake of statistics are welcome to dialogue."107 
Mr. Chiluba thanked his opponents for participating in the contest, and 
the electorate for casting their votes saying that this confirmed the existence of 
democracy in Zambia. Chiluba also thanked Zambians for the violence-free 
elections, noting that the good turnout at the polls symbolized unity among 
Zambians. He also promised, in an attempt to relieve the concerns of donor 
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countries and agencies, to ensure that investigative wings including the Anti¬ 
corruption Commission and Drug Enforcement Commission would remain free to 
exercise their duties. In addition, he said that the Electoral Commission, and other 
related wings would operate without interference. 
The immediate post-election conduct of the ruling party was marked by 
a series of repressive activities, principally, aimed at civil society organizations that 
issued statements saying that the elections were neither free nor fair. The detention 
and arrest of selected NGO leaders, the raiding of offices, and the freezing of bank 
accounts was characteristic of this practice. A number of opposition political party 
leaders have also been threatened with arrest.108 This statement was closely 
followed the dissolution of the cabinet and the president issuing a statement that 
he would be running the country with the assistance of the military and civil 
servants. This raised fears among many in the opposition that a palace coup had 
occurred. 
The idea that a donor plot existed to discredit the MMD's victory hurt the 
landslide victors foreign image and bilateral relations. However, once again the 
Chiluba government launched an aggressive diplomatic offensive to repair the 
damage. 
One could conclude by saying it is now clear that the unfolding 
democratic political process in Zambia is likely to be constrained for some time to 
come given that the MMD is behaving as UNIP once did under the one-party state 
structure. Veteran political observer, Michael Bratton argued that by the end of the 
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election period, democracy had all but vanished in Zambia.109 However, exactly 
what the future will be has not been determined. Nevertheless the November 1996 
electoral process and the election results have given rise to several implications for 
democracy in Zambia. 
Implications for Democratic Development in Zambia 
The immediate post-election conduct of the ruling party was marked by 
repressive activities against civil society organizations that had issued statements 
declaring that the elections were neither free nor fair and did not meet 
internationally accepted standards.110 In addition, warnings were issued to the 
independent media by the President not to "stir up trouble." 
The swift detention of several civil society leaders, the raiding of offices, 
freezing of bank accounts, and charges of receiving money from a foreign 
government without presidential approval, were characteristic features of this 
practice which was initiated immediately following President Chiluba's inaugural 
address, wherein he said he would not tolerate interference by foreign supported 
nongovernmental organizations.111 A number of opposition political party leaders 
were also harassed and/or threatened with arrest or deportation. These actions by 
the MMD government were closely followed by the cabinet being dissolved and the 
president issuing a statement that he would be running the country with the 
assistance of the military and civil servants. While such a state of affairs only lasted 
a few days, that statement initially raised fears among many in the opposition of a 
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palace coup having occurred, and was therefore further testimony to the creeping 
authoritarianism inherent in the form of presidentalism practiced by the MMD 
despite their manifesto promises. Moreover, because of the continued use of a 
military alert beyond the election period, rumors of an attempted coup d'etat were 
a constant in the charged political atmosphere. 
The November elections' impact on Zambia's political landscape led to 
greater political fragmentation by giving rise to old divisions in a new era. Those 
divisions were somewhat held in check under the one party state through Kaunda's 
political patronage system.112 
As a result of the November 1996 elections and the process leading up to 
it, at least five key implications can be identified which undoubtedly will have an 
impact on future democratic developments in Zambia. 
First, the enormous social and economic problems confronting Zambia 
cannot be addressed without cooperation between the important political groupings 
in the country. If problems are not addressed it could halt any progress made 
toward democratic consolidation in Zambia. Foreign assistance has been declining 
and it is likely to continue in that direction as donors will begin to set priorities in 
the Southern Africa region and begin focusing on countries such as South Africa 
and Angola. 
Second, the blurred distinction between the state and the party in the use 
of public resources, especially the government-controlled media, makes the political 
playing field so unleveled that the opposition political parties and civil society 
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organizations will continue to find it difficult to challenge the MMD government 
on essential public policy issues. 
Third, the level of organization among the opposition political parties in 
Zambia is discouraging. When one considers the precept that for the liberal 
democratic project to work, a strong opposition capable of challenging the ruling 
party and of forming government, ought to exist (if elected). The likely vacuum 
will continue to be filled by civil society organizations until a broad base social 
movement or a reformed UNIP emerges. 
Fourth, based on the actions of the MMD in the 1995-96 period, and since 
the 1996 elections, it is clear that there will be less tolerance and space for political 
dissent in the country, thereby creating conditions where extra-legal options will 
more than likely be considered by some political groupings. The immediate post¬ 
election conduct of the ruling party has already been marked by repressive 
activities by State security agencies against civil society organizations, who merely 
issued statements declaring that the elections were neither free nor fair, and did not 
meet internationally accepted standards. Such behavior by the MMD government 
suggests that not much time was spent enjoying a landslide victory. 
Fifth, and finally, the ability of the donor countries or SADC to influence 
developments in Zambia, or to hold in check the anti-democratic tendencies 
prevalent among MMD leadership, calls into question the use of conditionalities 
associated with foreign assistance and the role of regional organizations with 
respect to democratic consolidation in member states. In fact, it would seem 
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reasonable, based on the behavior of the donors, that the MMD steadfast position 
on structural adjustment was given more priority over the shortcoming in the good 
governance area. At the same time the question must be raised, are there some 
actions by foreign governments that do go too far when it comes to democracy 
assistance? Or is it possible that conditionalities only work when the leadership of 
the recipient country believes that they can be disciplined in some manner? 
Conclusion 
The basic premise of this chapter is that during the all important second 
election, a free and fair and acceptable electoral process was not realized because 
of the irregular and unequal playing field imposed and maintained by the MMD 
government a number of months before the actual election date. Moreover, there 
are serious implications for future democratic development in Zambia based on the 
ruling party's response to many of the obvious shortcomings of the electoral 
process, a number of which were pointed out by opposition political parties and 
civil society leaders, some of whom were key organizers of the original Movement 
for Multiparty Democracy. 
With respect to the democracy assistance provided by the United States, 
the chapter described how the various components of the Zambia Democratic 
Governance Project affected the all important second set of national multiparty 
elections. While it is true that the MMD bears a tremendous responsibility for the 
un-democratic slide, it must also be noted that the authoritarianism manifesting 
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itself in Lusaka was at once ignored time and time again by the donor, and 
reinforced by an insistence on the implementation of draconian social and economic 
policies. 
The events surrounding the 1996 elections suggest that United States' 
democracy assistance did not have the impact that the implementors believed that 
it did, given that a majority of the people failed to participate in the political 
process, did not understand their rights any better and did not attempt to exercise 
them when clear violations of their rights occurred. This included some of the 
organizations that were supposed to be implementing the civics education process. 
The November elections also raise several other important questions for 
those providing democracy assistance. Primary among them are the following: 
□ What should institutions dedicated to democratic development do when 
the political party claiming to be ushering in the new era of democratic 
dispensation becomes a repressive authoritarian regime instead? 
□ How should donors respond when the policy of economic restructuring 
is proceeding along the lines agreed upon, however, the process of 
political liberalization has stalled, or even gone into reverse? 
□ What may be legitimate points of engagement with a governing party 
even if the democratic process is stymied by its anti-democratic practices? 
United States Policy Options and the November Elections 
Because of the November elections and the growing authoritarianism of 
the Chibula government, United States foreign policy officials faced the following 
policy options with respect to U.S./ Zambia relations: 
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1. Continue to support the MMD regardless of its governance shortcoming 
because of the adherence to IFI's Structural Adjustment Program and the 
possible regional role of the country in various peace processes; 
2. Support new emerging political leadership such as that found in the 
Zambian Democratic Congress or other as of yet unformed political 
groupings as an alternative to the MMD and UNIP; 
3. Support a return of UNIP and Kaunda to power; 
4. End all bilateral assistance and multilateral support for other foreign 
assistance to Zambia, excluding humanitarian aid; 
It appears that the United States government chose option one, i.e., to 
continue to support the MMD government despite its shortcomings in the "good 
governance" area and because of its adherence to the neo-liberal economic reforms 
suggested by the international financial institutions, and supported by the Western 
donor states. 
We shall now turn to the final chapter and briefly outline what the 
implementors had to say in specified areas, Zambian perceptions of their work, and 





1. Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in Zambia November 18th 1996: A 
Report by the Committee for a Clean Campaign (Lusaka: Committee for a Clean 
Campaign, 1996). 
2. Human Rights Watch/ Africa, Zambia: Elections and Human Rights in the 
Third Republic 8 (December 1996): 10. 
3. Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in Zambia, 47. 
4. Ibid., 39-44. 
5. Ibid. 
6. Ibid., 129-132. 
7. Ibid., 80. 
8. Ibid., 39. 
9. Ibid. 
10. Ibid. 
11. Ibid., 42. 
12. Elections and Human Rights in the Third Republic, 39. 
13. Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in Zambia, 48. 
14. Ibid., 47. 
15. Ibid., 38-40. 




19. Interview with Alfred Zulu, Executive Director ZIMT, Lusaka, June 19, 
1996. 
20. Elections and Human Rights in the Third Republic, 46. 
21. Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in Zambia, 60. 
22. Ibid., 42-43. 
23. Ibid., 52-53. 
24. Ibid., 127. 
25. Ibid., 8. 
26. Lynn Duke, "Disaffected In Zambia," Washington Post, 12 September 
1995. 
27. Elections and Human Rights in The Third Republic, 46. 
28. Oxfam America, "The Impact of Structural Adjustment on Community 
Life: Undoing Development" (Boston: Oxfam America, 1997), 2. 
29. "The Treason Trial," The Post, 4-8, November 1996. 
30. Interview with Mike Kaira, Lusaka, Zambia, June 20,1996. 
31. Elections and Human Rights in the Third Republic, 28. 
32. Ibid. 
33. Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in Zambia, 82. 
34. A number of opposition parties actually filed papers in the High Court 
arguing that the president's real name was not Frederick Chiluba. During the trial 
the salaries of judges were increased, thereby raising further concern regarding the 
impartiality of the judiciary on that matter. 
35. The complaint by the opposition argued that Chiluba had not given 
correct information regarding his place of birth, parentage and that he used a voter 
roll and election administration that favored him. 
36. Ibid., 27-29. 
37. Ibid., 19-21. 
330 
57. Ibid., 52. 
58. Interview with Aswal Banda, Secretary General, Zambian Democratic 
Congress, June 15,1996. 
59. Ibid. 
60. Interview with Aka Lewanika, Lusaka, November 23,1996. 
61. Elections and Human Rights in the Third Republic, 10. 
62. Interview with Dr. Kenneth Kaunda, Lusaka, November 26,1996. 
63. Interview with Mwatiszo Wakumelo, MMD Elections Coordinator, 
Lusaka, November 24,1996. 
64. Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in Zambia, 65-68. 
65. Elections and Human Rights in the Third Republic, 26. 
66. Ibid., 27. 




71. Interview with Khalia Kunda, Executive Director FODEP, Lusaka, 
November 25,1996. 
72. Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in Zambia, 58. 
73. Ibid. 
74. Ibid., 53. 
75. Ibid., 59. 
76. Ibid., 43. 
77. Committee for a Clean Campaign, 32-33. 
78. Ibid., 137-8. 
331 
79. Ibid. 
80. "Tens of Thousands Turn Up to Vote," Times of Zambia, 19 November 
1996,1. 
81. Michael Bratton and Daniel Posner, "A First Look at Second Elections in Africa, 
with Illustrations from Zambia," in State Conflict and Democracy in Africa, ed. Richard 
Joseph (Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1998), 22. 
82. Elections and Human Rights in the Third Republic, 39. 
83. In discussions with several visiting Zambian members of Parliament at 
the Africa America Institute in April, 1999, a view was expressed by the group that 
tiie National Elections were seen at the time as being more important them the local 
elections by the MMD government 
84. "Voters' Drive to Run for 30 More Days," Times of Zambia, 11 January 
1996, 1. The exercise was extended three times in part because of the low 
participation and the problems associated with the registration process itself. 
85. Elections and Human Rights in the Third Republic, 40. 
86. Ibid. 
87. Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in Zambia, 48. 
88. Ibid. 
89. Elections and Human Rights in the Third Republic, 40. 
90. Ibid. 
91. Ibid., 78. 
92. Ibid. 
93. Interview with Ngande Mwanajiti, Chairperson of the Committee for 
a Clean Campaign, Lusaka, Zambia, November 24,1996. 
94. Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in Zambia, 70. 
95. "Elections Were Rigged, Maintains NP," The Post, 20 December 1996,1., 
and "Polls Rigged, Cries Dean," The Post, 20 November 1996,1. 
332 
96. National Democratic Institute, "Statement by NDI President Kenneth 
Wollack on Suspension of Program Activities in Zambia," Washington, D.C., June 
17,1996. 
97. European Union, "Declaration by the Presidency on Behalf of the 
European Union on the Elections in Zambia," November 21,1996. 
98. FODEP and ZIMT were also part of the CCC. 
99. Ibid., xviii. 
100. Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in Zambia, 188. 
101. Ibid., 74. 
102. Ibid., 78. 
103. Ibid., 79. 




108. Ibid., 80-83. 
109. Bratton and Posner, 22. 
110. Ibid., 80-81. 
111. Ibid., 83. 
112. This even caused divisions in the MMD as several members of Indian 
descent resigned from top positions in the party. 
CHAPTER VII 
THE IMPACT AND EFFECTS OF THE UNITED STATES' 
DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM ON THE 
DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS IN ZAMBIA 
Introduction 
This study has attempted to examine the problematic of United States 
democracy assistance and its relationship to the democratic transition in the 
Republic of Zambia during the years 1992-1997. In this chapter, the major findings 
and conclusions drawn from the study are presented. In addition, the principal 
limitations of the study and a few recommendations regarding further research on 
the topic of United States democracy assistance in Africa are identified and 
presented. 
Research Findings 
Each of the five research questions initially contemplated by the researcher 
was answered during the course of the study. Therefore, it is only necessary to 
present the answers here in summary fashion. 
In Chapter IV the question regarding what has motivated the recent United 
States interest in promoting democracy in Zambia was answered. Specifically, the 
study revealed how democracy promotion has become a central tenet of both post- 
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Cold War United States administrations. Moreover, the study suggests that the 
Zambia Democracy and Governance Project was to be a prototype for United States 
democratic assistance projects in Africa. 
Also, Chapter IV showed the prevailing concepts, main instruments and 
strategy the United States employed in providing its democracy assistance 
generally, and to Zambia in particular, were analyzed. The study's findings in this 
area suggests that the approach taken in Zambia was consistent with the general 
global democracy assistance approach adopted by the United States Agency for 
International Development in the early part of the 1990s. Additionally, in Chapter 
IV the question of what were the main focal points of United States' democracy 
assistance to Zambia was addressed. The study revealed a remarkable consistency 
with the "checklist approach" identified by Carothers. It was also apparent that in 
tiie Zambian case an attempt was made by USAID to implement, either through 
contractors, grantees or directly, all aspects of the designed program except for the 
legislative component of the identified focal points. This proved to be one of the 
most glaring weaknesses of the program given the central role of the National 
Assembly, at that time, in the democratic development of the country. Further, it 
seems as if the main reason for the program being stalled was not because of 
changing personnel, but because of a personality clash between the Speaker and the 
USAID identified liaison person as well as the inability of the democracy and 
governance project to see Zambians as full partners who might have something to 
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say about the design, implementation and evaluation of the legislative performance 
component. 
Finally, in Chapters V and VI the questions of what program activities took 
place and what their importance was for the Zambian political process is addressed. 
Moreover, those chapters attempt to place in perspective the extent to which there 
has been United States policy incompatibility in the area of economic liberalization 
and political liberalization, and how has this affected the Zambian democratization 
process were addressed. In those two chapters, it became apparent that United 
States policy options in the economic and political sectors did not consider the 
impact each had on the other in spite of one of the initial assumptions of the 
democracy and governance project which read, "[the] Government of Zambia's 
economic reform program provides tangible improvements in mass living 
standards."1 In addition, the study suggests that there is no evidence of any 
tangible contribution made to the democratic transition in Zambia by the five-year 
period, $15 million dollar United States democracy and governance project, save 
for some of the outstanding work carried out in the civil society sector. Even in that 
sector, the study revealed that most of that work was only modestly correlated to 
improving citizen participation in the political process. 
The Impact of the U.S. Democracy Assistance Program 
United States' democracy assistance to the Zambian democratization 
process was expected to contribute to sustainable economic development and 
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ensure broader citizen participation in public decision-making. In Chapter V it was 
shown that many of the democracy and governance project's objectives, as outlined, 
were for the most part met according to the implementors. To a great degree, this 
is true. Nevertheless, the actual impact of the program suggest something more. 
As pointed out in Chapter V, several of the assumptions underlying the 
project's design were simply erroneous. For example, the assumption that the 
people of Zambia will take advantage of a liberalized political environment to 
participate in elections and policy debates. Although a reasonable expectation, 
there was no evidence that a strong correlation existed between a liberalized 
political environment and greater citizens participation in elections or policy 
debates in Zambia. In fact, the space for participation in policy debates was non¬ 
existent under the MMD dominated government and the apathy, growing 
alienation and dwindling participation was evident in by-elections even before the 
national elections of 1996 despite the civic education activities of a number of civil 
society organizations. The broad-based and independent action of civil society 
organizations around the development of the "Green Paper," outlining citizens 
views on the constitutional reform process, was completely ignored by the 
government. 
Perhaps the most glaring mistaken assumption was the view that the 
Zambian government's economic reform program would provide tangible 
improvements in mass living standards. Even if conceived of in the "long term," the 
project designers must have been living on another planet to articulated, let alone, 
337 
believe that to be true. There was no way to conceive of any substantive 
improvements in mass living standards over the five year period, especially when 
a vigorous structural adjustment program was being implemented by one of 
Africa's and the world's most indebted countries. Moreover, the U.S. democracy 
assistance program and the economic reform support in the area of privatization 
should have suggested that part of the regular impact of an IMF structural 
adjustment program includes closing down of industries, increased unemployment, 
reduction of the civil service and increased poverty and therefore, especially in the 
immediate period, a worse standard of living not an improved one. Given that 
USAID strategic objective number one was the reduction of the Zambian 
government's involvement in the economy, it makes little sense for there not to have 
been a more fundamental and lucid understanding of the political impact of the 
neo-liberal economic reforms encouraged by United States foreign policy on the 
Zambian people and the Zambian democratization process. 
The structural adjustment program has had a tremendously negative 
impact on the life chances of Zambian citizens. It has led to worse medical care not 
better as claimed by United States officials. The neo-liberal economic policies have 
assisted in the destruction of the educational system causing parents to make 
choices between which child to educate and which one to put on the streets. 
Unemployment has quadrupled and even the informal economy cannot absorb all 
the former workers and the newly available workers. Unemployment has 
obviously affected people's access to decent housing and basic foodstuffs. There 
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has been an astronomical increase in crime, drug abuse and prostitution according 
to non-governmental organizations who have been monitoring these areas over 
time. Most maintain that the latter have been some of the most visible results of the 
macroeconomic stabilization programs. The HIV/ AIDS crisis is so grave that the 
disappearance of the Zambian people is more possible today than at any other time 
in their history. As a result of all of the above factors, insecurity and fear of the 
future is griping the entire country and the political leaders have no solutions to 
offer. 
Privatization has been a disastrous failure given tire large number of 
company failures that have occurred shortly after they were privatized. Of course, 
the failure of many of these companies is blamed on the lack of managerial tenacity 
rather than unsound policy prescriptions. At best, the privatization program has 
only meant the ownership of large sectors of the Zambian economy being 
transferred from public ownership to private ownership, mainly by pent-up capital 
from the white South African. Some of whom have not accepted a post-apartheid 
South Africa, therefore bringing with them business practices and policies that 
ought to offend the sensibilities of most decent human beings. 
Given that a "National Development Plan" does not exist, some government 
officials and citizens mistook the Structural Adjustment Program to be that. It 
ought to be painfully clear to all, especially those in the Zambian democratic 
movement, that macroeconomic stabilization is not a national development plan 
and that little, if any attention, has been given to the social and human dimensions 
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which has led to mass alienation from the Zambian state's social policies and public 
institutions. 
The contractors and grantees who worked on the Governance and 
Democracy program in Zambia all believed that they succeed in meeting their 
program objectives. Southern University said, 
As revealed in both the mid-term review and the final evaluation, the 
implementation of most of the activities of the D/G Project were quite 
successful. However, it is the perception of Southern University that a more 
successful project could have been possible if there had been greater 
communication with USAID's largest partner, GRZ. Had die Project 
Management Board that is described in Southern University's cooperative 
agreement with USAID functioned, there would have been greater 
understanding of the expectations of each partner.2 
This does beg the question of how should U.S. assistance programs be evaluated not 
only by the assistance providers but by the recipients as well. 
With respect to the methods of implementation, i. e., training techniques, 
monitoring, the study suggests that the program did not provide much in the way 
of direct transfer of skills except for scholarships given to a few students to obtain 
masters degrees in communications. Perhaps this would not have been the case if 
more Zambians were involved in design, implementation and evaluation of the 
project 
There was little Zambian ownership of the overall project. In fact, the 
government's attitude toward the U.S. democracy assistance program changed 
dramatically as many of the original democrats in the MMD leadership left. The 
result was the governing party perceiving the U.S. program with suspicion and 
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viewing it as interference. The posture adopted by the MMD government in the 
period immediately following the November 1996 elections suggests that the party's 
attitude toward the United States had also become quite similar to that of Kaunda's 
UNIP just before and after the October 1991 elections. At the same time, there was 
little effort made to officially involve the government or Zambian organizations in 
the direct management or oversight of the program. 
The management of the project was complicated to begin with and made 
more complicated because it was not a good idea to have one of the organizations 
who bid on the contract to be the evaluators of the project. Tension in the 
relationship was apparent even at the close of the project. A brief quote from the 
final report of Southern University will suffice to show that tension. 
In February 1997, four months before the PAU was expected to close and six 
months before the Zambia D/G Project was expected to close, a final evaluation 
was undertaken by external assessors. From the PAU's viewpoint, it is 
doubtful that the external assessors were able to determine the extent to which 
activities implemented by the PAU have been effective since very little time 
was spent at the PAU or with beneficiaries of PAU/USAID assistance. It 
appeared that more time was spent assessing the political climate in the 
country than the effectiveness of the Project.3 
Southern University's assessment of the Michigan State-sponsored 
evaluator's activities goes further and argues, 
The evaluations of the Project, particularly the components managed by 
Southern University, certainly took into consideration the change in component 
management during the life of the D/G Project. Of course, one questions how 
implementors of project components can be evaluators. The mid-term review, 
nevertheless, was comprehensive and attempted to reach the beneficiaries of 
the project activities to determine impact. It is unfortunate that no feedback 
relative to the recommendations from the evaluation was ever provided to the 
Chief of Party of the PAU. What happened to the findings of the mid-term 
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review? Was the information useful? Were the recommendations 
implemented? Should they have been? Although the scope of the work for the 
final evaluation was accessible to Southern University, there was little evidence 
that the final evaluation team operated within the framework of the scope of 
the work. No new information was acquired about the PAU activities since the 
mid-term review. Did the PAU make adjustments to the management of 
activities as stipulated in the mid-term review recommendations? Did USAID? 
Although these questions will remain unanswered for Southern University, 
they do not have to remain unanswered for future D/G activities.4 
Moreover, the failure to incorporate representatives of the Zambian government or 
society into project implementation and monitoring, who were not in a subordinate 
position or directly benefitting from the project in anyway, could be seen as another 
inexcusable blunder. Knowledge and trust of the program were the first casualties, 
despite regular meeting and briefings on developments. This was a particularly 
sore point to the Southern University team. They observed, 
Many differences between the approaches taken by the U.S. Mission 
toward the implementation of the Zambia D/G Project and the contribution 
toward democracy that GRZ expected from the U.S. government could have 
been mitigated if the Project Management Board that is described on page 26 
of the cooperative agreement between USAID and Southern University had 
been established, this Board, of which the PAU would have served as the 
secretariat, would have been the vehicle by which GRZ could have expressed 
their views on democracy in Zambia, their policies and the need for assistance 
toward the implementation of these policies. Rather, a Policy Advisory 
Committee which was comprised of representatives from the resident United 
States Country Team served as the mechanism through which USAID made 
final decisions on the implementation of D/ G Project activities. This committee 
neither had representation from GRZ nor the PAU, which implemented more 
than half of the D/G Project activities.5 
Southern University's recommendations are worth enumerating as many 
are consistent with observations made by critics of U. S. democracy assistance 
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programs based on concrete experiences in other countries. The recommendations 
are as follows: 
1. USAID Project design in Zambia should be developed with the Zambian 
government and in conjunction with the most relevant country program 
activities. 
2. At the project implementation stage, there needs to be a formal mechanism 
for continued dialogue with the Zambian Government, the U. S. 
government and the institutional contractor. 
3. If self-sustainability for any one of the organizations is to be achieved, 
practical mechanisms that lend themselves to self-sustainability should be 
deployed. 
4. All evaluations, especially those that take place before the final one, must 
be reviewed by all partners and implementation of recommendation 
collectively agreed upon. 
5. If the one-year extension will have as its objective the continuation of the 
promotion of civic education awareness, consideration should be given to 
the continued support of small, rural-based nongovernmental 
organizations. 
6. A follow-up should be considered for the civics education curriculum 
component to assess the extent to which pupils have acquired the 
knowledge proposed through the development of civics teaching material. 
7. With the D.G. Project's focus on civic education for the ordinary citizen, it 
may be apparent that ordinary citizens are more civically enlightened than 
the politicians. Perhaps future D/G Project components can provide 
greater emphasis on the civic enlightenment of politicians. 
8. Continued support should be provided to ZAMCOM which will no doubt 
become a regional media center for Southern Africa. 
9. Consideration should be given to a contractor for future implementation 
of D/ G Project activities. It is unlikely that USAID can effectively manage 
the implementation of activities because of the bureaucratic nature of their 
environment. 
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10. USAID Zambia should revitalize the re-engineering program so as to have 
greater communication with their partners and clients.6 
Finally, a challenge for the Zambian project, which was envisioned to be long¬ 
term in an U. S. democracy assistance sense, (i. e., five years), was the rotational 
leadership at USAID and the United States embassy. Consistent leadership and 
agreement on the overall program goals was not always apparent when it came to 
the governance and democracy project. Different views existed between the USAID 
Zambia director and the Democracy and Governance advisor and, from time to 
time, the U.S. embassy would express concerns regarding USAID's approach to 
"politically sensitive" issues. In short, some program changes or modifications 
occurred because of different USAID leadership and the typical rotation process. 
The media independence fiasco is a classic example. Southern University's 
observation here is again very revealing. The University's final report says, 
Prior to the establishment of the PAU, two activities had taken place: a) a 
feasibility study had been completed and b) an assessment of the equipment, 
which valued at over $1 M that would be used in the Media Resource Center 
was completed (based on the assessment prepared by a consultant contracted 
directly by USAID). . . the new USAID Director came to Zambia with mixed 
thoughts about providing any organization (potentially sound or not) with $1 
M worth of equipment. Consequently, when USAID (U.S. Government) 
wanted to make a statement to the GRZ relative to its dissatisfaction with the 
progress toward democracy in Zambia, a press conference was held 
announcing several budget cuts in the D/G Project (including NDI's activities), 
the budget was cut for ZAMCOM equipment from $1 M to $ 500,000. Shortly 
after the announcement of the ZAMCOM equipment budget cut, authorization 
was given to the PAU from USAID Zambia and Botswana (although the 
USAID/Zambia Director denied having approved the procurement) to 
purchase computer equipment only (because ZAMCOM had been waiting over 
a year to conduct the desktop publishing workshop). The remainder of the 
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equipment could not be purchased until ZAMCOM was an official educational 
trust.7 
This study has confirmed many of the conclusions drawn about challenges 
confronting United States' democracy assistance programs from the Romanian 
experience examined by Thomas Carothers. There are four critical observations 
made by Carothers that are directly applicable to the Zambian situation. First 
Carothers argues, 
It is clearly time to move away from the non-developmental approach that 
has characterized such assistance since 1989. Heavy reliance on visiting US 
experts, U.S. local representatives, short-term training, one-time conferences, 
and the like was probably inevitable in the initial period after 1989, when the 
U.S. assistance providers were trying to get assistance rapidly under way in 
countries with which they were largely unfamiliar... however, such methods 
no longer have much place and are wearing badly in the recipient countries.8 
Second, Carothers suggests that democracy assistance organizations need to 
provide more direct support to people and organizations as oppose to going 
through intermediaries. Carothers argues, 
U. S. assistance providers, particularly USAID, need to work on getting a 
much higher proportion of their aid directly to people and organizations in the 
recipient countries. This does not mean that U. S. intermediary organizations 
should have no role at all, but that their role should be substantially modified 
from being lead organizations in assistance projects to being technical partners 
working in collaboration with local organizations. U. S. intermediary 
organizations need to give far greater attention to local-capacity building. 
Local people need to be brought much more into the process of designing and 
implementing assistance, making decisions about the specific allocation of 
funds, and shaping the delivery of technical assistance.9 
A third critically important observation drawn by Carothers regarding United 
States' democracy assistance programs is that United States' democracy assistance 
providers need to alter their conceptions of the relationship between the society 
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providing the assistance and the society receiving the assistance. He argues that the 
"donors" must begin to understand that democracy assistance provides both 
societies a chance to work together on issues of mutual support rather than in a 
checklist manner for ingredients for democracy modeled on the providing nation. 
Carothers suggests, 
. . . assistance providers should back away from the institutional endpoints 
that make up the checklist approach and focus instead on a set of more general 
democratic values and processes, such as participation, representation, 
pluralism and openness. Under such an approach, democracy assistance 
programs would aim to promote these values and processes on the assumption 
that democracy will progress in a given country not when the socio-political 
institutions take on certain pre-defined forms, but when participation, 
representation, pluralism and openness increase. Such an approach cannot 
boast the definiteness that the checklist approach at least promises and that 
Americans want so badly. But it is better suited to the very modest amounts 
of assistance that the United States is actually providing, and it permits greater 
flexibility and local sensitivity with regard to actual programming.10 
Fourth, and most importantly, Carothers argues that the main point about effects 
is that the expectations must be brought into balance with the actual assistance 
provided and then against the political and development realities in the recipient 
countries. He notes, "the main point about effects is simply that we must bring our 
expectations about the impact of democracy assistance into line with the actual 
magnitude of our efforts."11 
In the Zambian situation, the expectations were simply out of sync with the 
Zambian political reality and existing political culture, almost naively so. 
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Conclusions, Limitations and Recommendations 
The Zambian situation also makes clear the fact that multiparty elections 
do not necessarily lead to greater tolerance, expanded participation, respect for the 
rule of law or more public accountability. In fact, it would not be unreasonable to 
say that the Zambian democratic process has been commandeered by a group of 
people whose democratic credentials were shoddy to begin with, but who have 
been supported by the international financial institutions. 
The MMD government has implemented political and economic policies 
that reflect the external control exercised by those financial institutions and Western 
donor countries over the economy and social policies. In addition, the authoritarian 
politics practiced by Chiluba and the MMD has been overlooked or excused 
because of blind faith in macroeconomic stabilization and hatred of anything that 
smacks of centralized state involvement in the economy. The discussion of a third 
presidential term by Chiluba personifies the transformation of the MMD into a 
shabby but more acceptable version of UNIP for the international financial 
institutions. 
Zambia's role in the Southern Africa region has gone from the prestigious 
role of being the recognized peacemaker to one of being the detached outcast. 
United States policy practices toward the Republic of Zambia during the 
period 1992-1997 suggest that it is more interested in establishing a politically stable 
environment where the appropriate commercial codes of conduct, functioning 
judicial system, and the effective application of the rule of law is in place to make 
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the country attractive to foreign investors who believe that "red tape," issues of 
property rights and the rate of return relative to risk have all been addressed. 
Secondly, the U. S. democracy assistance and economic reform assistance programs 
were more interested in Zambia meeting its financial obligations to the international 
financial institutions, i .e., debt servicing, rather than in seeing a MMD government 
responding to the popular democratic aspirations of Zambian citizens which more 
often than not ran counter to the dictates of the harsh economic and policy reforms 
associated with the structural adjustment program. Therefore, with respect to the 
issue of whether or not foreign funded democratization programs make a difference 
in the transformation of African political systems, the answer is yes and no. One 
could answer in the affirmative because it is clear from the Zambian case, from a 
neo-liberal perspective, the democracy assistance program did make a difference 
regarding the adoption of policies that helped to facilitate a liberalized economic 
system. At the same time, a categorical no can be provided as an answer when 
viewed from the perspective of a proposed political transformation that would 
provide for greater participation in public decisions, political and economic, that 
affect the actual life chances of citizens. 
The well-known reality is that the Zambian debt of more than seven billion 
dollars cannot be paid. The continued attempt to do so will only continue to lead 
to growing impoverishment of the masses of Zambian citizens and the country 
being sold piece by piece to foreign investors based on a blind faith in the invisible 
hand of the market. In addition, from a good governance point of view, the 
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imposition of the program given the heavy debt service burden of Zambia will only 
enhance the already manifested authoritarian tendencies of the governing party or 
any other party that remains committed to such a program. Because of this 
conditionalities could make a difference. However, the type of conditionalities 
presently conceived of would have to be changed in a fundamental way. New 
conditionalities could be associated with improved working conditions, with an 
expanded educational system or on the basis of adopting adequate health policies 
designed to address the needs of Zambians. 
The relationship between the state and civil society has been 
misunderstood, especially in the Zambian case. The liberal version suggest that the 
state can be held in check by organized and determined civil society organizations. 
That view idealizes civil society and underestimates the nature of the state 
especially the African neo-colonial state in the new global environment. In 
addition, it ignored the interplay between certain civil society organizations that are 
essentially part of the state apparatus. This is so because the state is basically run 
by the international financial institutions and transnational capital both of which 
are totally unaccountable to any one entity and only seek to make the social 
formation more hospitable for unimpeded capital flows in and out as quickly as 
possible and at the highest rate of return imaginable. The relationship between the 
state and civil society typified just before and in the immediate aftermath of the 
1996 elections. The MMD government created its own civil society organization 
and co-opted others to say that the elections were free and fair. And when the 
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authentic NGOs said that the elections were not free and fair and provided 
objective information to substance their claim, the full force of the state's repressive 
apparatuses; the security forces, the courts, and in this case the media went to work 
against them. The paradox of Zambian society is that civil society is weak and so 
are most of the country's political institutions, yet the state remains strong 
domestically, as it was during colonial days, but extremely weak in terms of its role 
in the international system. 
The Zambian pro-democracy movement has not attempted to overcome 
marginal issues and face the new challenge of moving forward beyond the 
disappointment of the MMD. Moreover, the pro-democracy movement's failure to 
adequately address the issue of leadership beyond personality was a critical 
mistake that has continued to characterize the movement. The pro-democracy 
movement, splintered as it is, most serious mistake has been its failure to 
conceptualize what substantive democratic change for Zambia will look like in a 
globalized era given the structural constraints confronting the country, even if the 
Zambian state and government were people centered. 
The task for the movement and its patriotic leadership is to articulate a new 
"Program of Action for Democratic Development" Key elements of such a program 
might include the following. 
People-centered participatory development, political and economic, must 
be the goal and process envisioned by any meaningful program of action. National 
focus groups in every province and district could produce the type of document 
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that every Zambia would be proud of and it could also be the type of national 
direction that all elected leaders would be accountable to regardless of their 
position or the level at which they operated. 
Political leadership could be seen as service, not as an opportunity to 
become the big man, the national chief, or great leader. Those models of leadership 
that were promoted since before independence are not only backward but would 
not promote new leadership that would be necessary for a sustained approach over 
time. 
Employment and education for the future must be tied together. The 
national education system must be overhauled. Education must be seen as an 
investment in the country's future. Therefore, a twenty-year plan is not beyond 
reason, especially given the scientific and technological breakthroughs that have 
already occurred and are bound to speed up in the new century. With respect to 
employment, the newly educated must find responsible and meaningful work. 
Working conditions must be humane and regulated. New forms of employment 
must be created by the government and supported by the captains of industry 
where none exists. 
The decentralization of political power, with the central government 
playing a coordinating role can ensure that national resources are not squandered 
but distributed in a balanced manner. Particularized development plans for each 
of the nine provinces could be developed by the people living there and supported 
by the central government. 
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Subsidized health care must be made available to all Zambian citizens once 
again. Preventative health care policies at the provincial level has to be given 
priority. A healthy population as a prerequisite for national development is not 
only a slogan but a truism. 
A National Youth Rehabilitation Project could begin to restore youth who 
have been damaged over the last decade. More than half the population is under 
18 years old. For Zambian youth, the options for existence must be expanded 
beyond being a prostitute and yard boy. Early childhood education must be 
restored and made mandatory and universal at the national level. 
Finally, a national economic development strategy must be complimentary 
to any plan of action for democratic development. While Zambia exist within an 
international system, its position in it and relationship to it must change. The debt 
has to be canceled if Zambia is to survive. A schedule of debt cancellation could be 
arrived at jointly by the government and the institutions to which Zambia is 
indebted. That schedule could reflect good governance benchmarks, proposed by 
the Zambian government (which are part of the plan of action for democratic 
development). Such benchmarks could include poverty alleviation, job creation and 
educational expansion. 
Western donors and the United States' democracy assistance programs 
could then be more tailored to assist with national development objectives as 
opposed to driving the process and projecting their own image of democratic 
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development. It would not even be a question of Zambian ownership because 
national consensus is the only way such a program could be realized. 
Perhaps the most cogent lesson learned from the Zambian Democracy and 
Governance Project should be that the donor community should not decide what is 
good for a country, whether in Africa or on another continent, with respect to 
designing, implementing, monitoring and evaluating democracy and good 
governance programs, simply because they provide the bulk of the funding. The 
attitude that they should is a particularly American and Western one that ought to 
be overcome. 
Limitations of the Study 
There were a few limitations of this study that must be appreciated. First, 
the researcher was not able to obtain a final copy of the USAID report on Zambian 
Democracy and Governance Project despite numerous attempts. Thus, the Southern 
University final report and interviews with Zambians became the main final 
statements on the project's developments and accomplishments. More surprisingly, 
FODEP, one of the main beneficiaries, never received a copy of the final report from 
Southern University or USAID. In addition, during the course of conducting the 
research, political developments that were connected to each other in Zambia 
continued to move at a very rapid pace. The attempted coup in 1997 has led to a 
more alarmed and paranoid MMD government. In spite of the failure of the so- 
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called "mickey mouse" coup, the root causes of the social discontent that produced, 
and would have supported a successful coup, still exists. 
A second important limitation and challenge of the study was the bad 
relationship between Southern University and USAID which meant that there were 
completely different views as to what was achieved and how certain processes were 
handled. In fact, the racial dynamic between some USAID officials and Southern 
University officials became a crucial issue as accusations of racial intolerance were 
made by Southern University to the regional USAID office in Botswana and 
headquaters office in Washington, D.C. Southern University officials believed that 
racial attitudes of some USAID officials influenced their behavior towards Zambian 
as well.12 
Future Challenges of Democratization in Zambia 
In conclusion, it must be noted that a clear concern among the opposition 
and civil society leaders exists which suggests that the Zambian democratic process 
is at a dangerous crossroads. Most believe that the seeds of the new emerging 
authoritarianism may have inadvertently been planted during the process of 
challenging the undemocratic one-party rule of UNIP and has grown through the 
form of presidentalism as practiced by the MMD government. The type of 
constitutionalism practiced in Zambia, through an MMD-dominated National 
Assembly and judiciary that is not totally independent, actually does serve to 
subvert the rule of law and counterpose it to the democratic yearnings of the 
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popular democratic movement. This has been and will continue to be a major 
challenge to the democratic forces in Zambia, both inside the MMD and outside of 
it. 
It is obvious that Zambia today is a "de facto" one-party state and the 
struggle for political power waged by the country's elites is rife with corruption as 
well as a general disregard for die democratic yearnings of the average citizen. 
Because of this most donors face a policy dilemma. If the donors were to withdraw 
their support from the MMD government, especially at a time when Zambia is 
presenting itself as the leader of a new front line that keeps the chaos of west and 
Central Africa from coming south, it is not clear what could happen. Moreover for 
the donors, there appears to be no alternative to the MMD. If, on the other hand, 
the donors continue to support the ruling party and ignore its obvious anti¬ 
democratic behavior, will they have rendered themselves ineffective? 
While donors must figure out their policy posture, the Zambian people are 
likely to revitalize the democratic movement in a new way and with the experience 
of the November 1996 elections under their belts. It seems rattier apparent from the 
foregoing that if external "prodding" is not forthcoming to compliment internal 
challenges for further democratization, Zambians may be in for another long period 
of depolitization, repressive manipulations and authoritarian rule. 
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Zambia and the Struggle for Democracy in Africa 
Zambia was projected as a model for democratic transitions in Africa after 
the dramatic MMD victory over Kaunda's UNIP in 1991. After almost ten years of 
being in power, it has become clear that Chiluba's MMD is not capable of leading 
the country toward the necessary national development. 
The Zambian democratic experience, to date, still does have significant 
meaning for Africa. The neo-liberal market democracy model has totally failed in 
Zambia. The rapid implementation of the structural adjustment program, 
privatization and the liquidation of state enterprises has led to a disaster that 
proportionately is just as bad as what has occurred in Russia and several other 
eastern European countries where the state was heavily involved in the economy. 
Time was not given to make a smooth transition, even if it were possible. Adequate 
time was not thought about with respect to establishing the prerequisites necessary 
to establish a market economy in Zambia. The macroeconomic policies ignore the 
condition of the very people who are suppose to benefit from them the most, the 
Zambian middle class. The Zambian middle class was largely located in the 
parastatal sector or civil service, generally. Many have been reduced to beggars or 
street vendors hawking their personal items to the highest bidder. 
The liberal view that there is a positive relationship between economic 
development and democratic development is not wrong. What is wrong is to see 
structural adjustment as an economic development program and to believe that 
capitalist development modeled after North America and Western Europe as the 
356 
only development paths. This critique has been stated before by African scholars 
such as Claude Ake. Ake points out the following about Africa policy debates in 
the United States. 
Writing in the Washington Post on 24 May 1990, Chester Crocker, former 
U.S. assistant secretary of state for African affairs, argued that structural 
adjustment programs 'are vital to the liberation of market forces, which in turn 
represent the building blocks of pluralist democracy.' This is a dangerous error. 
In African countries, structural adjustment entails draconian measures that are 
unpalatable and often disastrous. Unemployment and inflation rise steeply, yet 
at the same time subsides are removed and wages frozen. The combined effect 
of these measures can cause real incomes to fall as much as 50 percent. Given 
that 40 percent of the people in these countries already live below absolute 
poverty levels, structural adjustment does not entail minor inconvenience. 
These programs cause deep despair, widespread malnutrition, and premature 
death; as UNICEF reports indicate, much of the burden falls upon children. As 
should be expected, adjustment policies generate a great deal of political 
opposition even in countries like Gabon, which implemented a relatively 
moderate version In all cases, adjustment programs have been vigorously 
resisted by the public. To implement them, governments have been forced to 
resort to a large dose of coercion. For this reason, African regimes have become 
more, not less, authoritarian over the past decade.13 
The IMF and the World Bank have assisted the MMD government at 
crucial moments when the citizens of Zambia were campaigning to have their 
voices heard on economic decisions which would have to be implemented 
politically by parliament as directed by the international financial institutions. In 
other words, those institutions have contributed to the political authoritarianism 
being practiced in Zambia today. Again, this is nothing new and has been pointed 
out by Ake. 
The IFI has collaborated enthusiastically in this political authoritarianism. In 
Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth, the World Bank 
argued quite correctly that programs of action can be sustained only if they 
arise out of consensus built on dialogue within each country. Yet not once has 
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the Fund or the Bank encouraged discussion and consensus building before the 
introduction of structural adjustment programs. In every case, they were quite 
content to settle the issues with the president of the client country or his 
economics or finance minister. Having done so, they constantly urged the 
necessity of political will to carry out the program -a euphemism for its 
coercive imposition.14 
What this suggests is that the Zambian democratic movement must realize that 
political and economic democracy are part of the same process just as neo-liberal 
policy prescriptions proceed from a political economy orientation, so must the 
democratic movement. 
Finally, Zambia's contemporary meaning for Africa and the global 
democratic movement is clear. The demobilization, depolitization and opting out 
of the political process cannot be an option after those claiming to represent the 
democratic forces have been revealed as a "wolf in sheep's clothing." To do so 
almost guarantees the sacrifice of future generations at the alter of marginalized 
existence. Richard Joseph writing in the book, The Global Resurgence of Democracy 
has argued, 
People in many African nations have watched their standards of living 
drop steeply in recent years. In some cases, real earnings have fallen back to 
independence-era levels. Unless the new democracies can restore economic 
growth, they will face direct challenges from the very social forces that are 
currently undermining authoritarianism. . . . The new democracies will face 
the heightened expectations of their supporters. While they may be able to 
gain some breathing space to try and revive collapsed economies, the 
international community must be prepared to make generous assistance 
available to them, beginning with the cancellation of burdensome, unpayable 
debts that we contracted by corrupt, inept, and undemocratic governments. 
The emergent democracies will also have to address issues connected with 
democratization that go beyond the restoration of multiparty elections. 
Nigerian social scientist Ayesha Imam has pointed out that the state alone has 
not been responsible for denying basic rights-there are also "crisscrossing 
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networks of oppression" to be found in the economic, cultural, and religious 
spheres.15 
Zambian democrats must also constantly remember and appreciate what 
the accurate relationship is between capitalism and democracy if they are to move 
forward again. 
Democracy is not a fixed and finished system but a process of continual 
struggle and realization. Democratic gains are never absolutely secure. They 
can be rolled back if the contradictions of capitalism threaten to throw the 
system into crisis. The essence of capitalism, its raison d'etre, is not to build 
democracy, or help working people, or save the environment, or build homes 
for the homeless. Its goal is to convert nature into commodities and 
commodities into capital, to invest and accumulate, transmuting every part of 
the world into its own image for its own realization.16 
Such a sober understanding will assist the Zambian democratic movement in 
articulating policies that are in the best interest of the Zambian people as opposed 
to adopting policies that are in the best interest of global capital, especially if the 
struggle for democracy is indeed a struggle for power. 
Recommendations 
The Zambian pro-democracy movement must begin again to sort out 
differences and chart a new course for the survival of the Zambian people and the 
democratic process. Mature leadership is necessary because at certain points there 
can be a convergence of interest with the MMD government while at other points, 
in time, agreement on basic approaches to problem solving may be so far apart that 
it is impossible to even engage in dialogue on the matter. The issue of debt servicing 
is an example of the former. 
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A majority of the smaller Zambian political parties should dissolve and 
where possible join together to form several very formidable parties that are 
capable of representing the interest of the nation and particular regions. The 
continued presence and over reliance on political parties as a way to make a name 
for one's self continues to constrain the possibility for new and more dynamic 
leadership to emerge in other sectors. 
A basic needs strategy must be adopted by the government immediately, 
one that places a premium on the health status of the Zambian people from a 
holistic point of view. If the nation reoriented its productive capacity toward that 
end for one generation, perhaps, the country could make a dramatic turnaround 
and still be able to meet the challenges of living in a global economy. 
In the final analysis, Carothers is correct when he says, 
The answers to the various outstanding questions about democracy assistance 
obviously vary from country to country and region to region. A single-country 
case study inevitably sheds only limited light beyond the boundaries of tire 
particular country and region under examination. Nonetheless even some 
limited empirical grounding is useful as a start toward answering the broader 
questions. Moreover, the relatively centralized nature of the main U.S. aid 
providers, and the strong common framework of assumptions among them, 
leads to a certain sameness of assistance efforts across highly diverse recipient 
countries, rendering single country findings more widely relevant than might 
initially be expected.17 
In Zambia, "the Hour Has Come" again, and based on clear political facts, 
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